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This thesis explores how states bordering the Gulf of Guinea can cooperate in the 
exploitation, conservation and management of the region’s marine resources. Within 
the framework of international law generally, and the United Nations law of the Sea 
Convention (UNCLOS) in particular, the thesis demonstrates the legal basis for 
cooperation in four key areas: - maritime boundary delimitation, exploitation of non-
living marine resources of the seabed, protection of the marine environment from 
pollution arising out of such exploitation and the conservation and management of the 
living marine resources. The thesis applies a positivist analysis of international law, 
following a law-in-context approach. The key findings relate to challenges to the states’ 
duties to cooperate in the areas of delimiting their maritime boundaries due to the many 
maritime boundary disputes in the area and the lack of cooperative regimes for joint 
development of non-living resources. Another challenge identified is inadequate 
regional and national frameworks for the protection of the marine environment from 
pollution arising out of exploitation as well as for dealing with issues of liability from 
pollution incidents. Cooperation in the conservation and management of marine living 
resources is also insufficient. The thesis recommends regional and sub-regional 
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I. The Gulf of Guinea Region: Geography and Resources 
The Gulf of Guinea, is an area lying off the western coast of Central Africa.1 According 
to the International Hydrographic Organisation, its limits on the north and east, stretch 
from Cape Palmas (4°22'N - 7°44'W), in Liberia, eastward and southward, along the 
western coast of Central Africa, to Cape Lopez (0°37'S - 8°43'E), in Gabon.2 On the 
southwest, it stretches from Cape Lopez (0°37'S - 8°43'E), in Gabon, north-westward 
to Rolas Island in Sao Tome and Principe (0°01'S – 6°32'E); and continues from there 
north-westward to Cape Palmas (4°22'N - 7°44'W), in Liberia (see figure 1).3 The 
coastal states located in the area are Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and Gabon. The region is also 
home to several islands notable among which are the Equatorial Guinean Islands of 
Annobón and Bioko. Other small islands are Corisco, Elobey Grande and Elobey Chico. 
Sao Tome and Principe is an island nation consisting of two islands - Sao Tome and 
Principe4 
Figure 1: Gulf of Guinea Area 
 
Source: International Hydrographic Organisation, Names and Limits of Oceans and 
Seas (Draft 4th edn of S-23, IHB 2002) para. 1.9. 
 
1 International Hydrographic Organisation, Names and Limits of Oceans and Seas (Draft 4th edn of S-
23, IHB 2002) para. 1.9. 
2 ibid 
3 ibid 
4 John Misachi and others, 'Where is the Gulf of Guinea?' (WorldAtlas, 2020) 
<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/where-is-the-gulf-of-guinea.html> accessed 22 May 2020. 
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These states share in common the marine environment of the Gulf of Guinea with its 
non-living and living marine resources which are mostly transboundary in nature. The 
global framework for managing these resources as well as the marine environment is 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),5 and its Agreement 
for the implementation of the Provisions of the Convention of 10 December 1982 
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement).6 Together these instruments define the 
rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's oceans as 
well as the management of marine natural resources. All the states in the Gulf of Guinea 
are party to UNCLOS but, four of them7 are not party to the Fish Stocks Agreement 
which provides for states to cooperate in the management of straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks The states have enacted legislation to implement the Convention 
and these include claims to 200M Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).8 UNCLOS also 
requires states to deposit charts and lists of geographical coordinates of these zones with 
the UN Secretary General.9 However, four of them10 have not fulfilled this obligation 
which implies that there may be uncertainty where their perceived jurisdiction in the 
oceans begin and end.  
 
Regarding its marine resources, the Gulf of Guinea is a major marine region in terms of 
hydrocarbon, and fisheries resources. Regarding hydrocarbon resources, the area is 
currently the largest zone where African oil resources are located and, consequently, 
the main region where crude oil is produced and traded.11 Intense exploration activities 
are also underway for more discoveries.12 This expansion in exploration and 
exploitation of oil, has given rise to seismic surveys, drilling, dredging, installation of 
 
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS). 
6 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (adopted 4 August 1995, entered into force 11 December 2001) 2167 
UNTS 3 (Fish Stocks Agreement). 
7 Togo, Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea 
8See footnote 96 
9 UNCLOS art 16 (2), 75 (2) 
10 Togo, Benin, Cameroon and Nigeria  
11.Yoslán González, 'The Gulf of Guinea: The Future African Persian Gulf’' [2016] BJAS 85-105 
12 ‘Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis’ (GCLME 
Regional Coordinating Unit, February 2006) 104 
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oil rigs and other exploration and exploitation activities.13 The region is also home to a 
variety of marine living resources, and is a rich fishing ground which has attracted 
fishing trawlers from all over the world 14 The fishing business in the region provides a 
source of livelihood for the region’s artisanal fishers as well as foreign exchange for the 
states.15 Additionally it provides more than 50% of the protein needs of the region.16 
 
II. Challenges regarding marine resource exploitation, management and 
conservation 
However, there are challenges with respect to the effective exploitation of the resources. 
A fundamental one is that the states have not, in the majority of cases, delimited their 
maritime boundaries. Therefore, ocean space has not been allocated making it uncertain 
which states have sovereignty or sovereign rights over a maritime area, leading to 
uncertainty of title and disputes between them. This has negatively affected the states’ 
ability to exploit the resources. Some oil producing states in the region which have not 
yet delimited their maritime boundaries with their neighbours, use boundaries 
developed by their experts for exploration and exploitation of oil. For instance, for about 
50 years, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire in their oil activities, such as the granting of oil 
concessions, seismic surveys, and drilling operations, used a line which corresponded 
to an equidistance line between the two states.17  
 
Similarly Nigeria and Cameroon used a boundary for their oil concessions before 
Cameroon initiated proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) respecting 
the maritime boundary between the two states.18 Nigeria therefore argued that 
Cameroon’s claim to a maritime boundary should have taken account of the wells and 




15 Ibid p. 33 
16Ibid p.53  
17Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the 
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire) (ITLOS, Sept 23, 2017) Para.213. 
18 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening) (Merits) [2004] ICJ Rep 411. 
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status quo in this respect should not be changed.19 In the same case, Equatorial Guinea 
which intervened in the proceedings alluded to the fact that Cameroon had accepted the 
median line as the boundary between them and had never protested the many state 
actions authorised by Equatorial Guinea on its  side of  the boundary, including the 
issuance of oil concessions and the active exploitation of continental shelf resources.20 
Also Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea found that the Nigerian oil concession line and that 
of Equatorial Guinea agree with each other and so decided to use it as the basis for their 
maritime boundary agreement.21 Nevertheless, it appears to be the understanding that 
such boundaries are not permanent maritime boundaries, in the absence of a formal 
negotiated agreement. This was illustrated in the Ghana /Cote d’Ivoire case, when 
Ghana made the argument that the oil line had been tacitly agreed.22Thus, there is 
always an underlying dispute brewing with the constant threat of an eruption especially 
when major oil discoveries are made in the area.23 This raises the issue of the obligations 
states have under UNCLOS in undelimited areas, one of which is for them to make 
interim arrangements for exploiting the resources pending the delimitation of the 
boundary.24 However in the region, only a few of the states have decided to make such 
interim arrangements and these have generally not been as successful as expected.  
In spite of the lack of maritime boundaries the region has seen considerable exploitation 
of oil and gas in some states like Nigeria, and Ghana.25 This has brought in its wake, 
pollution of the marine environment. Currently in the region, there is a growing number 
of offshore platforms, export and import oil terminals and oil refineries are cited on the 
coast without proper effluent treatment plants.26 As oil pollution knows no boundaries, 
the whole region is exposed through these activities to the risk of major oil pollution 
incidents. The potential of future exploration and exploitation projects in the region is 
 
19 ibid para 256. 
20‘Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea,’ Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) [2001] ICJ Pleadings 
197-232.  
21 David Aworawo, ‘Decisive Thaw: The Changing Pattern of Relations between Nigeria and 
Equatorial Guinea, 1980-2005’ [2010] 1 Journal of International & Global Studies 99 
22 UNCLOS art 74(3), 83(3) 
23 This happened in the case of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire and eventually had to be settled by a Special 
Chamber of ITLOS in Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and 
Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire) (ITLOS, Sept 23, 2017) 
24 UNCLOS art 74(3) and 83(3) 
25 Monica Skaten, 'Ghana’s Oil Industry: Steady Growth in a Challenging Environment’ [2018] Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies <https://doi.org/10.26889/9781784671044> accessed 15 May 2020. 
26 ‘Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis’ (GCLME 
Regional Coordinating Unit, February 2006) 82 
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also likely to significantly increase the risk of pollution. Nonetheless, the regime for 
marine environmental protection from oil exploitation activities in the region is 
problematic. Additionally, the mechanism for dealing with liability for damages arising 
out of oil exploitation activities in the region is inadequate and makes the region ill 
prepared to cope with the liabilities that could arise out of any widespread accidental 
spill from oil exploitation and compensate victims who may be affected.27  
 
The exploitation of the marine living resources of the region, is also fraught with major 
problems as there is overexploitation of the resources due to overcapacity, the use of 
destructive fishing gear and Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing both in 
areas under national jurisdiction and on the high seas particularly from third parties 
from outside the region.28 The ability of the fisheries resources to replenish themselves 
is also being threatened by the destruction of important habitats.29 However, the regimes 
for conservation and management of the fisheries resources like in the case of the non-
living resources are inadequate and do not fully incorporate the UNCLOS regime which 
promotes regional cooperation. There is also poor implementation and enforcement of 
existing regulations. This has led to the depletion of the resources with consequential 
adverse impact on livelihoods of the region’s populations as well as food security. 
Additionally, failure to establish cooperative legal and institutional frameworks, both at 
the national and regional level, for area-based management measures like fishing 
refugia and ‘no take zones’ has contributed to the degradation of important habitats of 
fisheries which are found along the region’s coasts.  
 
To deal with these transboundary challenges, international law notably UNCLOS and 
the Fish Stocks Agreement prescribe that states cooperate bilaterally and at the regional 
level and through regional organisations. In compliance with these instruments, the 
states in the region have made some efforts at regional cooperation. However, 
concerning cooperation in the management and conservation of non-living resources, 
the states sharing these resources are not as forthcoming in cooperating for joint 
development regimes, as states in other regions, like the Persian Gulf and Southeast 
 
27 ibid 
28 Alfonso Daniels and others, 'Western Africa's Missing Fish' (odi.org 2016) 
<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10665.pdf> accessed 23 April 2020. 
29 ‘Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis’ (GCLME 
Regional Coordinating Unit, February 2006) 50 
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Asia, where it has been argued that there is a regional rule of customary law on joint 
development.30 To protect the marine environment, from pollution arising out of 
exploitation of hydrocarbons, the regional framework is the Convention for Co-
operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment 
of the West and Central African Region together with its Protocol Concerning 
Cooperation in Combating Pollution in Cases of Emergency (Abidjan Convention).31 
Its inadequacy to deal with the specific issue of marine pollution arising from 
exploitation and liability for damages arising from pollution necessitated the recently 
adopted Protocol on Environmental Norms and Standards for Offshore Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Exploitation Activities (Offshore Protocol).32 However, the 
incorporation and implementation of these regional mechanisms at the national level 
has proved a challenge for states due mainly to lack of capacity and the financial burden 
involved.33 Regarding the management and conservation of marine living resources the 
states have established cooperative regimes through a number of Regional Fisheries 
Bodies. However, a key issue is their fragmentation and lack of coordination.34 
 
III. Research objectives and scope of thesis 
This thesis explores how the states in the Gulf of Guinea can cooperate through bilateral 
and regional means in the 
a) delimitation of maritime boundaries,  
b) management and conservation of non-living marine resources,  
c) protection and preservation of the marine environment and 
d) management of the marine living resources  
This is done by examining the international legal obligations to cooperate in these areas. 
The main legal obligation to cooperate is provided in the provisions of UNCLOS and 
 
30 David Ong, ‘Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice 
or Customary International Law?’ (1999) 93:4 AJIL 804 
31 Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the West and Central African Region and Protocol concerning Cooperation in 
Combating Pollution in Cases of Emergency (adopted 23 March 1981, entered into force 4 August 
1984) (Abidjan Convention) < https://abidjanconvention.org/> accessed 23 April 2020 
32 Additional Protocol to the Abidjan Convention on Environmental Norms and Standards for Offshore 
Oil and Gas Exploration and Exploitation Activities (adopted 3 July 2019, not yet in force) 
<https://abidjanconvention.org/> accessed 23 April 2020. 
33 See Chapter Three para 3.7. 
34 See Chapter Four, para 4.3. 
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the Fish Stocks Agreement. General international law and the jurisprudence of 
international Courts and tribunals also contain obligations to cooperate. Under 
UNCLOS, the duty to cooperate in the delimitation of adjacent and opposite maritime 
boundaries, and the management of non-living marine resources is found in Articles 74 
(1), (3) and 83 (1), (3) dealing with the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
and the Continental Shelf respectively. By the said provisions, states are mandated to 
delimit their maritime boundaries by agreement and pending agreement make 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature. The obligation to agree on maritime 
boundaries implies cooperation by the states involved. Indeed, the Special Chamber in 
the Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire case was of the opinion that the obligation necessarily entails 
negotiations in good faith by the states. The Chamber further noted the importance of 
the obligation under UNCLOS and general international law and opined that 
cooperation is particularly relevant for states that conduct their maritime activities in 
close proximity.35 The other obligation to make provisional arrangements, also involves 
cooperation between states. Though the kinds of arrangements are not specified in the 
provisions, such practical arrangements are likely to pertain to cooperating in the form 
of joint arrangements for the exploitation and management of the non - living marine 
resources, as that is usually what motivates states in the first place to delimit their 
maritime boundaries.  
 
Regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment and the 
management of the marine living resources, the obligation to cooperate becomes even 
more pertinent to the Gulf of Guinea as a semi-enclosed sea under Article 122 of 
UNCLOS with shared resources and the risk of pollution occurring in one part of the 
region capable of spreading to other parts. Article 123 of UNCLOS provides in non-
mandatory terms that states in semi enclosed seas cooperate with each other in the 
exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under the Convention.36 
The provision further exhorts states to endeavour, to coordinate the management and 
conservation, of the marine living resources either directly or through an appropriate 
regional organisation and also cooperate to protect and preserve the marine 
 
35 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the 
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire) (ITLOS, Sept 23, 2017) para 604. 
36 The Gulf of Guinea’s status as a semi -enclosed sea is discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis 
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environment.37 Cooperation in the area of the management and conservation of living 
marine resources is particularly mandated by the Fish Stocks Agreement. It provides 
for states to cooperate directly and emphasises cooperation through Regional Fisheries 
Organisations. These regional bodies are expected to promote agreement between 
States for the conservation and development of straddling and highly migratory stocks, 
as well as their optimum utilisation.38 This situates Regional Fisheries Management 
Bodies at the centre of the regional cooperative regime. 
 
However, the specific obligations and standards of state conduct are not clear. Thus, 
international courts and tribunal have filled the gaps. In the context of maritime 
boundary delimitation, the North Sea Continental Shelf cases have decided that the duty 
to cooperate is a duty to negotiate in good faith.39 Regarding living resource 
conservation, the ITLOS Tribunal in the Bluefin Case decided that, under article 64, 
read together with articles 116 to 119, of UNCLOS, States Parties to the Convention 
have the duty to cooperate directly or through appropriate international organizations 
with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilisation 
of highly migratory species.40 Concerning cooperation in the management and 
conservation of the non-living resources, though there is no specific express provision 
to cooperate as in the case of living marine resources, the same principles found in 
Article 123 regarding the management and conservation of living resources can 
arguably be applied to the non-living resource as they are also shared resources.41 This 
is all the more relevant as states are exhorted to cooperate in in the exercise of their 
rights and obligation under the Convention which include the management of the non-
living resources. Regarding the protection of the marine environment, the tribunals in 
the Mox Plant42 and Land Reclamation43 cases, were emphatic, that the duty to 
cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the marine 
environment under Part XII of the UNCLOS and general international law and that 
 
37 UNCLOS art 123 
38 ibid 
39 ibid 
40 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), (Provisional Measures Order of 
27 August 1999) ITLOS Reports 1999, 293   
41 David Ong, ‘Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice 
or Customary International Law?’ (1999) 93:4 AJIL 783. 
42 MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), (Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001) ITLOS 
Reports 2001, 110  
43 Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) (Provisional Measures, 
Order of 8 October 2003) ITLOS Reports 2003, 25  
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rights arise therefrom which the Tribunal may consider appropriate to preserve under 
article 290 of the Convention.44 
 
In this regard the research objective is to explore how states can cooperate in the 
allocation, exploitation, and sustainable management of the non-living and living 
resources of the region as required by international law and UNCLOS. As UNCLOS 
emphasises the use of scientific data in the management of marine issues, the thesis also 
explores other management techniques rooted in science such as the Large Marine 
Ecosystem (LME) approach which might provide a tool for the enhancement of the 
regional cooperative approach. Incidentally UNCLOS does not expressly make 
reference to the large marine ecosystem approach. However, there are a number of 
implicit references to the approach in the Convention which may provide a legal basis 
for its use. Large marine ecosystems (LMEs) are described as “regional units for the 
conservation and management of living marine resources in accordance with the legal 
mandates of UNCLOS”.45 In the Preamble to the UNCLOS, it is noted that the problems 
of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.46 This 
acknowledges that the oceans and the living resources in them are an integral part of an 
ecosystem which are affected by the dangers of ocean pollution, overexploitation, and 
coastal habitat alteration.47  
 
The Convention also refers to the use of a science-based approach to decision making 
regarding uses and conservation of the marine environment.48 States are also to take 
into account the effects of fishery management measures on associated or dependent 
species.49 States are to adopt fisheries management measures on the basis of the best 
scientific evidence available and generally recommended international minimum 
standards.50 These all point to the fact that cooperation should be based on current 
scientific approaches to ocean management. The large marine ecosystem approach is 
also considered a science-based approach as envisaged under the Convention. This 
 
44ibid 
45 Kenneth Sherman, 'The Large Marine Ecosystem Concept: Research and Management Strategy for 
Living Marine Resources' [1991] 1 Ecological Applications 349. 
46 UNCLOS Preamble 
47 ‘Large Marine Ecosystems’ (CLME + Hub) < https://clmeplus.org/large-marine-ecosystems/> 
accessed 15 May 2020. 
48 UNCLOS art 197 and 200  
49 UNCLOS art 61 (2) 
50 UNCLOS art 119 
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approach uses competent regional organisations in its cooperative regimes as envisaged 
under UNCLOS.  
 
The concept of the LME approach is gradually gaining popularity and a number of 
international treaties applicable to the marine environment make specific reference to 
it.51 In the region these include the Abidjan Convention mentioned above, which is 
currently forging a partnership with the three LMEs located in the Convention area 
namely the Benguela, Canary and Guinea Currents. 52 The Gulf of Guinea States with 
the exception of Sao Tome and Principe are parties to the Convention and have made 
attempts to implement the LME approach in line with the requirements of the Abidjan 
Convention within the framework of the Interim Guinea Current Commission, a body 
set up to implement the LME approach to management of the marine environment and 
fisheries within the Guinea Current LME. 
 
As has been alluded to above, a common theme running through the thesis is 
regionalism in the context of ocean management. This concept has been defined by 
Alexander as “the management of oceans and their resources at the regional level.”53 
There are various types of regions delineated in the seas according to various factors 
and criteria.54 One type of region is defined by physical characteristics like sea surface 
temperature, ocean currents bathymetry, plankton concentration and upwelling among 
other oceanographic parameters.55Another type of region is the economic region 
defined by fishery and hydrocarbon resources and other mineral resources.56 The factors 
that determine the region’s boundaries are the location, extent and intensity of the 
economic activities. There are also management regions many of which have been 
associated with fishery resources and prevention of pollution of the marine 
 
51 Aldo Chircop and others, Ocean Yearbook (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 428 
52 UNEP, 'The Socioeconomics of the West, Central and Southern African Coastal Communities: A 
Synthesis of Studies Regarding Large Marine Ecosystems.' (researchgate.net, 5 September 2017) 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315755817_Addendum_The_SocioEconomics_of_the_West
_Central_and_Southern_African_Coastal_Communities_A_Synthesis_of_Studies_Regarding_Large_M
arine_Ecosystems> assessed 17 May 2020. 
53 Lewis Alexander, ‘Regionalism at Sea: Concept and Reality’ in Douglas Johnston (ed), 
Regionalization of the Law of the Sea (Ballinger Publishing Co, 1978) 3. 





environment. These are established by governments and the determination of their 
boundaries is on the basis of economic, political and oceanographic factors.57 The states 
determine a region within which to cooperate based on a management problem common 
to them which requires cooperation regarding regulation and enforcement measures to 
solve.58 The kinds of regional mechanisms also vary according to how flexible they are 
or how highly organised they are. Some arrangements have the power to make binding 
decisions whilst others are simply information sharing bodies. Where, as in the Gulf of 
Guinea, a number of states border a semi-enclosed sea and the challenges of the region 
need some kind of regulatory intervention, which is beyond the capability of a single 
state, new management regions will need to be established.59  
 
Within this framework, the existing regional arrangements are studied to assess their 
contribution to the management of the sustainable exploitation of the resources and 
suggestions are made on how to better enhance them. Thus, this research applies 
international law and regionalism to the problems associated with the sustainable 
management of non-living and living marine resources as well as the protection of the 
marine environment. The thesis demonstrates that regional cooperation takes different 
forms depending on the subject involved.  
 
In chapters one and two which deal with maritime delimitation, and joint exploitation 
of non-living marine resources respectively, regional cooperation is quite limited 
compared to regional cooperation in chapters three and four. In chapters one and two, 
cooperation is mainly between individual states delimiting the boundaries between them 
and making interim arrangements to exploit the non-living resources whilst the 
boundary delimitation is pending. The level of regional cooperation involved in these 
situations is limited to advisory and consultative bodies that can serve as a forum for 
states to discuss issues related to maritime delimitation and joint development as well 
as assist in settlement of disputes related thereto.  
 
However, in chapters three and four which deal with pollution of the environment and 




59 Ibid 301 
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the whole region and beyond due to the transboundary nature of pollution and the 
straddling and highly migratory nature of the fisheries resources. Thus, cooperation is 
examined in another framework involving another unit of analysis, based on science – 
the large marine ecosystem- which is ecologically rather than politically determined. It 
thus involves the area covered by the Guinea Current LME which subsumes the Gulf 
of Guinea.60 This approach is a methodology for monitoring, assessing and sustainably 
managing marine resources using five focal areas namely fish and fisheries, pollution 
and ecosystem health, productivity, socio - economic and governance. This therefore 
requires a holistic and integrated approach to the protection of the marine environment 
and the sustainable use of its living resources.61 
 
To achieve this objective, the main research questions addressed are: 
a) How states in the region can cooperate to delimit the maritime 
boundaries in the region in accordance with international law, the 
principles developed by international courts and tribunals and 
with the objective of achieving an equitable solution in a spirit of 
cooperation;  
b) How states in the Gulf of Guinea, can peacefully settle their 
maritime boundary disputes using international dispute 
settlement mechanisms and enhance cooperation through joint 
development in the exploitation of the non-living resources;  
c) In the exploitation of these resources how the states in the region 
can cooperate to protect the marine environment, from pollution 
arising out of the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas as 
 
60“Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) are relatively large areas of ocean space of about 200,000 km2 or 
more, adjacent to the continents in coastal waters and extending out seaward to the break or slope of the 
continental shelf or out to the seaward extent of a well-defined current system along coasts lacking 
continental shelves. LMEs are characterized by their unique undersea topography, current and water 
mass structure, marine productivity, and food chain interactions.” ‘What Are Large Marine Ecosystems 
(Lmes)?’ (Iwlearn.net, 2020) <https://iwlearn.net/marine/lmes> accessed 24 April 2020. The Guinea 
Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) extends from Bissagos Island (Guinea-Bissau) in the north 
to Cape Lopez (Gabon) and Angola in the south and is considered to include the Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZ) of sixteen countries, namely, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Sierra Leone and Togo. See 'Towards Ecosystem-Based Management 
of the Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem.' (United Nations Development Programme 2013). 
61 'Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis' (GCLME 
Regional Coordinating Unit 2006) 
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well as in dealing with issues of liability arising out of such 
pollution; and  
d) How the states can cooperate to manage the exploitation of the 
marine living resources of the region in a sustainable manner, 
through regional mechanisms to ensure their preservation for 
future generations.  
 
IV. Originality of the research 
The literature on the Gulf of Guinea deals mainly with maritime security, as an 
emerging issue due to the rampant cases of a contemporary form of piracy in the Gulf 
of Guinea which is believed to have developed over the past 25 years, as well as other 
crimes at sea which are being perpetuated on the sea routes in the Gulf of Guinea.62 
However issues of regional cooperation and management of transboundary shared 
marine living and non-living resources have not  received as much academic legal focus 
or are dealt with in a fragmented manner. This thesis on the other hand presents a 
comprehensive analysis of cooperation in the allocation and management of marine 
resources in the Gulf of Guinea. There is a focus on regional cooperation in four key 
areas - maritime boundary delimitation; the peaceful settlement of maritime boundary 
disputes and cooperation in the exploitation of non-living marine resources; the 
protection of the marine environment from pollution arising out of exploitation and the 
mechanism for dealing with liability for any harm caused in the course of exploitation; 
and the management and conservation of marine living resources.  
 
The thesis addresses in each of the chapters, how international law promotes 
cooperation- bilateral and regional - as the best solution to tackle the transboundary 
issues of resource management in the region. It demonstrates in practice how the global 
regulation is applied in the regional context of the Gulf of Guinea in the exploitation of 
the non-living and living marine resources. The thesis thereby makes a contribution to 
the literature on the Gulf of Guinea by assessing how far the states have succeeded in 
 
62 Some studies are: Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Johannes Riber Nordby, 'Maritime Security in the Gulf 
of Guinea' (Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House 2015); Ali Kamal-Deen, Maritime Security 
Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea (Brill 2015); Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi, 'Fault Lines In 
Maritime Security' (2013) 22 Afr. Secur. Rev.1–16. 
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their efforts at cooperation using these global instruments and identifying areas needing 
enhancement with the aim of achieving full regional solutions to the Gulf of Guinea’s 
resource management challenges. The proposals made may also be applied in regions 
with similar conservation and management challenges as the Gulf of Guinea, like the 




This thesis is a doctrinal research which involves analysing the current state of the 
international law of the sea from a positivist perspective but mindful of the law in its 
context. From this positivist perspective, it considers international law as the product of 
recognised law-making processes, which requires states giving consent. Within this 
framework the thesis utilises a combination of references to primary sources such as 
multilateral, regional and bilateral treaties, the cases of international courts and tribunals 
and references to handbooks and recent journal articles. Meeting documents of various 
regional bodies are also analysed. Secondary sources like scholarly books and articles 
which interpret and analyse the primary sources also feature significantly in this 
research as well as online resources. Information not publicly available was sourced 
from personal communication with officials of states and some of the regional bodies. 
However, these were often not structured interviews characteristic of empirical research 
methods. 
 
The legal research questions in the thesis are normative. They provide an evaluation of 
the legal state of affairs and offer legal solutions to the legal problems identified, namely 
the problems of delimiting maritime boundaries in a flexible and predictable manner, 
settling maritime boundary disputes, making provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature; protecting the marine environment from pollution arising out of exploitation; 
and managing the marine living resources, specifically fisheries, using the international 
law of the sea with particular reference to the 1982 UN Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 
Fish stocks agreement and other multilateral and regional instruments. This normative 
framework thus links existing research with the basis for the discussions or solutions 




The benefits of this approach is that it brings a clear understanding of particular legal 
issues and provides a foundation for the study of various socio-legal issues.63 Judges, 
lawyers and jurists need doctrinal legal research to develop principles to guide 
implementation of treaties and legislation which may need interpretation due to their 
ambiguous nature.64 However, there are pitfalls in utilising such a doctrinal approach. 
These include the limitations associated with the legal positivist approach, considering 
the uncertain scientific and social context within which this approach is applied. 
Therefore, this work takes into account that the law may need to be structured to address 
scientific uncertainly, through review and reporting procedures. There are also issues 
of lack of effective institutional frameworks at the regional and national levels, lack of 
financial resources and the political will of states to act as well as the lack of capacity 
to implement rules, principles and standards adopted through international and regional 
cooperation regarding the transboundary marine resources in the Gulf of Guinea. 
Conscious effort has therefore been made in this thesis to utilise the law-in-context 
approach referred to above to mitigate the rigidity of the doctrinal approach by taking 
due cognisance of such non-legal issues which are relevant to the legal processes being 
studied. 
 
VI. Structure of the Thesis 
The key argument reflected by the structure of this thesis is cooperation - regional and 
bilateral and its importance in all aspects of the sustainable management of the non-
living and living resources of the Gulf of Guinea as required by international law and 
UNCLOS. Chapter one emphasises that cooperation in maritime boundary delimitation 
is an important prerequisite for resource allocation, exploitation, and management. It 
discusses how states can delimit their maritime boundaries in accordance with 
international law and the principles and rules developed by international courts and 
tribunals. It also examines the state of maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of 
Guinea and the protracted maritime boundary disputes that are a hinderance to resource 
exploitation in the region. Some recommendations are made in the concluding part. 
 
The second chapter discusses how states can settle their maritime boundary disputes 
peacefully and promote cooperation by joint exploitation of the resources as required 
 




by UNCLOS. This also includes joint efforts to exploit non-living resources that 
straddle an agreed boundary. This is with the objective of identifying challenges that 
make cooperation in the exploitation difficult and to propose how cooperation can be 
enhanced by recourse to a regional framework.  
 
The third chapter follows from the discussion of exploitation of the non-living resources 
and focuses on the states’ obligations to protect and preserve of the marine environment 
from pollution arising out of oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities as 
required by international law. Due to the fact that pollution by such means knows no 
boundaries and can have a devastating effect on the entire region, the chapter 
emphasises the role of regional cooperation in the protection of the marine environment 
and regional mechanism for addressing issues of liability arising out of pollution. It 
assesses the cooperation efforts by the states in the region, identifies challenges and 
proffers suggestions to enhance regional cooperation.  
 
The fourth chapter explores how states in the Gulf of Guinea can cooperate as mandated 
by international law to sustainably manage the marine living resources with specific 
reference to fisheries which are transboundary in nature. The chapter has three parts, 
the first of which presents an overview of the international legal instruments that relate 
to fisheries conservation and management. The second part assesses the regional and 
national regulatory frameworks in the Gulf of Guinea that implement these global 
instruments. In so doing the challenges to management and conservation as well as the 
inadequacies of these regulatory frameworks, are identified and discussed. Based on 
this discussion and using examples from best practice, the third part is devoted to 
making proposals on the way forward within the framework of regional cooperation 
based on the LME approach to the management and conservation of fisheries. 
 
The concluding chapter of the thesis draws together the main arguments of the thesis 










COOPERATION IN THE DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES 
IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The Gulf of Guinea has more undelimited maritime boundaries than agreed 
boundaries.65 Nevertheless, all the states in the region have ratified the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which imposes obligations on states to delimit their 
maritime boundaries by agreement.66 Cooperation is therefore central to the allocation 
of marine jurisdictions. Further, in order to fulfil the other obligations in the Convention 
regarding the protection of the marine environment and the management of the marine 
resources, within the context of the Gulf of Guinea as a semi -enclosed sea,67 the states 
must have their boundaries in place. Knowing their respective jurisdictional areas would 
facilitate regional cooperation for these important tasks. It is important therefore to 
discuss cooperation in maritime boundary delimitation as a precursor to the discussions 
in the ensuing chapters on cooperation in the exploitation of non-living resources, 
protecting the marine environment from pollution arising out of exploitation and 
cooperation in the management of marine living resources. 
 
Attempts by states in the Gulf of Guinea to take advantage of the provisions under 
UNCLOS to make maritime jurisdictional claims, have resulted in many of the current 
disputes and conflicts over maritime jurisdictions in the area.68 Additionally, Article 76 
of UNCLOS, requires states to make submissions in respect of their continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles, within ten years from the date the Convention entered into 
force for that state. The risk of the deadline being missed and the perception that the 
extended shelf areas may be a reservoir of resource riches motivated states including 
 
65 See the section 1.4.1 of this chapter 
66 UNCLOS art 15, 74(1), 83(1) 
67 Lewis Alexander, ‘Regionalism and the law of the sea: The case of semi‐enclosed seas’ [1974], 2 
Ocean Dev&IntlL 151.  




the Gulf of Guinea states to make submissions for extended continental shelves.69 Many 
of these submissions overlap with one another since the States are located on shared 
continental margins, thereby giving rise to potential outer continental shelf boundary 
disputes which are likely to hinder resource development in the area.70 These disputes 
also hinder the implementation of the states’ obligations under international law and 
UNCLOS to cooperate in the allocation and management of marine resources as well 
as in the protection of the marine environment.71  
The maritime boundary conflicts that have arisen out of all these claims in the region 
have also proved difficult to settle for a variety of reasons. For instance, the geography 
of the region, shows islands belonging to one state located in the EEZ of another state.72 
There is also the complexity presented by protrusions along some parts of the coast and 
the presence of islands has also produced cut off effects for some states like Cameroon. 
Additionally, unresolved disputes over the sovereignty of some islands make the end 
points of some boundaries difficult to determine.73 Further, a number of the boundaries 
are complicated in that they cannot be resolved between just two states without the 
participation of third states, so that there are many outstanding tripoints to be settled in 
the region.  
As the main objective of delimiting the maritime boundaries in many cases is access to 
hydrocarbon resources, the practice of some of the states in the region is to utilise 
boundaries developed by their technical experts for exploration and exploitation of oil 
in the absence of an agreed maritime boundary. For instance for about 50 years, Ghana 
and Cote d’Ivoire in their oil activities, such as the granting of oil concessions, seismic 
surveys, and drilling operations, used a line which corresponds to an equidistance line 
between the two states.74 Similarly Nigeria and Cameroon used a boundary for their oil 
 
69 Robert van de Poll and Clive Schofield, 'A Seabed Scramble: A Global Overview of Extended 
Continental Shelf Submissions' (International Conference on Contentious Issues in UNCLOS – Surely 
Not? organised by the Advisory Board on the Law of the Sea (ABLOS)), Monaco at the International 
Hydrographic Bureau, 25-27 October 2010 <http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1635> accessed 17 May 
2020. 
70 ibid 
71 UNCLOS art 123. 
72 An example is the Equatorial Guinean island of Bioko located in Cameroon’s EEZ. 
73 Equatorial Guinea and Gabon dispute sovereignty of several small islets in Corisco Bay: Islote 
Mbane, Ile des Cocotiers and, possibly, Isla de Corisco. See Daniel Dzurek, ‘Gulf of Guinea Boundary 
Disputes’ [Spring 1999] IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 98. 
74Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the 
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire) (ITLOS, Sept 23 2017) Para.213. 
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concessions before Cameroon initiated proceedings at the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) respecting the maritime boundary between the two states. Nigeria therefore argued 
that even if Cameroon’s claim to Bakassi were valid, Cameroon’s claim to a maritime 
boundary should have taken account of the wells and other installations on each side of 
the line established by the oil practice and that the status quo in this respect should not 
be changed.75 In the same case, Equatorial Guinea which intervened in the proceedings 
alluded to the fact that Cameroon had accepted the median line as the boundary between 
them and had never protested the many state actions authorised by Equatorial Guinea 
on its  side of  the boundary, including the issuance of oil concessions and the active 
exploitation of continental shelf resources.76 Also Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea found 
that the Nigerian oil concession line and that of Equatorial Guinea agree with each other 
and so decided to use it as the basis for their maritime boundary agreement.77  
However, generally there is the understanding that such boundaries are not permanent 
maritime boundaries, in the absence of a formal negotiated agreement.78 Thus there is 
always an underlying dispute brewing with the constant threat of an eruption especially 
when major oil discoveries are made in the area.79 UNCLOS provides the framework 
for maritime boundary delimitation. Nevertheless, its provisions lack the necessary 
criteria for delimiting maritime boundaries, and international courts and tribunals have 
filled the gap by developing principles and practical methods for maritime boundary 
delimitation. This has arguably injected some predictability and flexibility into 
maritime boundary delimitation.80 Nevertheless, difficulties can arise as a result of 
states interpreting the principles of UNCLOS subjectively without regard to the 
jurisprudence developed by international courts and tribunals.  
 
 
75 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon / Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening) (Merits) [2002] 1CJ Rep 303 at 427 para 256. 
76. ‘Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea,’ Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) [2001] ICJ Pleadings 
197-232.  
77 David Aworawo, ‘Decisive Thaw: The Changing Pattern of Relations between Nigeria and 
Equatorial Guinea, 1980-2005’ JI&GS 99. 
78 Examples are Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon and Nigeria 
79 This happened in the case of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire and eventually had to be settled by a Special 
Chamber of ITLOS in the Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire Case  





In this regard, the objective of this chapter, is to explore how the states in the Gulf of 
Guinea can cooperate to fulfil their obligations under UNCLOS to delimit their 
maritime boundaries by agreement, taking into account the rules and principles 
developed by international courts and tribunals to guide the process. The chapter begins 
by discussing the obligation of states to cooperate under international law and UNCLOS 
in relation to maritime boundary delimitation. This process can be complicated and 
protracted due to issues like the method by which delimitation should be affected and 
which basepoints should be used in the delimitation. Thus, the current rules, principles 
and methods of maritime delimitation as provided by UNCLOS and the jurisprudence 
of International Courts and tribunals is also examined in this part  . The second part 
focuses on an analysis of the existing maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Guinea to 
assess the extent to which UNCLOS and international jurisprudence were used in their 
delimitation. The third part examines and analyses the pending boundaries in the Gulf 
of Guinea and presents options for the delimitation and negotiation of these maritime 
boundaries. The fourth part sets out the conclusions reached. 
 
1.2.  Obligation to Cooperate in maritime boundary delimitation under 
International Law  
 
1.2.1. Cooperation under Articles 74 (1) and 83 (1) of UNCLOS 
 
UNCLOS under Articles 74 (1) and 83 (1) obliges states to delimit their maritime 
boundaries by agreement. The identical provisions of articles 74 (1) and 83 (1) 
regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf respectively read, 
“The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/continental shelf  between States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international 
law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in 
order to achieve an equitable solution.” This of necessity requires states to negotiate 
which means they are to cooperate. In so doing the Convention enjoins parties to act in 
good faith under Article 300 which provides, “States Parties shall fulfil in good faith 
the obligations assumed under this Convention…” In the Guyana/ Suriname 
Arbitration, the tribunal was of the view that the obligation is not merely a non-binding 
recommendation or encouragement but a mandatory rule whose breach would represent 
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a violation of international law.81 In the more recent case of Ghana/ Cote d’Ivoire,82 the 
Special Chamber noted that the obligation to negotiate in good faith occupies a 
prominent place in the Convention, as well as in general international law, and is 
especially important within the context of neighbouring States conducting maritime 
activities in close proximity.83 However, the obligation according to the Chamber is one 
of conduct and not one of result and thus noted that, “…a violation of this obligation 
cannot be based only upon the result expected by one side not being achieved.”84 
 
In the region, some the states have together set up joint committees which meet to 
negotiate their maritime boundaries. These are usually made up of high government 
officials and technical experts mandated to effect the delimitation of the boundaries by 
their respective governments. Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire started negotiations for the 
delimitation of their maritime boundaries, this way before proceeding to third party 
adjudication and even after having procured judgment from ITLOS, the two states have 
set up a Joint Commission to oversee the implementation of the judgment.85 Ghana and 
Nigeria currently are in negotiation for  the delimitation of the maritime boundary 
between them in the continental shelf. The other states in the region like Ghana and 
Togo, Togo and Benin, Nigeria and Benin and Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and 
Cameroon are all in negotiations as discussed further in this chapter. The success of 
these negotiations depends to a large extent on the states understanding of the law 
governing maritime delimitation and acting in good faith. For instance, negotiations 
between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire broke down largely due to disagreement on the 
method to be used in the delimitation. Whilst Ghana insisted on the equidistance method 
in line with current jurisprudence, Cote d’Ivoire vacillated first between advocating for 
the meridian method and then later angle bisector.86 There was also disagreement on 
the basepoints to be used in the delimitation but both parties agreed on the use of BP55, 
 
81 Arbitration regarding the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guyana and Suriname 
(Guyana v Suriname) (2006) XXX RIAA 130 para 460. 
82Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the 
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire) (ITLOS, Sept 23 2017) 
83 Ibid 604 
84 ibid 
85 ‘Final Communique of First Meeting of the Committee in charge of Implementing the ruling of the 
Special Chamber of ITLOS on 23rd September 2017’ (Abidjan, 15 May 2018). 
86 ‘Memorial of Ghana Vol 1, 4 September 2015’ Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire) (ITLOS, Sept 
23 2017) para. 1.13. 
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their land boundary terminus as the starting point and this appears to have been the main 
point of agreement .87 
 
1.2.2. Cooperation under Articles 122 and 123 of UNCLOS 
A further legal basis for cooperation under UNCLOS has been set out in Part IX 
specifically Articles 122 and 123. Article 123 provides, “states bordering an enclosed 
or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights 
and in the performance of their duties under this Convention. To this end they shall 
endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional organization: 
(a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the 
living resources of the sea; 
(b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment…”  
 
These obligations relate to states that border an enclosed or semi enclosed sea. The 
discussion is relevant to the Gulf of Guinea as it is considered a semi enclosed sea. An 
enclosed or semi - enclosed sea has been defined in article 122 of UNCLOS as “a gulf, 
basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the 
ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and 
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.” This definition has four 
aspects - the first two are that there must be a “gulf, basin or sea” and it must be 
“surrounded by two or more States”. A gulf has been defined by the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica as, “any large coastal indentation. More specifically, such a feature is the re-
entrant of an ocean regardless of size, depth, configuration, and geologic structure.”88 
The Encyclopaedia names the Gulf of Guinea as one of the deepest gulfs being about a 
maximum depth of 6,363 meters.89 Being surrounded by nine states, the Gulf of Guinea 
clearly fulfils both of these requirements. The third and fourth aspects are alternatives - 
either the gulf, basin or sea must be “connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow 
outlet” or it must “consist . . . entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive 
economic zones of two or more coastal States”.  
 
87 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the 
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire) (ITLOS, Sept 23 2017) 56, para 177, 189. 
88 ‘Gulf’, Encyclopedia Britannica (2019) < https://www.britannica.com/science/gulf-coastal-feature> 





These elements are fraught with ambiguity. For instance, regarding the third element, it 
is not clear how “narrow” the outlet to the sea or ocean has to be to qualify.90 Also, 
regarding the area being “entirely” composed of the territorial seas and exclusive 
economic zones of States, the percentage of the composition is not specified.91 
However, the Gulf of Guinea again qualifies as it consists primarily of the territorial 
seas and EEZs of nine coastal states. The peculiar problems raised by the semi -enclosed 
seas including with regard to the management of their resources and the preservation of 
the marine environment was acknowledged during the conference that negotiated 
UNCLOS. The delegation of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) alluded to the growing danger of all types of pollution because of the small size 
and poor interchange of waters in semi enclosed and enclosed seas with adjacent seas.92  
 
Also, the necessity of taking special precautionary measures in relation to the 
management, conservation and exploitation of the living resources of such seas was 
acknowledged as they are endangered by their natural characteristics and by pollution. 
Thus, the obligations in Article 123 require bilateral and regional cooperation for their 
implementation. Nevertheless, the first sentence of the provision is not mandatory as 
the phrase used is “should cooperate”. The beginning part of the second sentence of 
Article 123, which states, “…To this end they shall…”  however is couched in more 
mandatory terms, but the obligation upon the coastal States which follows is, in three 
cases, only to “endeavour . . . to coordinate” activities relating to living resources, 
marine environment and scientific research, and in the fourth case to “endeavour . . . to 
invite” other interested States and organisations to cooperate.  
 
Clearly these are as noted by Whomersley, obligations of conduct, rather than of 
result.93 There is no requirement that there should be a completed delimitation of the 
various maritime zones between the coastal States surrounding the sea before the 
requirement to cooperate arises. It has been argued therefore that even in the absence of 
 
90 Chris Whomersley, ‘The South China Sea: The Award of the Tribunal in the Case Brought by 
Philippines against China—A Critique’ (2016) 15 Chin. j. Int Law 239.  
91 ibid 
92 Mitja Gcbec, The Extension of Coastal State Jurisdiction in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas: A 
Mediterranean and Adriatic Perspective  (Routledge 2014) 21 
93 Chris Whomersley, ‘The South China Sea: The Award of the Tribunal in the Case Brought by 
Philippines against China—A Critique’ (2016) 15 Chin. j. Int Law. 242 
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an agreed maritime boundary, it may still be important that coastal States cooperate for 
the purposes stated in Article 123.94 Indeed their cooperation would be more meaningful 
if they had maritime boundaries in place as each state would be able to regulate its 
jurisdictional zone within the framework of regional cooperation.  The GOG has also 
been referred to in the literature as one of the 23 seas that can be categorised as a semi 
– enclosed sea by a leading marine geographer.95  
 
As discussed above, cooperation is important for states to be able to reach an agreement 
as required by articles 73 (1) and 84 (1). Even though states can negotiate whatever 
boundary is agreeable to them using any reasoning they deem fit, they would still benefit 
from having clarity of the legal principles and practical methods of maritime boundary 
delimitation to guide them in their negotiation process. This could ensure that 
jurisdictional allocations are settled in an equitable manner. The next section discusses 
the current law on maritime boundary delimitation and the jurisprudence developed by 
international courts and tribunals. 
 
1.3 Legal Principles and Practical Methods of Maritime Boundary  
Delimitation 
 
1.3.1. Maritime Boundary Delimitation under UNCLOS 
All the Gulf of Guinea states are party to the Convention and their internal laws make 
reference to it.96 The Convention essentially divides the marine areas into three 
 
94 ibid 
95 Lewis Alexander, ‘Regionalism and the law of the sea: The case of semi‐enclosed seas’ [1974], 2 
Ocean Dev&IntlL 164 
96 Cote d’Ivoire’s Law No. 77-926 delimiting the Maritime Zones placed under the National 
Jurisdiction of the Republic of Ivory Coast of 17 November 1977 by which Cote d’Ivoire declares 12 M 
and 200M for Territorial Sea and EEZ respectively; Act No. 15/1984 of 12 November 1984 on the 
Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea by which 
Equatorial Guinea declares 12 M and 200M for Territorial Sea and EEZ respectively; Maritime Zones 
(Delimitation) Law, 1986 by which Ghana declares 12 M and 200M for Territorial Sea and EEZ 
respectively; Sao Tome and Principe’s Law No. 1/98 on delimitation of the territorial sea and the 
exclusive economic zone declares 12 M and 200M for Territorial Sea and EEZ respectively; Togo’s 
Ordinance No. 24 delimiting the Territorial Waters and creating a protected Economic Maritime Zone 
of 16 August 1977 declares a 30 M Territory Sea and a 200 M EEZ; Benin’s Decree No. 76-92 
extending the territorial waters of the People's Republic of Benin to 200 M, 1976 makes provision  for a 
200 M Territorial Sea but no EEZ; Cameroon’s Act No. 74/16 of 5 December 1974 fixing the Limit of 
the Territorial Waters of the United Republic of Cameroon provides for the Territorial Sea of 50M  but 
no EEZ; Nigeria’s Exclusive Economic Zone Decree No.  28 of 5 October 1978 declares a 200M EEZ 
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categories. One is the marine areas included in the territory of a state which is made 
up of the Internal Waters,97 the Territorial Sea98 and Archipelagic Waters.99 A second 
category deals with marine areas which are not part of a state’s territory and within 
which the state has limited jurisdiction and can only exercise sovereign rights. This 
includes the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which states can claim up to a distance 
of 200 M,100 as well as the Continental Shelf (CS).101 The third category which is the 
marine area beyond national jurisdiction, is made up of the High Seas and the deep 
seabed known as ‘the Area’.102 UNCLOS requires states to declare these zones and 
deposit charts with the coordinates with the  Secretary General of the UN. However, 
four of the states namely Togo, Benin, Cameroon and Nigeria have not yet done so.  
 
A zone which has become important to states, due to its potential for hydrocarbon and 
mineral deposits is the continental shelf beyond 200 M. The term ‘continental shelf’ 
is used in UNCLOS as a juridical term which according to Article 76103 comprises the 
submerged prolongation of the land territory of a coastal state – the seabed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea to the outer edge of the 
continental margin or to a distance of 200nm where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend up to that distance. The continental margin consists of the 
seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise.104 It does not include the deep 
ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof.105  
 
 
and the Territorial Waters (Amendment) Decree 1998 amends Nigeria’s initial 30 M Territorial Sea to 
12 M. 
97 UNCLOS Part II  
98 ibid 
99 UNCLOS Part IV  
100 UNCLOS art 57  
101 UNCLOS Part V and VI 
102 UNCLOS Part XI  
103 UNCLOS art 76 
104 The continental rise is an underwater feature found between the continental slope and the abyssal 
plain. This feature can be found all around the world, and it represents the final stage in the boundary 
between continents and the deepest part of the ocean. At the bottom of the continental slope, one will 
find the continental rise, an underwater hill composed of tons of accumulated sediments. The general 
slope of the continental rise is between 0.5 degrees and 1.0 degrees. Beyond the continental rise stretches 
the abyssal plain, an extremely flat area of the sea floor which is also incredibly deep. See ‘continental 
rise’ (Definitions.net STANDS4 LLC, 2020) <https://www.definitions.net/definition/continental++rise> 
assessed on 22 May 2020 
105 UNCLOS art 76 (3)  
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Figure 2. Maritime zones under UNCLOS 
 
Source: ‘The United Nations Law of the Sea PharmaSea Toolkit’ 
<http://www.vliz.be/projects/marinegeneticresources/united-nations-convention-law-
sea.html> accessed May 17, 2020 
Under Article 76 for states to extend their continental shelf beyond 200nm up to the 
350nm limit106 specified in the Convention, they are required make submissions in 
respect of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles to the Commission on 
Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS), a body of the United Nations established under 
the UNCLOS. This must be done within 10 years of the entry into force of the 
Convention for that state.107 This involves the acquisition by the state of complex 
scientific and technical data concerning the outer limit of the state’s continental shelf, 
in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nm.108 The CLCS then considers the 
data and makes a recommendation based on the submission.109 When a coastal state 
accepts the recommendations, it establishes the limits of the continental shelf beyond 
200 M based on the recommendations which then become final and binding.110The 
recommendation of the CLCS is however without prejudice to the final delimitation 
of the continental shelf between opposite and adjacent coasts.111 The implications of 
 
106 UNCLOS art76 (6) S 
107 UNCLOS Annex II rt 4  
108 UNCLOS Annex II art 4  
109 UNCLOS art 76 (8)  
110 ibid 
111 UNCLOS art 76 (10)  
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this is the CLCS recommendation does not constitute a maritime boundary 
delimitation. 
 
All the states in the region have managed to make formal submissions within the time 
limits pertaining to them. Five of them have submitted preliminary information 
pending full submission.112 Three of them have made full submissions and are awaiting 
recommendations.113 Currently Ghana is the only state in the region, which has 
received a recommendation from the CLCS on its submission.114 
 
1.3.2. Rules and principles on maritime boundary delimitation developed by 
          international courts and tribunals 
 
A major criticism of Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS is its lack of clarity in that it does 
not specify a definite method of delimitation but only emphasises the outcome or result 
of delimitation which is that it produces an equitable solution taking into account all 
the relevant circumstances of the case which are theoretically unlimited.115 The 
vagueness of these two UNCLOS provisions reflected the conflicting positions of 
states during the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which 
resulted in UNCLOS. One group of states favoured making equidistance, the method 
of delimitation whilst the other group was of the view that equity be made the guiding 
principle of delimitation.116 Articles 74 on the exclusive economic zone and Article 83 
on the continental shelf, are therefore a  reflection of the compromise reached in the 
 
112 These states are Benin, Togo, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe. See 
‘Continental Shelf-General Description’ (Un.org, 2020) 
<https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_preliminary.htm> accessed on 27 May 2020 
113 These are Gabon, Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Gabon’s Submission was made on 10 April 2012 
(CLCS 78), Nigeria’s submission was made on 7 May 2009 (CLCS/64) and Cote d’Ivoire’s submission 
was made on 8th May 2009. See United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
‘Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982’ (2018) UN doc CLCS/64 & CLCS/95. 
114 United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ‘Progress of work in the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Statement by the Chair’ (24 September 2014) UN 
doc CLCS/85. 
115 Jonathan Charney, 'Progress in International Maritime Delimitation Law' (1994) 88 AJIL 277. 
116 R Platzoder, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents, Doc NG 7/2, 20 
April 1978, Vol IX (New York, NY, Oceana, 1986) 392-93. Members of the NG 7/2 (pro –equidistance) 
group were: Bahamas, Barbados, Canada, Columbia, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Gambia, 
Greece, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malta, Norway, Spain, Sweden, The United Arab Emirates, The 
United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. 
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debate which resulted in a provision that has been described as an ‘empty formula.’117 
and “…consciously designed to decide as little as possible.”118  
 
This indeterminacy was illustrated in the 1982 Tunisia/Libya case119 in which the ICJ 
was of the view that it was bound to decide the case on the basis of equitable principle. 
However, according to the court, it was the result of equitableness that was 
predominant and the principles were subordinate to it and thus the principles have to 
be selected according to their being able to reach an equitable result.120 However in 
the 1986 Libya /Malta case, 121 the court changed its stance in favour of predictability 
stating that “justice of which equity is an emanation, is not abstract justice but justice 
according to the rule of law”122 The court was in favour of delimiting maritime  
boundaries according to some predictable set of rules. 
 
Thereafter progressively, international courts and tribunals have as Judge Mensah, puts 
it, fleshed out “…the bones of the provisions to the extent necessary in the 
circumstances of a particular case in order to attain the objects and purposes of the 
provisions in question.”123 This exercise by international courts and tribunals has 
infused some flexibility and predictability into the process of maritime delimitation by 
providing a practical method for the delimitation process. 124 
 
117 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gros, in the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine Area, (Canada/United States of America) (Judgment) [1984] 1.C.J. Reports, p. 246, referred to 
Article 83 as providing an empty formula that had the effect of destroying all previous gains achieved 
through the 1958 Convention and the North Sea Continental Shelf, (Judgment), [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 365). 
He criticized the Chamber’s reasoning in the matter, reasoning that the principles relied on by the 
chamber, the methods employed to put them into practice and the corrections made to the whole 
process, transform the entire operation into an exercise, which it will thereafter be open to each judge to 
decide at his discretion, what is equitable. (Case concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary 
in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada / United States) Judgment, [1984] ICJ Rep. 365 paras 8. Tanaka is 
also of the view that the reference to Article 38 of the ICJ statute is quite meaningless especially with 
regard to the EEZ as it may be debatable whether the principles of law referred to in Article 38 exist in 
relation to maritime delimitation. See Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and flexibility in the law of 
maritime delimitation, (Oxford, UK Hart 2006) 47-48. 
118 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, (Canada/United States of 
America) (Judgment) [1984] 1.C.J. Reports, (dissenting opinion of Judge Gros para 70). 
119 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), (Application to Intervene,) [1981] 1.C.J. Rep. 
3. 
120 ibid 
121 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta), (Merits) [1985] I. C.J. Rep. 
122 Ibid para 45 
123 Camouco (Panama v. France), Prompt Release, (Judgment of 7 February 2000, Declaration of 
Judge Mensah) ITLOS Reports 2000,10 at para 4. 





1.3.2.1. The three-stage approach to maritime boundary delimitation 
Currently, international courts and tribunals have through the jurisprudence developed 
a three- stage approach to maritime boundary delimitation. Bringing together the case 
law on maritime boundary delimitation the ICJ extrapolated on this in the Romania/ 
Ukraine case. The Court noted that in the process of delimiting the continental shelf or 
exclusive economic zone or to draw a single delimitation line, the court proceeds in 
defined stages.125  
 
Before beginning the process, the Court or tribunal considers in addition to 
jurisdictional issues some preliminary matters. These include whether there is a prior 
agreement between the parties, affecting maritime boundaries. Where there is partial 
agreement or treaty (e.g. as to the starting point or end point of a delimitation or initial 
relevant base points or baselines), the Court will take that agreement as the basis for the 
delimitation. The most notable example in the region is in the Nigeria/ Cameroon 
case.126 The ICJ found that part of the maritime boundary had been established by treaty 
between Britain and Germany during the colonial era.127 The Court saw its task on the 
basis of this treaty simply to “specify definitively” the course of the boundary as fixed 
by the relevant instruments and not to delimit the boundary de novo nor to demarcate 
it.128 However,  
as the ICJ in the Nicaragua / Honduras129 case, observed, “the establishment of a 
permanent maritime boundary is a matter of grave importance and agreement is not to 
be easily presumed.”130 Another preliminary issue for the court or tribunal is to identify 
the relevant area in which each party claims to have an equally legitimate claim. This 
according to Malcolm Evans, involves the relevant coastal lengths which is the distance 
from the land boundary terminus out to the most distant controlling points in each 
direction.131  The ICJ in the Romania/ Ukraine case pointed out that the relevant coasts 
 
125 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), (Merits), [2009] I.C.J. Rep. 61 
126 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), Judgment, [2002] ICJ Rep. para 303. 
127  Ibid, Paras 261-268. 
128 Ibid p.2. 
129 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua v. Honduras) (Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep 659. 
130 Ibid, para. 253. 
131 Malcolm Evans, ‘Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Where do we go from here?’ (4 February 2005 
British Institute of International and comparative law, www.biicl.org. 
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are those coasts that generate overlapping claims.132 Another issue the international 
courts and tribunal have to decide at the preliminary stage is whether it is being 
requested to delimit a single all-purpose boundary or a different boundary for each zone, 
using different criteria. The jurisprudence and state practice show that the single all- 
purpose maritime boundary is fast gaining popularity.133 
 
After dealing with these preliminary issues, the court or tribunal moves on to the first 
stage of the process. In the Romania/ Ukraine case mentioned above, the ICJ noted that 
the in the first stage of the process, the Court establishes a provisional delimitation line 
using “geometrically objective” methods which are appropriate for the geography of the 
area where the delimitation is to take place.134 The Court identified that so far as 
between adjacent coasts, the equidistance method is used, unless there is reason to use 
another method. 135 Where it is opposite coasts the method is a median line between the 
two coasts.136 The lines in both cases are to be constructed from the “most appropriate 
points on the coasts of the two states concerned”.137 The Court pays attention in this 
process to those parts of the coasts jutting out , and the extent to which the court may 
deviate from the basepoints the parties selected for their territorial seas in the 
construction of a single -purpose delimitation line.138 The court chooses its own 
basepoints having regard to the physical geography and the most seaward points of the 
 
132 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) (Merits) [2009] I.C.J. Rep para.77. 
133 In the Gulf of Maine case the parties requested the court to delimit a single maritime boundary 
dividing the Continental Shelf and fisheries zone of Canada and the USA in the Gulf of Maine area. In 
the Guinea/ Guinea Bissau case, the parties requested the Tribunal to delimit the EEZ and CS by a 
single line. The court noted that nothing prevented it in international law or customary law from doing 
so.   The ICJ in the Cameroon/Nigeria case also drew a single boundary for the CS and EEZ as did the 
Tribunals in the recent cases of Bangladesh/ Myanmar and Russia / Ukraine to mention a few. Where 
the states have not requested the court or tribunal to draw a single boundary as in the Greenland /Jan 
Mayen case, the court nevertheless drew a provisional equidistance line for the two zones stating that 
the location of the CS stems from the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf whilst the 
location of the Fisheries zone stems from customary law but there was a convergence which allowed 
for the use of a single maritime for both zones.  State practice also reveals that after the emergence of 
the concept of the EEZ states have been using the multipurpose single line as a convenient way to 
delimit their maritime boundaries. A few examples include the Agreement between Bulgaria and 
Turkey, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe. 
134. Ibid para 116.  
135 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), (Merits), [2007] ICJ Rep 745 para 281. 
136 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), (Merits), [2009] ICJ Rep para 116. 




two coasts.139 The court during this first stage is simply preoccupied with plotting a line 
based on a strictly geometric criteria on the basis of objective data.  
 
Where the geography of the coasts of disputing states has made it impossible for the 
Court or tribunal to identify appropriate baselines to draw an equidistance line, the 
Court can use alternative methods like it did in the Nicaragua and Honduras case where 
it utilised the angle bisector method of delimitation for constructing the line stating that, 
“…bisecting the angle created by the linear approximations of coastlines has proved to 
be a viable substitute method in certain circumstances where equidistance is not 
possible or appropriate.”.140 The Court’s decision not to begin with a provisional 
equidistance line might be viewed as a departure from the trend in maritime boundary 
adjudications, and so was at pains to give cogent reasons why in this particular case, it 
had to depart from the standard approach.141  
 
The second stage of the delimitation process involves a consideration by the Court or 
Tribunal of whether there are any factors that necessitate a shift or adjustment of the 
provisional equidistance line with the purpose of obtaining an equitable result.142 What 
constitutes special or relevant circumstances has not been specifically defined. 
International courts and tribunals have therefore taken into consideration many factors 
pertinent to the case before them. The ICJ in the Libya - Malta case declared that 
although there is no closed list of considerations which a court may invoke, the only 
ones which will qualify for inclusion are those which are pertinent to the institution of 
the continental shelf as it has developed within the law, and to the application of 
 
139 Ibid Para 117  
140 Ibid 
141 Martin Pratt, 'Case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras 
in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua /Honduras)' [2007] 2(3) HJJ 37. In the Gulf of Maine case the Court 
stated, “…like equidistance, the bisector method is a geometrical approach that can be used to give 
legal effect to the criterion long held to be as equitable as it is simple, namely that in principle, while 
having regard to the special circumstances of the case, one should aim at an equal division of areas 
where the maritime projections of the coasts of the States...converge and overlap.” See Delimitation of 
the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America) Judgment, [1984] 
1.C.J. Rep. para. 195. In the Tunisia/ Libya case, the bisector had to be used due to the impossibility of 
finding a point on the equidistance line. Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 
(Judgment) [1982] I.C.J. Rep.82 para 115. It can be concluded from this discussion that the bisector 
method is used only in situations where due to the geography of the coast it would be inequitable to 
draw an equidistance line or the drawing of the equidistance line would be impossible. 
142 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), (Merits) [2002] 1CJ Rep142 para 288. 
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equitable principles to its delimitation.143 The kinds of circumstances considered 
relevant are usually geographical and non-geographical144 circumstances but the former 
 
143 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) (Merits) [1985] I CJ Rep 40 para 48. 
144There are non-geographical factors discussed in the jurisprudence. One of these is navigational 
interests which states have frequently cited as relevant circumstances. International courts and tribunals 
have generally not been favourably disposed to shifting the equidistance line on this basis due to the 
fact that all states enjoy the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea and freedom of navigation in 
the EEZ.  For instance, in the Qatar/Bahrain case, the court found it unnecessary to shift the 
equidistance line on grounds of navigation. See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain, (Merits) [2001] 1. C. J. Rep. 248. 
Thus, it is only in a few cases that the equidistance line was adjusted to accommodate navigational 
interests. Two cases in this regard are the Beagle Channel case and the Guyana/ Suriname case.  In the 
Beagle Channel case, the tribunal shifted the median line so that it could follow ‘the habitually used 
navigable track.’ See Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel, (1977) 
XXI RIAA 53-264 at para. 110. The tribunal in the Guyana/Suriname case, held that the factors which 
related to Suriname’s navigation and security interests constituted special circumstances requiring 
significant adjustment of the equidistance line over the first 3 nm of the territorial sea. See Guyana/ 
Suriname case, paras 304, 306 
In the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf however, navigational interests generally have not 
been such an important consideration. Fietta and Cleverly, note that, “to date no international court or 
Tribunal has delimited an EEZ or continental shelf boundary so as to accommodate 
navigational…interests.” See Stephen Fietta and Robin Cleverly, A practitioner’s Guide to Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation, (Oxford University press 2016)  
 
The jurisprudence also shows that security interests have been considered a relevant circumstance in 
territorial sea delimitations. The tribunal in the Guinea/ Guinea Bissau case, stated as regarding security 
that it was to avoid that “either party should see rights exercised opposite its coast or in the immediate 
vicinity thereof which could compromise its security.” Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between 
Guinea and Guinea – Bissau (Guinea/ Guinea-Bissau) (Arbitration Tribunal) (1985) XIX RIAA 148-
196 at para. 124. 
In the EEZ and continental shelf delimitations, security interests in principle can be considered relevant 
only in highly exceptional circumstances. In the Nicaragua / Colombia case, the court, recognised that 
legitimate security concerns might be a relevant consideration if a maritime delimitation was effected 
near to the coast. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), (Judgment) [2012] 
I.C.J. Reports para 221-222.The ICJ in the Libya /Malta and Greenland /Jan Mayen cases also examined 
security considerations based on distance from the coast. See Maritime Delimitation in the Area between 
Greenland and Jan Mayen, (Denmark v Norway) (Judgment) [1993] I.C.J. Reports para 81. The 
conclusion can be drawn therefore that there is no predictable standard on how security should be taken 
into account as a relevant circumstance even though international courts and tribunals consider it 
important especially if the delimitation is near the coast. However, Tanaka notes, “there is no judgment 
which explicitly takes national security into account for establishing maritime delimitation.” Stephen 
Fietta and Robin Cleverly, A practitioner’s Guide to Maritime Boundary Delimitation, (Oxford 
University press 2016) 85  
 
Access to natural resources in the area of delimitation is another non geographic consideration. In the 
Jan Mayen case, the court considered the question of access to fish stocks for vulnerable fishing 
communities in the area. The adoption of a median line would mean that Denmark could not be assured 
of equitable access to the fish and thus the Court adjusted the median line towards the Norwegian island 
of Jan Mayen. In the jurisprudence, this is the only case where the court has accepted access to fisheries 
resources as a relevant circumstance for the adjustment of the equidistance line. See Stephen Fietta and 
Robin Cleverly, A practitioner’s Guide to Maritime Boundary Delimitation, (Oxford University press 
2016) 85. 
In the case of Barbados / Trinidad and Tobago, the court did not consider fishing for flying fish off the 
coast of Tobago as a relevant circumstance requiring the shifting of the equidistance line. See 
Arbitration between Barbados and The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago relating to the Delimitation of 
the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf between them (Barbados/ Trinidad and Tobago) 
(2006) 27 RIAA 147 Para 215. International courts and tribunals have however not completely rejected 
the fact that equitable access to fisheries is an important circumstance. They thus try to be creative by 
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are regarded as more important when evaluating the equitableness of the equidistance 
line.145 Three categories of geographical circumstance would call for the courts or 
tribunals to adjust the line. One would be in situations of encroachment.146 Another is 
where there is disparity in the lengths of the parties’ coastlines147 and a third is where 
features like islands, rocks and other promontories distort the geography of the area to 
be delimited.148  
 
using geographical factors to determine the boundary line whilst safeguarding the fisheries interest. See 
Eritrea/ Yemen case, where the court held that the “traditional fishing regime” that was already in use in 
the delimitation area should be respected and protected by law and must therefore be preserved by the 
parties for the benefit of fishermen of both states. See Eritrea/ Yemen case para 68  
145 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of maritime Boundary Delimitation (Hart 
Publishing 2006) 348; Stephen Fietta, Robin Cleverly, A Practitioner’s Guide to Maritime Delimitation 
(Oxford University Press 2016) 65 – 93. 
146 Regarding situations of encroachment, the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf case had occasion to 
consider the issue. In that case, Germany was compressed between the Dutch and Danish areas and 
virtually cut -off due to the marked concavity of its coast, when the equidistance line was used. The court 
decided that the delimitation should be undertaken in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each 
Party those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into 
and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the other.  
According to the court, cut-off effects were to be avoided as much as possible. See North Sea Continental 
Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands (Judgment) 
[1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3 
This approach was adopted in the Bay of Bengal cases (Bangladesh/ Myanmar and Bangladesh/ India) 
where the coastal geography bore a similarity with that of the North Sea case.  In the Bangladesh/ 
Myanmar case, the Tribunal found that if the strict equidistance were applied, Bangladesh’s access to the 
continental shelf would be cut -off leaving it a disproportionately small EEZ relative to the length of its 
coastline. The Arbitral Tribunal, in the Bangladesh/ India case also noted that the common view in 
international jurisprudence is that concavity as such does not necessarily constitute a relevant 
circumstance requiring the adjustment of a provisional equidistance line. It is only when a cut-off effect 
is produced by the equidistance line which prevents a state from extending its maritime boundary as far 
seaward as international law permits and prevents the achievement of an equitable solution, that it can be 
considered a relevant circumstance. See Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal 
(Bangladesh/Myanmar) (Judgment of 14 March 2012) ITLOS Rep. 2012, 81 para 291; In the Matter of 
the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v India) (Award) (Arbitral Tribunal) Case 
No 16 (2014) < https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/383> accessed 12 May 2020. 
147 Another factor the courts consider is whether there is any disparity in the lengths of the relevant 
coastlines of the parties especially in the case of opposite coasts. In the Libya / Malta case, the court took 
into consideration the geographical context of Malta, a small island state, with a very short coastal 
segment, facing the very long continental coastline of Libya. See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v Malta), (Merits) [1985] I. C.J. Rep. In the Jan Mayen case, the Court found that there was 
a disparity of coastal lengths and therefore the median line should be adjusted or shifted in such a way as 
to effect a delimitation closer to the coast of Jan Mayen. See Maritime Delimitation in the Area between 
Greenland and Jan Mayen, (Judgment,) [1993] I.C.J. Rep. para. 69.The court in all these cases adjusted 
the line in favour of the state with the longer coastline. 
148 The third factor international courts and tribunals consider is the effect of islands, rocks and other 
promontories or small features on the equidistance line. This is especially so when they produce a 
distorting effect on the geography of the delimitation area. In the jurisprudence islands are the most 
noteworthy. See Stephen Fietta and Robin Cleverly, A Practitioner’s Guide to Maritime Delimitation 
(Oxford University press 2016) 73. Article 121 (1) of the UNCLOS defines an island as a naturally 
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.” Under the Convention, 
islands are treated as land territory in the delimitation of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and 
Continental shelf. However, when an island is determined a relevant or special circumstance, the effect 
to be given to it, have not been detailed out in the Convention. It has therefore been left to international 




The final stage of the delimitation process, provides the court with the opportunity to 
verify that the line arrived at, does not lead to an inequitable result due to any marked 
disproportion between the “ ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the ratio between 
the relevant maritime area of each state by reference to the delimitation line”.149 The 
court needs to confirm through a comparison of the ratio of coastal lengths that no great 
disproportionality of marine areas has occurred.150 The ICJ put in a caveat though, that 
this does not imply that the areas appertaining to the states should be proportionate to 
the coastal lengths.151 It recalled its judgment in the Denmark / Norway case 152 where 
it was stated “the sharing out of the area is … the consequence of the delimitation not 
vice versa”. In the Nicaragua /Columbia case, the court ruled that for an equidistance 
line to be adjusted at this final stage, there must be a “significant disproportionality” 




The jurisprudence shows that in situations where small islands belonging to one party to a dispute are 
located off the mainland coast of the other party, the ICJ has held that this constitutes a relevant 
circumstance meriting the adjustment of the equidistance line. In the case of Nicaragua/Columbia where 
this was the case, the court found that a median line between a group of small Columbian islands had a 
cut -off effect on Nicaragua to the extent that it affected three quarters of its maritime area. The line was 
therefore adjusted in favour of Nicaragua.   However only cut -off effects that occur within the area to be 
delimited without reference to coasts of any third states would be considered relevant. See Territorial 
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) 
(Merits) [2012] I.C.J. Rep. 624. 
Islands are also treated differently depending on the maritime zone they are found in. This was discussed 
by the Tribunal in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case where the court drew a clear distinction between the 
effect of islands in the delimitation of the territorial sea from the effect of islands in the delimitation of 
the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. In that case, the court in the territorial sea delimitation 
gave full effect to the St Martins island, which belonged to Bangladesh but was located opposite 
Myanmar’s mainland. However, in the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf, considerations 
of the equitableness of the equidistance line, determines whether they would be given full, partial or even 
no effect. The courts have dealt with it on a case by case basis.  In the Anglo-French Continental shelf 
case, different islands at different locations belonging to the two parties were given different effects. The 
tribunal decided that giving the Channel Islands, belonging to Britain but located off the French coast of 
Normandy, full effect in the continental shelf boundary delimitation between the two states would 
produce an inequitable result. It therefore created a 12-mile enclave to the west and north of the islands. 
With respect to the Scilly islands, also belonging to Britain in the same case, the court decided to give 
them half effect to abate their distorting effect.  However, the Tribunal decided that the Ushant island, 
located at the south-western end of the English Channel but which belonged to France, be given full 
effect. Sometimes an island’s effect is very substantial, but it is uninhabited and located well offshore in 
an adjacent coast situation. The Court in such a case would likely discount it altogether as it did in the 
case of Qatar/ Bahrain with Fasht al Jarim island to produce an equitable result. See Stephen Fietta and 
Robin Cleverly, A Practitioner’s Guide to Maritime Delimitation (Oxford University press 2016) 67. 
149 Romania /Ukraine Para 122 
150 ibid 
151 ibid 
152 Greenland and Jan Mayen case para 64  
153 Nicaragua v. Colombia para 242 
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This approach which is also called in the literature the equidistance/relevant 
circumstances method was adopted in subsequent cases by the ICJ, ITLOS and Annex 
VII arbitral tribunals.154The main advantage of the approach lies in its predictability by 
the incorporation of specific method of delimitation which is the equidistance method.  
 
1.3.2.2. Delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 M and grey areas  
The jurisprudence discussed above relates mainly to the delimitation of the territorial 
sea up to the continental shelf within 200 M. However special mention must be made 
of the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 M, due to the unanswered 
questions regarding delimitation in this zone and the sparse reference to it in the 
jurisprudence on maritime delimitation. The delimitation of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 M is as with the continental shelf within 200 M, governed by Article 83 of 
UNCLOS which does not make a distinction between the inner and outer continental 
shelf. However, there is a relation of this provision to Article 76, as a preliminary issue 
would be whether there is in existence a shelf to delimit. Additionally, the process at 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is a protracted one and it may 
take years before the states receive a recommendation due to the heavy workload of the 
Commission which has been a long standing issue.155 In the meantime, the issue is what 
the legal status of the CS beyond 200 nm is, in the absence of a CLCS recommendation 
and whether an international court or tribunal can delimit its boundaries. The Special 
Chamber in the Ghana/ Cote d’Ivoire case ruled that it had the jurisdiction so to do.156 
It reasoned that there is only a single continental shelf in law and that there is no 
 
154 The approach was used in the 2012 Bangladesh / Myanmar and Nicaragua / Colombia cases; the 2014 
the Chile | Peru and Bangladesh /India cases; in 2017 in the Croatia / Slovenia and Ghana /Cote d’Ivoire 
and in 2018 the Costa Rica and Nicaragua case. The main advantage of the approach lies in its 
predictability by the incorporation of specific method of delimitation which is the equidistance method. 
155 By Letter dated 5 April 2019 from the Chair of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
addressed to the President of the twenty-ninth Meeting of States Parties the Chair of the Commission 
revealed that the actual workload of the Commission far surpasses earlier initial projections. He stated 
that as at 26 March 2019, 71 States parties had made submissions either individually or jointly. Overall, 
he disclosed that the Commission has received 89 submissions, including individual, joint and revised or 
partially revised submissions. He expected that there would be a lot more to be received in the coming 
years. In addition, he was of the view that the scientific and technical components of the submissions far 
exceed the complexity originally envisaged due in part to evolving knowledge and technologies and, in 
part, to the efforts of coastal States to support the proposed delineation with comprehensive data and 
information. He stated that 45 submissions are still pending consideration. He forecasted that at the 
current stage, the waiting time between the making of a submission and the establishment of a sub 
commission is approximately 10 years and is expected to increase even further. Given the workload, the 
remaining work of the Commission may last several more decades. See CLCSC ‘Progress of work in the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf - Statement by the Chair - Fifty -first session’ (13 
December 2019) CLCS/51/1. 
156 Ghana v Cote d’Ivoire Para 495. 
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distinction between an inner continental shelf and an extended or outer continental 
shelf.157 It was therefore of the opinion that the Special Chamber can delimit the 
continental shelf beyond 200 M but only if such a continental shelf exists.158 The 
Chamber was of the belief that such a continental shelf existed for both parties up to 
350 M as required by Article 76. The Chamber was of the view that as Ghana had 
already received a recommendation showing the validity to claim a continental shelf 
beyond 200nm and Cote d’Ivoire’s geological situation is identical to that of Ghana, it 
is also likely to have a recommendation from the CLCS to that effect.159 
 
An issue that also arises is whether a decision by an international court or tribunal would 
interfere with the competence of the CLCS. In this regard the Special Chamber in the 
Ghana Cote d’Ivoire case emphasised that the functions of the CLCS and of the Special 
Chamber differ and referring to the Judgment of the Tribunal in Delimitation of the 
maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), came to the 
conclusion that there is nothing in the Convention or in the Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission or in its practice to indicate that delimitation of the continental shelf 
constitutes an impediment to the performance by the Commission of its functions.160 
Article 76, (10) of UNCLOS states clearly that the work of the CLCS is without 
prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts”. Article 9 of Annex II, to the Convention, also states that 
the “actions of the Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of 
boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”. 
 
Regarding the methodology for delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 M, 
the jurisprudence shows that the continental shelf has been considered as a single 
continental shelf.161 Therefore, there is no distinction made between the continental 
shelf within and beyond 200 M Consequently, the equidistance/relevant circumstances 
methodology for the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental 
 
157 The Special Chamber cited the Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between 
them, (2006) XXVII RIAA, 147, at pp. 208-209, para. 213, quoted by the Tribunal in its Judgment in the 
dispute concerning Bangladesh/Myanmar case p. 4, at pp. 96-97, para. 362). See also Ghana/Côte 
d’Ivoire case Para 490 
158 Ghana/ Cote d’Ivoire case para. 491. 
159 ibid 
160 Ibid 378 
161 ibid para 526 
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shelf, have been used as evidenced in the Ghana /Cote d’Ivoire case. The Special 
Chamber in that case saw no special circumstances that merited a deviation from that 
default position in the continental shelf beyond 200 M 
 
A potential complexity arises in the delimitation of this zone which requires that states 
cooperate in its delimitation. Under the UNCLOS, the Continental Shelf and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone have been provided for as related, but distinct maritime 
zones although the rights which the exclusive economic zone entails over the sea-bed 
of the zone are defined by reference to the regime laid down for the continental shelf.162 
However, the distinctiveness of these zones poses some technical problems when it 
results in a situation where a state’s jurisdiction over its continental shelf extends into 
an area that is within 200 M of another state. In such a case, the former state will not 
have jurisdiction over the water column and a situation would be created whereby there 
would be split jurisdiction and this has been referred to by Judge ad hoc Arechaga, in 
the Libya/Tunisia case as “a vertical superimposition of rights”.163 UNCLOS however 
does not provide for this problem of different coastal States exercising continental 
shelf rights and EEZ rights over the same area. This has been referred to in the 
jurisprudence as a “grey area”. 164 
 
In both the cases of Bangladesh and Myanmar and Bangladesh and India, this 
situation arose. In the case of Bangladesh and Myanmar the tribunal found that the 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 M gave rise to a grey area located 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the coast of Bangladesh but within 200 M from the 
coast of Myanmar, yet on the Bangladesh side of the delimitation line. In the case 
between Bangladesh and India, the delimitation line of the Arbitral Tribunal also 
created a grey area beyond 200 M from the coasts of Bangladesh but within the 200 
M of India. This meant that Bangladesh has sovereign rights to explore the continental 
shelf and exploit ‘mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil 
together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species,’ as provided by Article 
77 (4) of UNCLOS, east of the dividing line in the grey area whilst India, has sovereign 
 
162 This was acknowledged in the Libya / Malta Continental Shelf case, where the ICJ indicated that the 
institutions of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone are different and distinct 
163 Continental shelf (Tunisia/ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Judgment) [1982] ICJ Rep 18 (Sep Op of 
Judge Jiménez De Aréchaga) para 99. 
164 Bangladesh/ Myanmar case para 464. 
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rights over the EEZ regarding the superjacent waters. Similarly, in the Bangladesh 
/Myanmar case, Myanmar has rights over the EEZ whilst Bangladesh has rights over 
the continental shelf beyond 200 M. 
 
Under UNCLOS, a coastal state can exercise complete jurisdiction over its resources 
from the water column, seabed and subsoil within its EEZ. In the Extended Continental 
Shelf, it can only explore resources from the seabed and subsoil. The tribunal’s 
dilemma was that allowing Myanmar to claim its entitlement to the seabed in the grey 
area would cut Bangladesh off from a much larger section of its own continental shelf. 
In seeking to do equity the grey area was created. The tribunal however noted that 
UNCLOS recognises to a greater or lesser degree the rights of one State within the 
maritime zones of another. Within the provisions of the Convention relating to the 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, articles 56, 58, 78, and 79 all require 
States to exercise their rights and perform their duties with due regard to the rights and 
duties of other States. This definitely requires a degree of cooperation between the 
states. And the tribunal left it for the individual states to determine the measures they 
consider appropriate in this respect, including through the conclusion of further 
agreements or the creation of a cooperative arrangement. The Tribunal could only 
express confidence that Bangladesh and Myanmar would act, both jointly and 
individually, to ensure that each is able to exercise its rights and perform its duties 
within the grey area. 165 In almost similar words the tribunal in the Bangladesh / India 
case expressed the same views on cooperation as the ITLOS tribunal, before it, in the 
Bangladesh /Myanmar case.166 
 
1.4. Analysis of settled maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Guinea 
There are five fully or partially settled maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Guinea area 
under discussion namely the respective maritime boundaries between Nigeria and 
Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Cameroon, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, Sao Tome and 





165 Bangladesh/Myanmar para. 475, 476. 
166 Bangladesh/ India para 504-508 
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1.4.1. Settled maritime boundaries 
 
I. Cameroon and Nigeria 
The Cameroon /Nigeria maritime boundary is one of the two maritime boundaries in 
the region to be settled by recourse to third party dispute settlement. Cameroon and 
Nigeria are adjacent states situated on the West coast of Africa. They share a land 
boundary extending from Lake Chad in the North to the Bakassi Peninsula, situated in 
the hollow of the Gulf of Guinea, in the south and their coasts in the Gulf of Guinea is 
concave in character.167 The two states also share boundaries with other states in the 
region particularly Equatorial Guinea whose island, Bioko, is situated opposite their 
coastlines.168 In 1994, Cameroon filed an application to the ICJ requesting the 
determination of the land and maritime boundary between the two states. The court after 
analysing the arguments of the parties on the prior existence of a maritime boundary, 
held that there was already an agreed maritime boundary, based on historical treaties, 
dividing the territorial seas of the two states.169 The boundary to be delimited was 
therefore an EEZ and continental shelf boundary. The Parties requested the court to 
draw a single line for the maritime zones in the area to be delimited.170  
At the time the court had not yet formulated the three stage approach and so in line with 
jurisprudence at the time specifically the Jan Mayen, the court begun the process by 
drawing a provisional equidistance line as the first step of a two-stage process- drawing 
an equidistance line and then examining any factors that would necessitate a shift in the 
equidistance line.171 To draw the provisional equidistance line, the court first identified 
the relevant coastline of the parties, for the determination of the base points for use in 
the drawing of the equidistance line. In so doing, the court decided on points on the 
coastlines of only the two states rejecting Cameroons submissions on the relevant coast 
which encompassed the entire coastline of the Gulf of Guinea.172 The court though 
observed that the equidistance line it had used could not “extend very far” because of 
 
167 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), Judgment, [2002] ICJ Rep 330 para 30 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid para. 268. 
170 Ibid para286 
171 Ibid para290 
172 Ibid para 272 
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the presence of Equatorial Guinea which was not party to the proceedings even though 
it had been allowed to intervene.173  
 
Among the relevant circumstances necessitating the adjustment of the equidistance line 
which Nigeria cited but which the court did not endorse was the oil practice line which 
the parties had respected for many years.174 The court held, noting earlier jurisprudence, 
that it would not normally consider oil practice absent evidence of a modus vivendi or 
tacit agreement and that oil and gas wells were not in themselves to be considered as 
relevant circumstances justifying a shift of the equidistance line. The court did not find 
in the present case evidence of such tacit agreement and therefore declined to take the 
oil practice into consideration as a relevant circumstance.175 
 
Another significant relevant circumstance cited by Cameroon, was the cut- off effect of 
the island of Bioko on Cameroon which the latter argued should not be given its full 
effect.176 The court acknowledged that islands could sometimes be taken into account 
as relevant circumstances but only when they belonged to one of the parties to the 
dispute which was not the case as Equatorial Guinea was not party to the dispute.177 
Further Cameroon’s argument on the concavity of the coastline was held not to be a 
relevant circumstance as the relevant coastline of the two parties used by the court in 
the delimitation, did not exhibit any particular concavity.178  Further the Court did not 
see the need for any further adjustment of the equidistance line on the basis of 
proportionality as it found that the relevant coastline of Cameroon was not longer than 
that of Nigeria, though it acknowledged that a substantial difference in the lengths of 
the parties’ coastlines may be a relevant factor to be considered.179  After these analysis, 
the court concluded that the equidistance line represented an equitable solution and 
drew the line up to where Equatorial Guinea, became involved and no further.180  
 
 
173 Ibid para 307 
174 Ibid para 282 
175 Ibid para 304 
176 Ibid para 274 
177 Ibid para.238. 
178 Ibid para. 297 
179 The Court cited the Gulf of Maine and the Jan Mayen cases. 
180 Nigeria/ Cameroon para 306  
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In drawing the equidistance line, the court took into consideration the prior Maroua 
Declaration of 1975 in the near shore area and drew an equidistance line up to a point 
‘G’ which did not correspond to the equidistance line.181 Thereafter, further offshore 
from point ‘G’ the court decided that the line directly join the equidistance line at a 
point they called ‘X’ and continue southward along the equidistance line. However, the 
court stopped at point ‘X’ where it determined that Equatorial Guinea’s interest might 
be affected and considered that it could do no more than indicate the general direction 
of the equidistance line from point ‘X’. 182 
 
After the judgment the two parties set up a Commission named Cameroon  - Nigeria  
Mixed Commission to facilitate the implementation of the ICJ judgment as well as 
undertake the demarcation of the land and maritime boundary according to the judgment 
of the court.183 The main achievement of the Commission has been to facilitate the 
peaceful transfer of authority over Bakassi to Cameroon through the Greentree 
Agreement, in conformity with the ICJ judgment.184 The Commission has also made 
considerable progress in the maritime demarcation exercise and is currently still 
working with the parties to resolve and conclude the outstanding demarcation 
disagreements between them.185 
 
This judgment has implications for maritime boundary delimitations in the Gulf of 
Guinea. The court did not extend the delimitation of the boundary between the two 
states into the territory of third states namely Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and 
Principe. Interestingly it allowed Equatorial Guinea to intervene in the proceedings 
stating that Article 59 of UNCLOS did not provide it enough protection and therefore 
meticulously delimited the boundary so as not to encroach on its rights.186 This means 
that Nigeria and Cameroon can only complete their maritime boundary with the full 
cooperation of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. Due to the complexity 
of their coastal geography this has proved rather difficult as evidenced by the fact that 
 
181 Ibid para 307 
182 Ibid  
183 'The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission: A Success in the Resolution of Boundary Dispute' 
(UNOWAS, 2019) <https://unowas.unmissions.org/cameroon-nigeria-mixed-commission-success-
resolution-boundary-dispute> accessed 18 May 2020. 
184 ibid 
185 ibid 
186  Ibid para 238 
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since the judgment in 2002, the states still have not completed the boundary.187 This 
case was also about the allocation of resources and Cameroon wanted a share of the rich 
resources in the region. The court however stated that its task was not to compensate 
Cameroon for any disadvantages it must contend with due to the geographical 
circumstances of the region.188 
 
Figure 3: Judgment Cameroon and Nigeria Case 
 
Source: Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, [2002] ICJ Rep para 449. 
The judgment of the ICJ in the Cameroon / Nigeria case, was not the end of the matter. 
In order to implement the judgment, the parties needed to cooperate hence they set up 
a joint commission - the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC) - in 
November 2002.189 This Commission was established under the auspices of the United 
nations Secretary General at the request of the presidents of the two countries, then 
Presidents Paul Biya and Olusegun Obasanjo of Cameroon and Nigeria 
respectively.190The Special Representative of the Secretary General for West Africa and 
the Sahel serves as Chairman of the Mixed Commission.191 The main goal of the 
 
187 Authors personal communication with an official from Nigeria. 
188 Cameroon / Nigeria case para 296, see also the Counter- Memorial of Nigeria 575 -581 para 21.14 -
21.23. 
189 'Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission' (UNOWAS, 2020) 





Commission is to facilitate the implementation of the 10 October 2002 judgment of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary dispute. Among 
its achievements is the fact that the full implementation of the Court’s ruling in respect 
of the maritime boundary has been completed including all technicalities pertaining to 
the delineation of the maritime boundary, including the maritime charts which have 
been approved by both Parties, in compliance with the judgment.192  
 
II. Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire have adjacent coasts in the Gulf of Guinea. In September 2014, 
Ghana initiated arbitral proceedings against Cote d’Ivoire requesting the establishment 
of a single maritime boundary between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire delimiting the 
territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf including the continental 
shelf beyond 200M.193 In its submissions to the Special Chamber of ITLOS, Ghana 
forcefully argued that the parties have tacitly agreed a boundary line that generally 
follows an equidistance line. This line according to Ghana has been respected for many 
years as exhibited by both parties’ oil practice and by their cordial conduct respecting 
the line.194 Cote d’Ivoire disagreed with this assertion and argued that the boundary had 
never been agreed as evidenced by the fact that the parties have been in protracted 
negotiations over the years to determine it.195  
 
The Special Chamber rejected Ghana’s argument stating that evidence relating solely 
to the specific purpose of oil activities in the seabed and subsoil is of limited value in 
proving the existence of an all-purpose boundary which delimits not only the seabed 
and subsoil but also superjacent water columns.196 On the issue of the relevant coast to 
be used in the delimitation, the parties differed completely. Ghana was of the view that 
the relevant coast would be the coast appertaining to the two parties only and it is this 
coast that should be used to draw an equidistance line.197 Cote d’Ivoire on the other 
hand, related the relevant coast to its preferred method of delimitation which is the 
 
192 ibid 
193 Ibid p. 1 
194 Ibid Para 1.22 
195 Ghana v Côte d'Ivoire (Counter - Memorial of Cote d’Ivoire) Para. 4.3.  
196 Ghana v Côte d'Ivoire Para 226 
197 Ibid Memorial of Ghana Para 5.80 -5.81, Ghana Reply Vol 1 para1.19, 3.21, 3.101, Ghana Memorial 
Vol. 1 para 4.56 and 5.87. 
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bisector method. It noted that the jurisprudence distinguishes between coasts useful for 
drawing the bisector and coasts relevant for the equidistance/relevant circumstances 
method. It quoted the court in Bangladesh / India which stated that, "…the identification 
of the relevant coasts for the delimitation in general and the depiction of the general 
management of the coast when applying the angle-bisector method are two distinctly 
different operations."198 Cote d’Ivoire’s view was that there should be a regional 
approach that takes into consideration the entire coast of the Gulf of Guinea being the 
area between Senegal and Gabon which they argue may be divided into three segments, 
illustrating both directions of the African west coast. 199 The Special Chamber however 
rejected Cote d’Ivoire’s arguments and identified the relevant area as the area in which 
the projections of the coasts of the two Parties overlap, extending to the outer limits of 
the area to be delimited.200 
 
Regarding the method of delimitation, Cote d’Ivoire advocated the bisector method 
putting emphasis on an equitable solution.201 Côte d'Ivoire, drew the attention of the 
Chamber to the particular geographical context of the dispute, which it alleged justified 
the application of the bisector method. They cited the Nicaragua v. Honduras case202 
and claimed that the basepoints to be used for the delimitation are situated on a portion 
of the coastlines that are unstable and therefore justifies the use of an alternative method 
to that of equidistance.203 Ghana argued that the starting point of the delimitation is the 
land boundary terminus (known as Boundary Pillar 55 or BP 55) and that there has been 
no suggestion that base points in the vicinity of the land boundary terminus at BP 55 
would have to be placed on unstable features, or that an active geomorphology would 
make them “uncertain within a short (or, indeed, any) period of time.”204 To the 
contrary, according to Ghana’s arguments, the relevant coasts in this case consist 
entirely of dry land and are remarkably stable.205  
 
 
198 ibid. Para 277 quoted by Cote d’Ivoire in the Rejoinder at p. 72 para.3.10. 
199 Cote d’Ivoire Rejoinder para 3.29 – 3.32, 2.37. 
200 Ghana v. Côte d'Ivoire para. 381 
201 Cote d’Ivoire Counter Memorial para 25 -26. 
202 Ibid Vol 1 para. 6.32 
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The Special Chamber found that the international jurisprudence concerning the 
delimitation of maritime spaces favoured the equidistance/relevant circumstances 
methodology. It observed that the international decisions which adopted the angle 
bisector methodology were due to particular circumstances in each of the cases 
concerned. According to the Chamber, this international jurisprudence confirms that, in 
the absence of any compelling reasons that make it impossible or inappropriate to draw 
a provisional equidistance line, the equidistance/relevant circumstances methodology 
should be chosen for maritime delimitation. 
 
On the relevant circumstances requiring a shift in the equidistance line, Cote d’Ivoire’s 
argument in case the chamber decided to use the equidistance method, was that there 
are several circumstances which call for the adjustment of the provisional equidistance 
line, a key one being the instability of the Ivorian coast in the vicinity of the land 
boundary terminus (Boundary Pillar 55.) Another relevant circumstance that Cote 
d’Ivoire alluded to was the exceptional concentration of hydrocarbons in the area to be 
delimited.206 It cited the Libya / Malta case, where the Court held that: “the actual 
resources contained in the continental shelf subject to delimitation, as far as is known 
or can easily be determined, could effectively constitute relevant circumstances which 
might reasonably be taken into account in a delimitation.”207 According to Cote 
d’Ivoire, these resources effectively represent the essential objective which the States 
have in mind by advancing claims on the seabed that contains them, and should 
therefore be considered as relevant circumstances in the delimitation process.208 Cote 
d’Ivoire requested the Chamber to ensure equitable access to these resources by Côte 
d'Ivoire, especially when they are particularly concentrated in the area in question.209 
Ghana’s argument on this point was that the location of hydrocarbons in the disputed 
area could not, per se, constitute a relevant circumstance.210  
 
According to Ghana, access to resources has been taken into account by the case-law as 
a relevant circumstance, only where necessary to avoid “catastrophic repercussions for 
the subsistence and economic development of the populations of the countries 
 
206 Ghana v Côte d'Ivoire para 11 
207 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya /Malta) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep. para. 50. 
208 Ghana v Côte d'Ivoire, Cote d’Ivoire Rejoinder para 2.62. 
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concerned.”211 Ghana submitted further that Côte d'Ivoire is not under the threat of such 
repercussions since it does not currently derive any economic benefit from this zone as 
it had never had access to it in the past.212 The Special chamber did not agree that there 
were relevant circumstances to warrant an adjustment of the equidistance line.213 At the 
final stage, the Special Chamber carried out the disproportionality test and decided that 
the ratio of the allocated areas is approximately 1:2.02 in favour of Cote d’Ivoire and 
that this ratio does not lead to any significant disproportion in the allocation of maritime 
areas to the parties in relation to the lengths of their respective coasts.214 The Special 
Chamber also specified the course of the delimitation line in the continental shelf 
beyond 200M reasoning that, “there is in law only a single continental shelf.215 The 
Court however did not specify the endpoint of the boundary line. 
 
The parties like in the Cameroon /Nigeria situation have set up a committee made up of 
members of both states to assist in the implementation of the judgment. Both parties 
also agreed to abide strictly by and cooperate to implement the ruling of the Special 
Chamber of ITLOS and to further collaborate within the framework of a bilateral 
Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) executed by the Heads of States of the two 
states on 17 October 2017. 216 This delimitation like the other cases in the Gulf of 
Guinea concerns the sharing of resources and as discussed in the beginning of this 
chapter, delimitation of the maritime boundary is a necessary first step in the process. 
It would give certainty of title to enable concessions to be granted for oil exploration 
and exploitation. However, the ruling emphasised geographical factors to the exclusion 
of resource related criteria like the location of oil wells. Nevertheless, it appears that the 
boundary arrived at by the Special Chamber is advantageous to Ghana as all its 
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Figure 4: ITLOS ruling  
 
Source: Reproduced by Nana Adusei Poku, Lead Geomatic Engineer for Ghana 
National Petroleum Company 
 
1.4.2. Partially settled maritime boundaries 
 
I. Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea  
Equatorial Guinea consists of a mainland territory Rio Muni and five small islands - 
Bioko, Corisco, Annobon, Elobey Chico and Elobey Grande. Bioko the site of the 
capital Malabo lies 40 km off the coast of Cameroon. Annobon island is 350 km west-
south -west of Cape Lopez in Gabon. Corisco and the two Elobey islands are in Corisco 
bay on the border of Rio Muni and Gabon. Equatorial Guinea has overlapping maritime 
boundaries with Cameroon and Nigeria and during the pendency of the ICJ case 
between Nigeria and Cameroon, Nigeria started negotiations with Equatorial Guinea 
for a single maritime boundary between the two states in their exclusive economic 
zones. The motivation for the delimitation was oil and gas activities which were 
becoming a very important economic activity for both states.217 During bilateral 
 




negotiations Equatorial Guinea proposed a median line boundary whilst Nigeria 
proposed an adjusted median line solution which took account of the relative lengths of 
their coastlines which favoured Nigeria.218 
 
A compromise between the two positions was reached in a treaty signed on 23rd 
September 2000 which came into force in April 2002. The line the parties agreed upon 
ran from a point slightly due south of the notional Nigeria – Cameroon – Equatorial 
Guinea tripoint to its south-western limit on the median line between Equatorial Guinea 
and Sao Tome and Principe.219 It was agreed that each party would confine itself to its 
side of the boundary.220The parties considered the oil fields belonging to the two states 
relevant circumstances in the delimitation. They therefore shifted the equidistance line 
to accommodate an oil field licensed by Nigeria so that the field was untouched by the 
delimitation and ensured that each party kept its oil interests.221 The equidistance line 
was further adjusted in favour of Nigeria due to its longer coastline.222 To solve the 
problem of the straddling oil fields on the maritime boundary arrived at, the parties 
agreed to make the appropriate unitisation arrangements for the area to be developed in 
a commercially feasible manner.223 This will be discussed more fully in the next chapter 
dealing with joint development agreements. It is clear that the parties being free to 
negotiate managed to procure a line that ensured that the oil fields that were so important 
to them were taken into consideration in the delimitation. This could only have been 
achieved by the excellent cooperation between the two states. The Agreement covered 
only part of the maritime boundary as the ICJ was at the time, in the process of hearing 
the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria. Due to the fact that the results of that case 
were likely to affect the other maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Guinea, the parties 
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agreed therefore to complete the delimitation after the ICJ case was concluded.224 This 
is some evidence that states in the region are not disposed to delimiting their maritime 
boundary in such way as to affect third parties. To date however Cameroon, Nigeria 
and Equatorial Guinea, have not completed this boundary.225 Figure 5 below shows the 
Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria Treaty line depicted by the blue line. 
Figure 5: Map of Nigeria-Cameroon Treaty  
 
Source: UK Hydrographic Office  
 
II. Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe 
Sao Tome and Principe is an archipelagic state with overlapping maritime boundaries 
with Equatorial Guinea and the two states’ coasts are opposite each other. On 26 June 
1999, Equatorial Guinea and the island of Sao Tome and Principe, signed a treaty in 
Malabo, delimiting their maritime boundary.226 The preamble to the agreement stated 
that the delimitation was to be done in an equitable manner using equidistance as the 
general criterion for delimitation. This criterion had been incorporated in the national 
 
224 Ibid Article 3.  
225 This was communicated to the author through personal communication with an official in Nigeria. 
226 Treaty Regarding the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between the Republic of Equatorial 
Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, (adopted on 26 June 1999, entered into 
force in 1999)< 
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/GNQ-
STP1999MB.PDF> assessed on 12 May 2012 
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legislation of both states and so there was no dispute regarding its use. Sao Tome and 
Principe by its Act No.1/98 adopted on 23 March 1998 provided for the establishment 
of a 200 M EEZ using the “median equidistance line” as between states with opposite 
coasts.227 Equatorial Guinea on 6 March 1999 also designated the median line as the 
maritime boundary of Equatorial Guinea which contains a list of geographical 
coordinates of points for drawing the outer limit lines of the territorial sea and the EEZ 
off the island of Bioko and the coast of Rio Muni to the north and the outer limits lines 
of the EEZ off the island of Annobon in the south.228 
 
The boundary set out by the text of the treaty consists of two parts. The first part 
separates Annobón Island (belonging to Equatorial Guinea) and São Tomé Island and 
there is an approximate equidistance line between the two islands.229 The second part 
of the boundary which is also an approximate equidistance line, separates the mainland 
Equatorial Guinea (Río Muni) from Príncipe Island.230 The resulting boundary 
represents a compromise agreeable to these two island states. However there is no 
reference to the continental shelf boundaries though the two states have submitted 
‘Preliminary Information Indicative of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf and 
Description of the Status of Preparation of Making a Submission’ to the CLCS.231 It can 
be assumed that once they have completed the procedures under Article 76, the 
boundary would follow the one established for the EEZ. Figures 6 below show the 
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Figure 6 Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe Maritime Boundary 
Agreement 
 
Source: 'Equatorial Guinea–São Tomé & Príncipe Maritime Boundary Agreement' 
(Sovereign Limits, 2020) <https://sovereignlimits.com/boundaries/equatorial-guinea-
sao-tome-and-principe> accessed 29 May 2020. 
  
III. Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe  
São Tomé and Príncipe islands are about 250 km west of northern Gabon. They are 140 
km apart and form the southwestern end of a chain of mountains and islands. Sao Tome 
and Principe and Gabon are states with opposite coasts in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2001, 
they negotiated an agreement for their maritime Boundary. 232The line of delimitation 
was drawn equidistant from the baselines from which the territorial sea of each State is 
measured. Sao Tome and Principe used a system of archipelagic baselines and Gabon a 
straight baseline system as declared in their respective legislations.233 The method of 
 
232 Agreement on the Delimitation of the Maritime Border between the Gabonese Republic and the 
Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, (adopted on 26 April 2001, not in force) 
<https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/GAB-
STP2001MB.PDF> 
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which delimited the outer limits of its EEZ. Gabon claimed a 12-nm territorial sea and EEZ of 200 nm 
under Act No. 9 of 1984. 
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delimitation used was equidistance between the two baseline systems.234 It appears that 
proportionality did not play a part in arriving at the agreed boundary line 
notwithstanding the fact that Sao Tome and Principe is a group of islands whose 
relevant coastline is shorter than that of Gabon. The equidistance line however could 
not be completed in the treaty due to the fact that in both the north and the south, the 
maritime boundary with Equatorial Guinea had not yet been fixed. This pending 
boundary is discussed in the section on pending boundaries below.  
Figure 7: Gabon -Sao Tome and Principe maritime Boundary Agreement 
 
Source: 'Gabon–São Tomé And Príncipe' <https://sovereignlimits.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2019/04/GAB_STP_web.jpg> accessed 23 May 2020 
 
Even though Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS do not specify the method of maritime 
delimitation, states are free to use any method they choose to arrive at a maritime 
 
234 Agreement on the Delimitation of the Maritime Border between the Gabonese Republic and the 
Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, (adopted on 26 April 2001, not in force) 
<https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/GAB-
STP2001MB.PDF> art 2. 
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boundary between them. However, in these delimitations the states chose to apply 
international law principles. 
 
1.4.3. Pending Maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Guinea  
The maritime zones of most of the states in the Gulf of Guinea overlap and remain to 
be determined. The unique geography of the region shows bilateral and trilateral 
maritime boundary relationships. In the discussions that follow these bilateral and 
trilateral relationships will first be identified and then analysed using the principles and 
methods discussed in the first part as developed in international jurisprudence.  
 
I. Nigeria and Benin  
Benin is located on the Gulf of Guinea, has a coastal length of approximately 125 km 
and is adjacent to Nigeria to the east and Togo to the west. It has a concave coast and 
would have to delimit maritime boundaries with Togo and Nigeria and has indicted that 
it shares a continental shelf with Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire as well.235 Negotiations begun 
in 1968 for an agreement on the maritime boundary between the Benin and Nigeria, 
following Nigeria’s protest against Benin granting an exploration license in the area. 
Negotiations stalled many times and in August 2006, Benin and Nigeria signed a 
maritime boundary treaty which has not yet been ratified by Benin but has been ratified 
by Nigeria.236 The maritime boundary is a single all-purpose boundary.237  
 
The coastline between Nigeria and Benin, taking the other neighbours like Togo and 
Ghana into account, make the use of the strict equidistance method difficult.238 This is 
 
235 Republic of Benin, ‘Informations Préliminaires Indicatives sur les Limites Extérieures du Plateau 
Continental du Benin’, (May 2009) 
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236 Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi, 'Fault Lines in Maritime Security' (2013) 22 African 
Security Review 7; Republic of Benin, ‘Informations Préliminaires Indicatives sur les Limites 
Extérieures du Plateau Continental du Benin’, (May 2009) 
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4256–4269. Article 5 of the Treaty shows that the boundary covers the airspace, waters, seabed or 




due to the protrusions in the Nigerian and Ghanaian coastline. The equidistance line 
takes a sharp turn away from Nigeria’s coastline and then back towards Ghana thereby 
cutting off a big chunk of the maritime space in front of Benin’s coastline. The line as 
it progresses is intercepted by the Togo/Ghana line where Togo is then cut off and the 
line continues with only Nigeria and Ghana featuring on it at the last 12 M and towards 
the outer limits of both parties EEZ.239 These were obviously the relevant circumstances 
that called for the parties to adjust the equidistance line more towards Benin’s side of 
the boundary whilst compensating Nigeria to the northern section.240 The line then 
looked like a meridian drawn as a perpendicular from the coastline. Benin thus got a 
full 200 M EEZ but the endpoint of the boundary has not been determined as Ghana 
was involved at that point creating a trilateral relationship between them.241 In its 
preamble, the treaty refers to UNCLOS and reiterates that the parties have agreed the 
treaty in a spirit of brotherhood and goodwill.242  
 
The agreement is generally regarded as favouring Benin because it departs from a strict 
application of the equidistance method which would have meant that Benin would have 
a much more limited maritime space (Figure 7 shows the treaty line).243 It would be 
recalled that Benin has submitted preliminary information to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf for an extended continental shelf (which it subsequently 
updated), showing that it is using the meridian method for delimitation with its 
neighbours.244 This makes unclear the status of the treaty with Nigeria where 
equidistance was used especially as Benin’s parliament has declined to ratify the 
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Figure 8: Benin-Nigeria Maritime Boundary Agreement   
 
Source: Benin–Nigeria’<https://sovereignlimits.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2019/04/BEN_NGA_web.jpg> accessed 23 May 2020 
  
  
II. Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe 
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe are opposite each other. Whilst Nigeria was 
negotiating with Equatorial Guinea, it was also negotiating with Sao Tome and Principe. 
The latter claimed a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, limited in the north-east by the 
median line negotiated with Equatorial Guinea and in the north - west by what Sao 
Tome and Principe perceived as the median line between it and Nigeria. Nigeria, on the 
other hand, under its 200-mile EEZ legislation, claimed an area which overlapped very 
considerably with Sao Tome and Principe’s exclusive economic zone. The negotiations 
which had been difficult resulted in the setting up of a Joint Development Zone for the 
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exploitation of resources.246 This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
The settlement of the maritime boundary having been suspended the parties would have 
to finish the delimitation at a later date. In this delimitation, the huge disparity in the 
length of the respective coastlines of the two countries may be a relevant factor to be 
considered in any decision to shift the equidistance line. 
 
III. Ghana, Togo and Benin 
Like in the Bay of Bengal, the likely of grey areas in the GOG is high. One such is likely 
between Ghana and Togo. Using the equidistance line Togo is likely to be cut of about 
70 M into its EEZ due to a protrusion near the eastern boundary at Cape St Paul. To 
avoid this cut off and accord Togo its full EEZ of 200 M there may be the need to adjust 
the equidistance line. Once that happens it is likely that the sort of situation between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar would be created where Ghana’s extended continental shelf 
would then be situated within Togo’s EEZ so that Togo would have sovereign rights 
over the superadjacent waters whilst Ghana has rights over the extended continental 
shelf. The only way the two states can coexist in this situation is by finding creative 
ways of cooperating as recommended by the tribunals in the Bay of Bengal cases.  
 
Ghana, Togo and Benin are adjacent states whose geographical situation is such that the 
coasts of Togo and Benin are concave but that of Ghana is not. The length of their 
coastlines is also unequal as Ghana has a coastal façade of about 500 kilometres, 
whereas Benin and Togo have one which is ten times shorter, and therefore their 
maritime zones are enclaved by the maritime zones of Ghana and Nigeria. Regarding 
the maritime boundary between Ghana and Togo, one expert247 suggests that the 
relevant coast could be from Achowa point (on Cape Three Points in Ghana) to Anecho 
(Togo/Benin boundary) whose northern limit is in the 12M limit of the territorial sea 
and southern limit is the 200 M EEZ limit.248. The western limit is the median line 
boundary with Ivory Coast and the eastern limit is the median line boundary between 
Togo / Benin, and Ghana / Nigeria. The coastal fronts are Newtown to Aflao to Anecho 
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(Togo). These direct coastal fronts are more likely to be considered by a Court or 
tribunal because they could be regarded as the relevant area for the delimitation in a 
delimitation between Ghana and Togo.249 In considering only the Ghana /Togo area, 
Togo’s area would lie partly east of the Togo/ Benin median line and partly west of the 
Ghana /Togo median line.250  
 
The area east of the Togo / Benin line would have to be settled between Togo and Benin. 
This scenario, as noted by Tim Daniels, puts Ghana, Togo and Benin in an interesting 
juxtaposition.251 He observes that if a pure equidistance is used, for delimitation of the 
three states maritime boundaries, Togo would be cut-off like Germany was in the North 
Sea whilst Ghana would be afforded a disproportionate offshore area,252 This is due to 
the protrusion at Cape Saint Paul on the eastern boundary, which causes  the 
equidistance line to deflect outwards. Togo could therefore argue that there are special 
or relevant circumstances to shift the equidistance line. Beazley makes suggestions for 
such situations when he stated that “…by employing a general direction or general 
directions of the coast and a series of perpendiculars to form the maritime boundaries, 
many of the anomalies which might result from using strict or modified equidistance 
could be avoided.”253 The  likely disadvantage of this method is that it is often 
impracticable to establish any general direction of the coast as it would depend on the 
scale of the charts used and how much coast is used to determine any general 
direction.254 In the Guinea / Guinea - Bissau  Arbitration,255 where this method was 
used,  the coasts were partly adjacent and partly opposite as well as concave whilst the 
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and to avoid a cut-off effect took into consideration the general direction of the coastline 
of West Africa and drew a straight-line perpendicular to it.256  
 
In the larger region states have occasionally used other methods like parallels of latitude 
or meridians of longitude in situations of cut off. For example, Gambia/ Senegal have 
used the parallels of latitude solution to avoid a cut-off for the Gambia as figure 9 below 
shows. 
 
Figure 9: The Gambia-Senegal Maritime Boundary Agreement  257 
 
Source: ‘The Senegal-Gambia' <https://sovereignlimits.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2019/04/GMB_SEN_web.jpg> accessed 23 May 2020. 
 
Togo has prescribed that the method of delimitation with Ghana and Benin would be 
by meridians.258 These methods are rarely used in the region and current jurisprudence 
does not support it. In line with the jurisprudence, the states have to first draw a 
provisional equidistance line and then adjust it as necessary to take account of special 
circumstances like cut -offs to arrive at an equitable solution. Thereafter, there should 
 
256Ibid para 108 
257 ‘The Senegal-Gambia' <https://sovereignlimits.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2019/04/GMB_SEN_web.jpg> accessed 23 May 2020. 
258 See Transcript of Hearing ITLOS/PV.17/C23/5/Rev.1.(Pitron) 
59 
 
be a check to determine whether any disproportionality has been created by the line. 
The parties would need to consider cases like the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case 
where the court modified the equidistance line so that it was not so close to the Tunisian 
coast as to encroach on Tunisia’s seaward extension.259Another case to consider would 
be the Gulf of Fonseca case (El Salvador / Honduras) Nicaragua intervening, the court 
adjusting the equidistance line prevented a serious cut off for Honduras which would 
otherwise have been left with a narrow corridor between El Salvador and Nicaragua.260 
A more recent case which can further be considered is the Bay of Bengal Maritime 
Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India261 where it was determined that, 
in order to warrant an adjustment of a provisional equidistance line, such cut-off effect 
must, first, prevent the State from extending its maritime boundary as far as 
international law permits and, second, prevent an equitable solution from being reached. 
These two conditions can be said to exist in the delimitation between Ghana, Togo and 
Benin as illustrated by Figure 10 below. 
Figure 10 showing Togo’s cut off if a pure equidistance line is used 
 
 
Source: Redrawn from J.C.E White, 'Maritime Boundaries: Report on the Report on 
the Technical Aspects of the Delimitation of Ghana’s Maritime Boundaries' (The 
Commonwealth Secretariat Marlborough House Pall Mall London 1987) by Nana 
Adusei Poku 
 
259 Case concerning the Continental Shelf Delimitation (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), [1982], 
I.C.J. Rep 18. 
260Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, El Salvador and Nicaragua (intervening) v Honduras, 
Judgment, Merits, ICJ GL No 75, [1992] ICJ Rep 351, 




A solution for the states would be for them to agree on the relevant coasts and basepoints 
and then according to the jurisprudence construct a provisional equidistance line. As 
there are clearly geographical factors that merit an adjustment, the countries can agree 
to modify the line by deflecting it after the point where Togo would have cut off by a 
strict equidistance in such a way as to allow Togo its 200M EEZ. This would have to 
be done with the cooperation of both Benin and Nigeria in order for any maritime 
boundary agreed on to be equitable. 
This negotiation could be achieved through the facilitation of the already existing Ghana 
- Togo Permanent Joint Commission for Co-operation. This body is made up of high-
level officials of both states and initially served as a framework for discussing issues of 
importance to the states like cooperation in the sectors of security, immigration, 
agriculture and environment among others.262 However, in recent times maritime 
boundary delimitation has featured highly on the agenda of the Commission’s meetings. 
This has been prompted by some incidents of Togolese authorities challenging 
Ghanaian vessels in waters Ghana believed to be its waters.263 Subsequently at a 
meeting between the presidents of the two states, the Ghanaian president gave an 
indication that Ghana might be more favourably disposed to cooperative measures 
rather than third party dispute settlement in the delimitation of the maritime boundary 
between the two states.264 
 
Togo also appears to favour negotiation above third-party dispute settlement. Its cabinet 
has adopted legislation dated 6 July 2011, regarding, the, “delimitation of the maritime 
boundaries of the Togolese Republic with the Republic of Benin to the east and the 
Republic of Ghana to the west by the meridians of the boundary posts located on the 
baselines of the territorial sea of the Togolese Republic”.265 This decree, it is reported, 
provides the legal framework for the delimitation of the maritime boundaries between 
 
262 Communications Bureau, 'Ghana, Togo Resolve to Deepen Co-Operation & Bilateral Ties' 
(Presidency.gov.gh, 2017) <http://presidency.gov.gh/briefing-room/news-style-2/230-ghana-togo-
resolve-to-deepen-co-operation-bilateral-ties> accessed 18 May 2020. 
263 Republic of Ghana and Republic of Togo, 'Outcome of Meeting Between Ghana and Togo on the 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Held at the Accra International Conference Centre' (5 June 
2018) This document which is not publicly available is in the author’s possession. 
264Ibid.  
265 'Togo To Demarcate Maritime Borders with Ghana, Benin - People's Daily Online' (En.people.cn, 
2011) <http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/90855/7433628.html> accessed 20 April 2020. 
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Togo and its neighbours to the east and west.266 Negotiations have begun in earnest 
between the two countries. A survey team made up of officials from Ghana and Togo 
met at the border between Ghana and Togo to adopt a common methodology for the 
conduct of field work to determine the land boundary terminus from where the maritime 
boundary would be delimited.267  
 
Regarding Togo and Benin, a Joint Commission is in active negotiation to settle the 
maritime boundary between them.268 Some preliminary work in this regard has been 
carried out jointly by the two countries including the reconstruction of four boundary 
markers at their land boundary terminus which were washed away by coastal erosion; 
developing and editing, of a 1: 10,000 scale map of the coastal section necessary for the 
delimitation of the Benin-Togolese maritime boundary.269 As evidence of their 
cooperation, a joint Preliminary Information has been submitted to the CLCS for an 
extended continental Shelf in May 2009. Both countries have decided to adopt the 
meridian method for the delimitation of their maritime boundary.270 On September 24 
and 25, 2019 in Cotonou, in the Republic of Benin, the ninth session of the Benin-Togo 
Joint Commission for the delimitation of the maritime boundary was held. It addressed 
especially the submission of their continental shelf beyond 200M and the parties were 
satisfied with the significant strides made so far. In making these decisions, these two 
states have had no regard to Nigeria and Ghana, their closest neighbours, which would 
be affected by the outcome of this negotiation. There may well be challenges if all the 
states along that stretch of coast do not concur to the adoption of this method. This 
Commission would therefore have to further cooperate with Ghana and Nigeria in this 




267 'Fifth Meeting on Ghana/Togo Maritime Boundary Negotiations Opens in Accra' (Ghanaweb.com, 
2019) <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Fifth-meeting-on-Ghana-Togo-
Maritime-Boundary-Negotiations-opens-in-Accra-775145> accessed 20 April 2020. 
268 ‘Réunion De La Commission Mixte Togo-Bénin De Délimitation Des Frontières - Le Hub Rural’ 
(Hubrural.org, 2020) <http://hubrural.org/Reunion-de-la-Commission-mixte.html?lang=fr> accessed 
20 April 2020. 
269 Agence Ecofin, ‘Le Togo Protège Ses Frontières Maritimes’ (Agence Ecofin, 2011) 
<https://www.agenceecofin.com/gestion-publique/0408-760-le-togo-protege-ses-frontieres-maritimes> 
accessed 18 May 2020. 
270 Republic of Benin, ‘Informations Préliminaires Indicatives sur les Limites Extérieures du Plateau 
Continental du Benin’, (May 2009) 
<https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/ben_2009preliminaryinformati
on_update.pdf> Accessed 12 May 2020 
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IV. Ghana, Benin and Nigeria 
Regarding the Ghana, Benin and Nigeria maritime boundary, the configuration of the 
Ghana and Nigeria coastline shows protrusions of the Niger Delta in Nigeria and Cape 
Three points in Ghana. The configuration of Nigeria’s coastline to the east of the 
Nigeria/Benin equidistance line is a stretch of line which goes out to the full 200 miles 
where Nigeria and Ghana likely have a common maritime boundary.271 Nigeria and 
Benin have already agreed a maritime boundary in 2006, using the equidistance method, 
albeit not yet in force.272 Nigeria is currently in negotiations with Ghana to delimit the 
two parties’ maritime boundary.273 The parties have agreed to use the same median rule 
they used in the preparations of the Extended Continental Shelf submissions and to 
finalise the base points and establish the contributing points to the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) outer limits;274 They decided to set up a Joint Committee to collate relevant 
data and construct the maritime boundary using an appropriate software and to draft a 
maritime boundary treaty for discussion by the parties.275 
 
The boundary between Nigeria and Ghana results in a tripoint which includes Benin. 
Therefore, the three countries in their negotiations would have to cooperate to agree on 
the tripoint to complete the maritime boundary. If this does not happen then Ghana and 
Nigeria would have to delimit the boundary in such a way as not to prejudice Benin’s 
right to its maritime boundary which would be difficult. This would be in line with the 
international law principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt whereby agreements are 
only binding on states which are party to it.276 It would also accord with other examples  
in the region, where in their maritime boundary treaties states have left the section of 
the boundaries where third states become involved, undelimited. In view of the 
indications by Benin’s legislation not to ratify the Treaty with Nigeria, it is likely that 
 
271 J.C.E White, 'Maritime Boundaries: Report on the Report on the Technical Aspects of the 
Delimitation of Ghana’s Maritime Boundaries' (The Commonwealth Secretariat Marlborough House 
Pall Mall London 1987) 
272 Treaty on the Maritime Boundary and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (Benin/Nigeria) 
(signed 4 August 2006, not in force) 
273 5 meetings of the Negotiation of Maritime Boundary between Nigeria and Ghana have held since 
2008 
274 ‘Ghana-Nigeria Maritime Boundary delimitation Within 200 nautical Miles’ (6th Meeting held in 
Accra on 10 January 2012). 
275 ibid 
276 Latin: a treaty binds the parties and only the parties; it does not create obligations for a third states. 




the parties may have to renegotiate the boundary and Benin is very likely to press for 
the meridian method.277 This would complicate the  settlement of the maritime boundary 
and would also not be in accordance with the current principles and practical methods 
of maritime boundary delimitation as developed by international courts and tribunals. 
 
Figure 11: Map demonstrating the median line boundaries in the EEZ of Ghana, Togo, 
Benin and Nigeria  
 
 
Source: J.C.E White, 'Maritime Boundaries: Report on the Report on the Technical 
Aspects of the Delimitation of Ghana’s Maritime Boundaries' (The Commonwealth 
Secretariat Marlborough House Pall Mall London 1987) 
 
V. Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria 
As discussed above, the ICJ in the Nigeria / Cameroon case, noted that the equidistance 
line it had adopted for the delimitation between Nigeria and Cameroon could not be 
 
277 In the Preliminary Information Benin, has presented to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, after its agreement with Nigeria, it has indicated a preference for the meridian method. 
Republic of Benin, ‘Informations Préliminaires Indicatives sur les Limites Extérieures du Plateau 
Continental du Benin’, (May 2009) 
<https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/ben_2009preliminaryinformati
on_update.pdf> Accessed 12 May 2020 
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extended very far.278 This was because the court held that it did not have the jurisdiction 
to take a decision which might affect the rights of Equatorial Guinea whose island, 
Bioko is situated less than 24 M from Cameroon’s coast.279 Additionally, Nigeria 
already had a partial maritime boundary agreement with Equatorial Guinea. Therefore, 
the maritime boundary can only be completed between the three states if they come 
together to determine their tripoint boundary. The most likely method to be used would 
be the equidistance method since the ICJ had already shown the direction the line would 
go leaving the endpoint to the parties.280 Further, the respective parties’ maritime 
legislations specify equidistance as the method of delimitation.281 The geography of the 
area would require a decision to be taken on the treatment to be given to the island of 
Bioko which can be said to constitute a relevant circumstance due to its closeness to the 
outer limit of the territorial seas of both Cameroon and Nigeria. 
 
In the Cameroon /Nigeria case Equatorial Guinea emphasised two important facts about 
the island of Bioko. First, that it is an island of “substantial size and importance” being 
about 2000 sq. kilometres with a population representing a quarter of Equatorial 
Guinea’s population. It is also home to Equatorial Guinea’s capital Malabo. This island, 
Equatorial Guinea emphasized cannot be ignored or enclaved as advocated by 
 
278 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), Judgment, [2002] ICJ Rep para 307. 
279Ibid 
280 Nigeria/Cameroon case para. 307. 
281 Article 10 of the Act No. 15/1984 of 12 November 1984 on the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic 
Zone of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (1) states that “The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond 
and adjacent to the territorial sea. The exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea 
extends from the outer limit of the territorial sea of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea up to a distance of 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Article 
11 (1) of the Act dealing with the EEZ state that, “Except where otherwise provided in international 
treaties concluded with States whose coastlines are opposite or adjacent to those of Equatorial Guinea, 
the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone of Equatorial Guinea shall not extend beyond the 
equidistant median line. (2). Equidistant line means that line every point of which is at an equal distance 
from the nearest points on the line of passage drawn from each State in accordance with international 
law. By Article 4 of  Act No.1/1999 of 6 March 1999 designating the median line as the maritime 
boundary of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, it was provided that the boundaries of the maritime 
jurisdiction of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, as designated in articles1, 2 and 3 of this Act,( which 
clearly sets out the coordinates for the respective maritime boundaries) are intended to be without 
prejudice to any other decision which the Government may take in the future in relation to each of its 
neighbouring Governments regarding the boundaries of the aforementioned maritime jurisdiction in the 
areas in question. The Nigerian legislation on maritime boundaries - Exclusive Economic Zone Decree 
No. 28 of 5 October 1978 provides that the provisions of any treaty or other written agreement between 
Nigeria and any neighbouring littoral State, the delimitation of the Exclusive Zone between Nigeria and 
any such State shall be the median or equidistance line. Cameroon for its part has by its legislation (Act 
No 74/16 of 5 December 1974 Fixing the Limit of the Territorial Waters of the United Republic of 
Cameroon) fixed its territorial sea at 50 nm but has not claimed any EEZ. 
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Cameroon.282 Nigeria in support of Equatorial Guinea’s position, was of the view that 
Bioko is a substantial island in terms of area and population and also the seat of 
Equatorial Guinea’s capital and therefore cannot be totally ignored or simply treated as 
a relevant circumstance but be accorded partial effect.283 It appears that a potential 
solution would be to give Bioko a corridor as was done in the Saint Pierre and Miquelon 
Case where a corridor running north to south of about 188-nautical-mile (348 km) south 
of the islands was awarded to France, presumably to allow France access to its EEZ 
from international waters without having to pass through the Canadian EEZ.284 This 
delimitation of the maritime boundary between the three states is further complicated 
by a sovereignty dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at 
the mouth of the Ntem River. The states are obliged under international law to cooperate 
in this situation in order to produce an equitable solution. 
 
VI. Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe. 
Sao Tome and Principe as described above is an archipelago opposite Equatorial Guinea 
and Gabon. The situation with the potential maritime boundary between Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe, is that though Sao Tome and Principe has 
delimited boundaries with both Equatorial Guinea and Gabon there are overlapping 
endpoints.285 The Gabon / Sao Tome and Principe endpoint is approximately 7 M north 
of and beyond the Equatorial Guinea – Sao Tome and Principe endpoint.286 In the south 
Gabon and Equatorial Guinea must agree on the effect of the tiny island Annobon which 
belongs to Equatorial Guinea. The eastern and southern sectors of Sao Tome and 
Principe’s EEZ are also affected by the Equatorial Guinean mainland, Rio Muni and the 
Annobon island belonging to Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.287  
 
 
282 ‘Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea,’ Land and Maritime Boundary between 
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Gabon and Equatorial Guinea are adjacent states but because of the islands of Annobon 
and Rio Muni belonging to Equatorial Guinea, they are also in a position of 
oppositeness.  The two states dispute sovereignty of the islands in Corisco Bay. The bay 
covers about 2,700 sq.km and the Corisco island which has an area of 14 sq.km is part 
of Equatorial Guinea and is at the mouth of Corisco Bay off the coast of West Africa.288 
Within the Corisco Bay are the Equatorial Guinean islands namely Corisco island, 
Elobey Grande and Elobey Chico which are inhabited. There are also several small 
uninhabited islands in the bay – Mbanie, Coctotiers and Congas and it these, that the 
states are disputing because of the high likelihood that the area has a rich deposit of oil. 
289 This may account for the delay in finding a solution to the maritime boundary dispute 
between the two states. The dispute surfaced in 1972 and relates to the interpretation of 
Article 7 of the Franco-Spanish Convention of 27 June 1900. The disagreement has 
been relatively latent, but there are occasional skirmishes, such as in October 1995, 
when Equatorial Guinean authorities seized Gabonese fishing boats near Corisco 
Island.290  
 
Currently, however, good progress has been made towards resolving the Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon dispute with the help of the former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-
moo.291 In 2016 the parties signed an agreement to submit their dispute to the ICJ.292 
Until the issue of the sovereignty of the islands is settled, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon 
are unlikely to delimit their territorial sea and EEZ boundary in the Gulf of Guinea.293 
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In the south of Sao Tome Island, Gabon claimed a 12M territorial sea and EEZ out to a 
maximum of 200nm (370km), under Act No. 9 of 1984. According to Article 11 of that 
law, overlapping claims are to be resolved according to generally recognised principles 
of international law –equidistance is not mentioned. Gabon ratified the 1982 
Convention on 11 March 1998. Eventually Gabon must delimit the territorial sea and 
exclusive economic zone boundaries with Equatorial Guinea and EEZ boundaries with 
the opposite state of Sao Tome and Principe. The equidistance line appears to be the 
method likely to be used by the states as in delimiting its EEZ limit, Sao Tome and 
Principe explicitly designated the coordinates of its equidistance line with Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria.294 The islands of Sao Tome and Principe are likely to be 
accorded effect as they also form an archipelagic state which is very relevant to 
maritime delimitation in terms of the use of archipelagic basepoints for the drawing of 
the delimitation line. However the outcome of the sovereignty dispute between 
Equatorial guinea and Gabon could have an effect on the location of the tripoint, but the 
trilateral relationship will still exist among the three states.295 The solution can only be 
effected through cooperation between the states as they are obligated under international 
law to do. 
 
1.5. Regional Cooperation in maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of 
Guinea 
 
One way to deal with overlapping claims to maritime zones may be through regional 
solutions, as provided by Article 123 of UNCLOS especially in the case of enclosed or 
semi-enclosed seas like the Gulf of Guinea. This provision encourages states “cooperate 
with each other in the exercise of their duties” and one such duty is to cooperate in the 
delimitation of their maritime boundaries as provided by Articles 74 (1) and 83(1) of 
UNCLOS. Significantly, the states in the Gulf of Guinea met in Gabon on 19 November 
1999 and decided to create a body called the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) which 
is expected to serve as a “framework for consultation, coordination, harmonisation and 
cooperation in the subregion, particularly as regards exploitation of natural wealth in 
 
294 Ibid. 
295Coalter G. Lathrop, ‘Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ in David Colson and Robert 
Smith (eds) International Maritime Boundaries (Vol V) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005) 3339. 
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the Gulf of Guinea.” 296 The Heads of State in the Final Communiqué of the meeting 
emphasised support for agreements on the delimitation of maritime boundaries between 
certain member States, and encouraged the inclusion of others, in order to put an end to 
actual or potential territorial disputes.297 
 
The Commission was subsequently established by Treaty signed in Libreville Gabon 
on 3 July 2001. Its member states include Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Congo, Sao Tome 
and Principe,298 Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo and Equatorial 
Guinea299and recently Ghana. Cote d’Ivoire, Togo and Benin were represented at the 
3rd Summit held in Malabo. 300 The membership of the Commission is limited to states 
bordering the Gulf of Guinea region.301 At the establishment of the Commission, land 
and maritime boundary disputes among member states were rife. The Nigeria Cameroon 
dispute over the Bakassi in the International Court of Justice was ongoing and its ruling 
of 10 October 2002 was given wide publicity. Also, sovereignty claims over the Mbanie 
Peninsula between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon had reached a critical point with 
Gabon making claims to the Corisco Bay islands of the Peninsula in 2003.  
 
Due to many factors including lack of political will and inadequate funding, the 
Commission remained in an inactive state till 2006 when the first summit of Heads of 
State and Governments was held in Gabon.302 During the next summit two years after, 
the leaders recommended that the Gulf of Guinea be transformed into a ‘peace and 
security priority zone’. Subsequently due to the threat posed by crimes at sea like piracy, 
armed robbery and illicit activities at sea, the third summit in August 2013 saw the 
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leaders endorsing a decision to revitalise the Commission and make it operational.303 
From July 2015 to February 2017, the Executive Secretariat carried out various 
activities to revitalize the GGC in order to make it more relevant in regional affairs.304 
However the activities of the commission regarding the revitalisation do not reflect its 
earlier decision to settle potential maritime boundaries in the region.305 From the work 
of the Commission so far, it can be concluded that it has not distinguished itself in the 
area of maritime boundary delimitation as evidenced by the fact that so far it has been 
more preoccupied with maritime security matters.306 Cooperation in maritime boundary 
delimitation issues would no doubt need to be brought back into the agenda of the 
Commission to assist states begin delimiting their maritime boundaries including the 
extended continental shelf boundaries. In the section that follows, the states’ compliance 
with Articles 74 (1) and 83 (1) to settle their boundaries by agreement which entails 
negotiations are examined.  
 
1.6. Conclusions  
 
The above discussions demonstrate the importance of cooperation in maritime boundary 
delimitation in the Gulf of Guinea. This is mandated by Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of 
UNCLOS. However, in order to fully comply with this obligation, the states must also 
apply the rules and principles established by international courts and tribunals to 
facilitate the settlement of their maritime boundaries. This would make the process more 
predictable. The Gulf of Guinea region as a semi enclosed sea according to Articles 122 
and 123 of UNCLOS has an obligation albeit not a mandatory one to cooperate in the 
performance of their duties under this Convention which include delimiting their 
maritime boundaries as well as protecting and preserving the marine environment and 
managing the fisheries. These duties are better performed in a region with clear 
jurisdictional boundaries. Within the context of these obligations the many undelimited 
maritime boundaries in the region are an issue of concern. These must be agreed in a 
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spirit of cooperation to facilitate regional cooperation under Article 123 of UNCLOS. 
States therefore need to be aware of and utilise the relevant rules and principles for 
delimiting maritime boundaries, found mainly in the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), and the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals as has been 
discussed.  
 
Negotiation appears to be the states’ preferred means of settling their maritime 
boundary disputes. Currently, the states have been cooperating, through joint 
commissions, which among others have a mandate to settle maritime boundary disputes 
regarding the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf within 200 
nm. Several instances have been cited and discussed above. However, due to the 
geography of the area, negotiations between one set of states is likely to affect other 
states and so the boundary cannot be fully settled without the involvement of third 
states. This is the case with the settlement of the maritime boundary between Ghana, 
Togo, Benin and Nigeria as well as Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome 
and Principe and Gabon. The relevant states therefore need to be part of the negotiations 
in order for the boundary to be completely determined. Negotiation appears to be 
appropriate for the states in question as it is a cost-effective method. Though endowed 
with natural resources the states have struggling economies. Negotiation therefore 
would save them from paying for protracted and expensive international litigation. 
Further it would strengthen the bonds of friendship between the states and lead to further 
cooperation in the exploitation of the resources in the area. 
 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the way these maritime boundaries have been 
settled in the Gulf of Guinea show that where in their negotiations, the equidistance 
method was used and adjusted by relevant or special considerations like oil practice and 
economic factors, the parties were successful. On the other hand, in the case between 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, the latter was not agreeable to the use of the equidistance and 
this contributed to the breakdown in negotiations. 
 
The Gulf of Guinea Commission has an important role to play in this regard. As the 
only body in the region with a mandate to facilitate cooperation in maritime boundary 
delimitation. The Commission needs to awaken from its comatose state and fulfil its 
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mandate of providing the states in the Gulf of Guinea with the forum for consultation 
in the agreement of their maritime boundaries. 
 
Admittedly it is not an easy matter to delimit maritime boundaries as ultimately the 
predominant reason for such delimitation may be states’ desire to have jurisdiction over 
the non-living resources of the area. This has heightened tensions between the states in 
the region. As in the case of Cameroon and Nigeria and Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, the 
parties may have used oil concession lines for many years and may have worked fields 
on their side of the defacto boundary and are thereby reluctant to negotiate any other 
line that would deprive them of the oil fields. The parties may out of political 
expediency be reluctant to shift their position based on these oil activities. The negative 
effect this has on the exploitation and management of the non-living resources in the 
region means that states must settle their maritime boundary disputes and also make 
some interim arrangements pending the settlement of the maritime boundaries, or in 
situations where resources straddle a maritime boundary. In this regard, states are 
obligated under UNCLOS to cooperate in the making of provisional arrangements of a 






















OBLIGATION TO COOPERATE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF MARITIME 
BOUNDARY DISPUTES AND EXPLOITATION OF NON-LIVING 
RESOURCES IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the Gulf of Guinea is an area replete with 
conflicting and overlapping maritime boundary claims due to the different approaches 
to maritime boundary delimitation. UNCLOS provides mechanisms for dispute 
settlement and the states in the region have used different means for the settlement of 
these disputes which are often protracted and take many years to complete. For instance, 
the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
took about eight years to complete.307 In some situations the states have been 
negotiating for years as happened between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.308 
 
Whilst maritime boundary delimitation is pending, the states’ need to explore and 
exploit oil and gas resources for much needed development remains an important and 
urgent issue for them. This may not be environmentally sound given the climate change 
emergency the world faces currently. However due to the discoveries of these 
hydrocarbon resources in the region, tensions have escalated between adjacent and 
opposite coastal states in the region, over which state has the sovereign right to exploit 
the resources in a disputed area. In such circumstances it is common for states to contest 
the validity of boundaries already in existence, usually for oil practice, and respected 
by them for many years.309 In some cases, petroleum companies already licensed by the 
states in dispute, continue to explore and exploit the resources sometimes leading to 
escalating tensions between the disputing states.310 Some other states as a practical 
 
307 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 330. 
308 Negotiations took place between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire over six years, with 10 meetings between 
2008 and 2014. 
309 This was the case between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. The two states respected a maritime boundary 
for over fifty years for their oil practice even though there had been no formal agreement. This 
corresponded to the equidistance boundary between the states, but Cote d’Ivoire decided to contest the 
boundary which led to a protracted ITLOS arbitration. 
310 This happened in the Ghana Cote d’Ivoire case. 
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solution, have decided to cooperate in the management of the oil and gas resources, by 
having Joint Development Arrangements (JDAs) for their exploitation. This raises the 
pertinent issue of what rights and obligations under international law the states have 
while maritime boundary disputes are pending. In this regard Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) 
as well as Article 123 of UNCLOS emphasis self-restraint and cooperation as vital 
components of an inter- State regulatory framework, for stability and security in the 
allocation, exploitation and management of the living and nonliving resources. 
 
Cooperation under this framework discussed in this and the ensuing chapters take 
different forms for the exploitation of these shared transboundary resources. In this 
chapter which deals with the exploitation of non-living resources, cooperation is mainly 
in the form of joint development arrangements which have been used in two ways in 
the region. One is as an alternative to maritime delimitation,311 and the other in cases 
where there is an agreed maritime boundary, but the resources straddle the boundary.312 
The latter is necessitated by the very nature of these resources, being fluid and fugacious 
so that one state would be unable to exploit them, without putting the other state’s access 
in jeopardy.313 However for cooperation regarding the exploitation of the shared living 
marine resources, and highly migratory and straddling fish stocks, UNCLOS and the 
Fish Stocks Agreement provide for states to cooperate either directly or through sub 
regional or regional organisations.314 This is discussed in the fourth chapter of the thesis.  
 
This chapter discusses the settlement of maritime boundary disputes in the region and 
cooperation in the exploitation of oil and gas resources. The first part presents a 
discussion of the obligation of states under international law, in undelimited areas. It 
analyses the legal basis for cooperation in the management of non-living marine 
resources. This leads into a discussion on joint development arrangements as 
arrangements of a practical nature and the joint development agreements in the Gulf of 
 
311 This was done in the case of Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe See Section 2.2.2. 
312 Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea decided to jointly exploit the oil field that straddled their agreed 
boundary See Section 2.2.2. 
313Gerald Blake and Richard Swarbrick, ‘Hydrocarbons and International Boundaries: A Global 
Overview,’ in G. Blake et al (eds.) Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospects (Kluwer Law 
International, 1998) 3.  
314 UNCLOS art 63 (1), 63 (2), 116; Fish Stocks Agreement art7, 8  
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Guinea. The second part presents an overview of the obligations under UNCLOS to 
settle maritime boundary disputes peacefully. Within this context the options available 
to the states in the Gulf of Guinea are discussed as well as the settlement of disputes 
related to the continental shelf beyond 200M. The third part deals with regional 
cooperation for promoting joint development and settlement of maritime boundary 
disputes and makes recommendations on how the states can further strengthen 
cooperation to exploit oil and gas taking into consideration the peculiarities of the 
region. The fourth part presents the conclusions of the chapter. 
 
2.2. Obligations under international law of states in undelimited areas to make 
provisional arrangements and obligation not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching 
of final agreement 
Under UNCLOS, coastal states have the sovereign right in their exclusive economic 
zones and continental shelves to exploit the living and non- living resources of the 
waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.315 The Convention 
further enjoins states in articles 63-67 to cooperate for the management and 
conservation specifically of the living marine resources in the EEZ, but does not provide 
in the same manner for the non-living resources. Article 56 (3) which deals with the 
resources in the EEZ specifically removes non-living resources of the seabed from the 
EEZ regime and puts it under the continental shelf regime. It expressly provides for the 
living resources and the protection of the marine environment as well as cooperation 
for the purposes of scientific research. Therefore, it is argued that there is no legal 
obligation for states to cooperate to conserve and manage the non-living resources.316 
As to whether there is a customary law obligation to cooperate there is a debate as there 
are no established rules of customary international law regarding the issue.317 However, 
Article 123 of UNCLOS acknowledges that states in semi enclosed seas need to 
cooperate in the management and conservation of the shared resources in the area 
having regard to the close proximity the activities regarding such resources are 
conducted. Therefore, by analogy the obligation to cooperate in the management of the 
 
315 UNCLOS art 56 (1) (a) 
316 David Ong, ‘Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice 
or Customary International Law?’ (1999) 93:4 AJIL 803 
317 Ibid 802 
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non-living resources can be presumed.318 Therefore as a practical measure states 
cooperate to jointly exploit the resources even though they are not mandated to do so 
under UNCLOS. 
 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that states are favourably disposed to having such 
cooperation. For instance, states have shown in General Assembly resolutions their 
support for cooperation regarding shared natural resources.319 the General Assembly 
adopted by an overwhelming majority, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States320. Article 3 of this Charter, provides that, “…in the exploitation of natural 
resources by two or more countries, each state must cooperate on the basis of a system 
of information and prior consultation in order to achieve optimum use of such resources 
without causing damage to the legitimate interests of others”. Applied to hydrocarbon 
resources, though not authoritative this could form a legitimate basis for states to 
cooperate through joint development. UNEP also has guidelines for states to cooperate 
in the conservation and utilisation of shared natural resources and in the protection of 
the environment from damage arising out of such exploitation.321 The jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals also favours states having joint exploitation of 
resources that straddle maritime boundaries. In the Guyana /Suriname case, the Tribunal 
supported the opinion of the arbitral tribunal in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration,322 when 
it stated that the  parties “should give every consideration to the shared or joint or 
unitised exploitation of any such resources.”323 The ICJ in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, was also of the opinion that there was state practice to show that in dealing 
with deposits straddling a boundary line states have entered into undertakings with a 
view to ensuring the most efficient exploitation or apportionment of the products 
extracted.324 Where the method of delimitation results in the deposits straddling the 
 
318 Ibid 781 
319 David Ong, ‘Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice 
or Customary International Law?’ (1999) 93:4 AJIL 781 
320Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA Res 3281 (XXIX) (12 December 1974) 
(adopted by 115 votes to 6; 10 abstentions)  
321UNEP Principles of Conduct in the field of the Environment for the Guidance of states in the 
Conservation and Harmonious Utilisation of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States (adopted 
by UNEP Governing Council 19 May 1978) (1978) 17 ILM 1097 (UNEP Principles).  
322 Arbitration regarding the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guyana and Suriname 
(Guyana v Suriname) (2006) XXX RIAA 130  
323 Ibid para 463 
324 North Sea Continental Shelf (Merits) [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3, para. 97. 
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boundary created, the Court stated that agreements for joint exploitation were 
particularly appropriate in order to preserve the unity of deposits.325 
 
States also have obligations to cooperate and exercise restraint under Articles 74 (3) and 
83(3). These identical provisions on the EEZ and Continental Shelf state that pending 
agreement of the maritime boundary, “the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding 
and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a 
practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the 
reaching of the final agreement.” Such arrangements are to be without prejudice to the 
final delimitation. The provisions impose two obligations on states - one positive which 
is “to make every effort to conclude provisional arrangements of a practical nature 
pending agreement on delimitation,”326 and the other negative which is “during this 
transitional period not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of final agreement.”327 
Article 100 further provides that states are obliged to fulfil in good faith the obligations 
assumed under the Convention and exercise the rights, jurisdictions and freedoms in the 
convention without abuse of right. In this regard the provisions emphasis that these 
obligations are to take place in a “spirit of understanding and cooperation.”328 These 
obligations are discussed below in further detail. 
 
I. Obligation to make provisional arrangements under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) 
 
States have an obligation under UNCLOS to delimit their maritime boundaries by 
agreement. During the period the maritime boundary remains unsettled the states are 
further under obligation to exercise self-restraint and cooperate in the exploitation of 
the resources in the undelimited area. The purpose of this obligation was set out by the 
arbitral tribunal in the Guyana v Suriname case,329 as the promotion of interim regimes 
and practical measures that could pave the way for provisional utilisation of disputed 
 
325 Ibid para. 99 
326 UNCLOS art 83, 74 
327 ibid 
328Award in the Arbitration regarding the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Guyana and 
Suriname, (Guyana v Suriname) (2007) XXX RIAA para 460-461.  
329 ibid  
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areas pending delimitation.330 The Tribunal, was of the view that this obligation 
acknowledges the importance of avoiding the suspension of economic development in 
a disputed maritime area, as long as such activities do not affect the reaching of a final 
agreement.331 The obligation to make every effort to conclude provisional 
arrangements, according to the Tribunal in Suriname / Guyana case, entails the states 
preparedness to approach the negotiations for the settlement of the maritime boundary 
in a conciliatory manner and be prepared to make concessions in the pursuit of 
provisional arrangement.332 Such approach according to the tribunal, is expected of the 
parties as any provisional arrangement arrived at, are temporary and without prejudice 
to the maritime delimitation.333 
 
The case between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire334 is a good example of an international 
tribunal’s view of how states can fulfil the obligation to make every effort to conclude 
provisional arrangements. The Special Chamber pointed out that negotiations to 
establish a maritime boundary cannot automatically be taken as negotiations to make 
provisional arrangements.335 This, according to the chamber is a separate issue the states 
could pursue alongside their negotiations for a maritime boundary especially as the 
wording of the obligation, “clearly indicates that it does not amount to an obligation to 
reach an agreement on provisional arrangements.”336 It is therefore an obligation of 
conduct not an obligation of result. In the view of the Special Chamber, it would have 
been for Côte d’Ivoire to make the requisite proposals for  the establishment of 
“provisional arrangements of a practical nature” and thus to trigger the requisite 
negotiations.337 The Special Chamber was of the view that this was important as 
Ghana’s hydrocarbon activities had continued over several years.338 Although the 
tribunal did not find that this oil practice was acquiesced to by Côte d’Ivoire, it is 
nevertheless took this fact into account when assessing the relationship between the two 
 
330 Ibid para 473. 
331 Ibid para 460. 
332 ibid 
333 ibid 
334. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in 
the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire) (ITLOS, Sept 23, 2017) 
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Parties.339 Therefore, Cote d’Ivoire not having requested Ghana to enter into 
negotiations on provisional arrangements of a practical nature bars it from claiming that 
Ghana has violated its obligations to negotiate on such arrangements.  
 
II. Obligation not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of final agreement under 
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) 
The second obligation imposed by Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) mandates that during the 
transitional period, when the maritime boundary is in the process of being settled, the 
parties are not to “jeopardise or hamper the reaching of final agreement.”340 The tribunal 
in the Guyana / Suriname case 341 noted that the obligation is not intended to preclude 
all activities in a disputed maritime area.342  In the Tribunal’s view the activities that 
could jeopardise or hamper the reaching of the final agreement, are those that have the 
effect of prejudicing the final agreement.343 These are acts that have permanency or that 
involve physical damage to the seabed, examples of which are drilling for oil and gas, 
without an agreement to that effect between the parties.344 However, the tribunal gave 
two classes of activities surrounding hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation that are 
permissible - one being any activities the parties pursue pursuant to provisional 
arrangements and the second any acts, even if unilateral, which do not have the effect 
of jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of final agreement on the maritime 
boundary.345 The latter activities, according to the Tribunal, are those that do not lead 
to a physical change to the marine environment, an example of which is seismic 
studies.346  
In the Ghana/ Cote d’Ivoire case, the Special Chamber took this interpretation a bit 












not be an activity to be prohibited.347 In the view of the Special Chamber, the 
consequences are that maritime activities undertaken by a State in an area of the 
continental shelf which has been attributed to another State by an international judgment 
cannot be considered to be in violation of the sovereign rights of the latter if those 
activities were carried out before the judgment was delivered and if the area concerned 
was the subject of claims made in good faith by both States.348  On this basis, the Special 
Chamber found the argument advanced by Côte d’Ivoire that the hydrocarbon activities 
carried out by Ghana in the disputed area constituted a violation of the sovereign rights 
of Côte d’Ivoire not sustainable.349  This would be so even if some of those activities 
took place in areas attributed to Côte d’Ivoire by the Judgment of the Special 
Chamber.350 The Chamber therefore found that Ghana had not violated the sovereign 
rights of Côte d’Ivoire.351 The Special Chamber in keeping with Guyana/ suriname 
indicated what would constitute jeopardizing or hampering when it ordered Ghana in 
the context of a provisional measures application by Cote d’Ivoire, not to start any new 
drilling or break new ground as this would amount to such jeopardizing or hampering.352  
The conclusion that can be drawn therefore is that if the activity was already in place 
before the dispute, it could not be said to be jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of 
an agreement. The Special Chamber further acknowledged the importance of avoiding 
suspension of economic activity in a disputed maritime area so long as such activities 
do not affect the reaching of a final agreement.353  
 
This is significant for the undelimited areas of the region, like the Ghana – Togo 
maritime area, where the Ghanaian government awarded an exploration block in the 
region to a joint venture of Blue Star Exploration, Ghana’s state-owned oil company 
GNPC, and Heritage E & P. The Togolese authorities are against this attempt by Ghana 
to exploit the resources claiming that the maritime boundary covering the oil concession 
granted is in Togolese territory. The Togolese coast guard therefore are preventing the 
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joint venture from going into execution.354 This is a practical example of states which 
need to cooperate to make provisional arrangements of a practical nature. This may 
have to be initiated by one of the parties as the Special Chamber in the Ghana Cote 
d’Ivoire case opined. In the meantime, as drilling may have a permanency to it, Ghana 
may not unilaterally begin drilling without incurring international liability according to 
the jurisprudence discussed above. This is also the case with the other states which are 
yet to delimit their boundaries but have to exploit their resources. These include 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon as well as Benin and Togo. Nevertheless, the parties can 
undertake seismic surveys in the areas being disputed as these would not permanently 
harm the marine environment. 
 
2.2.1. Joint Development Agreements as provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature 
In the literature Joint Development Agreements (JDA) are recognised as a type of 
provisional arrangement of a practical nature which are commonly used arrangements 
for overlapping claim areas.355 This has been demonstrated through state practice as 
already stated above to be an effective means for cooperation in the exploration and 
exploitation of non-living resources.356 Thus many bilateral joint development 
agreements can be found in many regions of the world.357 The term ‘Joint Development 
Agreements’ has been variously defined by different scholars. David M. Ong defines it 
as a generic term given to international agreements between states whose main function 
is to provide for the cooperative exploitation of hydrocarbon resources that come under 
the jurisdiction of two states.358 Vasco Becker- Weinberg views it as, “a cooperative 
 
354 Mozambique Resources Post, 'Africa Oil & Gas: Ghana And Togo Could Battle Over Keta East 
Block' (Mozambiqueminingpost.com, 2018) <https://mozambiqueminingpost.com/2018/07/19/africa-
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355 Robert Beckman and Leonardo Bernard, ‘Framework for the Joint Development of Hydrocarbon 
Resources’ (cil.nus.edu.sg) < https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/BECKMAN-AND-
BERNARD-FRAMEWORK-FOR-THE-JOINT-DEVELOPMENT-OF-HYDROCARBON-
RESOURCES.pdf > assessed 17 May 2020. 
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357 ibid 
358 Robert Beckman and others, Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal 




effort between two or more states for the exploration and exploitation of mineral 
resources that straddle a maritime boundary or are found in areas of overlapping 
claims.”359 According to Shihata and Onorato, JDAs are, “a procedure under which 
boundary disputes are set aside, without prejudice to the validity of the conflicting 
claims, and the interested states agree, instead, to jointly explore and exploit and to 
share any hydrocarbons found in the area subject to overlapping claims.”360  Lagoni’s 
definition of JDA is, “the cooperation between states with regard to the exploration for 
and exploitation of certain deposits, fields or accumulation of non-living resources 
which either extend across a boundary or lie in an area of overlapping claims.”   
Though not exhaustive of the definitions in the literature, these definitions show that 
joint development agreements relate to exploration and exploitation of non -living 
resources notably hydrocarbons in areas of overlapping claims or where the resources 
straddle a boundary, and further that cooperation between states is key. Joint 
development is therefore used broadly to refer to cooperation in two forms. One is when 
states exploit a single resource straddling an international boundary and the other is 
situations where states that have not agreed a maritime boundary, put on hold the 
delimitation of their maritime boundary and jointly exploit the resources in the 
overlapping claim area for their mutual benefit. The parties to such arrangements could 
choose to make it a more permanent arrangement.361 Some states which have agreed 
boundaries still have joint development regimes incorporated in them in anticipation of 
sharing resources that are subsequently found straddling the boundary.362 The 1965 
treaty between England and Norway in the North Sea is one such example.363 The UK 
also used this approach with a number of oil fields that straddle the UK -Netherlands 
Maritime boundary.364 Countries bordering the North Sea and in the Middle East, South 
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Int. Law 393-6. 
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and South East Asia usually include common deposit clauses demanding such 
cooperation in their delimitation agreements.365  
 
2.2.1.1. Models of Joint Development Agreements  
Joint development agreements have been categorised into three broad models in the 
literature.366 The first Model is a ‘compulsory’ joint operating venture between the 
interested states and their nationals or nominated oil companies in designated zones.367 
The Agreement that inspired the identification of the model is the 1974 Japan/ South 
Korea Agreement.368 In that Agreement, the Parties set aside the disputed area as the 
joint development zone and agreed to postpone issues of delimiting their maritime 
boundary for at least fifty years.369 The zone was split into subzones with each state 
authorising its concessionaires, or entities to whom they have granted concessions to 
explore and exploit the subzone under a joint operating agreement with the 
concessionaires of the other state.370  
 
In this model, the states retain control of the development and jointly approve the Joint 
Operating Agreement between the concessionaires. The Agreement usually includes 
extensive resource management provisions.371 For the performance of this function the 
parties created a joint commission – the Japan/South Korea Joint Commission to act in 
a supervisory capacity. Each state’s concessionaires share the resource equally with the 
concessionaires of the other state and are answerable to the authorising state in respect 
of tax and disposal of revenue issues.372 The main advantage of this system is that each 
state is free to use the benefits of the development as it chooses without being saddled 
 
365 Terrence Daintith, Finders Keepers? How the Law of Capture Shaped the World Oil Industry, (RFF 
Press 2010). 
366 See Hazel Fox, (ed) Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas. A Model Agreement for States for 
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with the laws and taxation system of the other state. A disadvantage seen from the 
working of this agreement is that the Joint Commission also appears to be involved less 
in the operation of the joint development zone and is more a forum for enquiry and 
implementing cooperation between the states.373 Alternatively, the agreement provides 
for the compulsory utilisation of transboundary deposits. A single operator then exploits 
the straddling deposits lying across a previously agreed maritime boundary. This is 
mainly found in the North Sea region.374 
 
The second Model makes use of a joint authority to develop the joint zone. This involves 
the creation of a supra–national authority through an agreement between the states to 
establish an international joint authority or commission which has the necessary legal 
personality, licensing and regulatory powers.375 The states also give it the mandate to 
manage the joint development zone on their behalf. A good example is the 1979 
Thailand /Malaysia Memorandum of Understanding aimed at solving the problem of 
jointly developing a disputed continental shelf area.376 In this Agreement unlike the 
Japan/ South Korea one, the states do not retain control but have ceded their powers of 
licensing or approval of joint operations to a joint authority in which each state is 
equally represented. This authority is accorded all rights and responsibilities relating to 
exploration and exploitation of the joint zone and has direct licensing power over the 
area which unlike the Japan /South Korea situation has not been split into subzones and 
does not have direct licensing power.377 The main disadvantages of the model are that 
it does not address the issue of preexisting rights and this can lead to great controversy 
especially if the rights offered under the new agreement are substantially different from 
what was already existing.378 There is also the problem of which jurisdiction and 
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applicable law is to be used by the authority in the joint zone.379 States are also reluctant 
to divest wide powers to the authority.380  
 
The third Model is a single state managing the joint development zone and paying one 
share of the revenue thereby realised to the other State Party.”381 In its simplest form, 
one state manages or administers the resources in the disputed area on behalf of both 
states. This model can be used where there is an agreed maritime boundary in place. 
The managing state applies its own licensing and regulatory procedures. The other state 
has monitoring and inspection powers and receives the agreed share of the revenues 
accruing from the exploitation.382 Thus the managing state becomes the agent of both 
states. This model has the advantage of simplicity and is cost effective as it uses existing 
administrative machinery thereby also avoiding delays.383 A variant of this model, the 
researchers’ call the checkerboard variant is best used in larger areas with many blocs. 
The states allot the area to themselves in a checkerboard fashion and each state shares 
the revenue it generates with the other. This puts the states on an equal footing and 
thereby solves some of the problems inherent in this model of one state being perceived 
as having the upper hand.384 The obvious difficulty would be how states would agree 
on the criteria for allocating the areas to be exploited.385  
 
Some “imperfect examples” of this model in practice have been highlighted in the 
literature .386 One is the Agreement between Qatar/ Abu Dhabi387 which involved the 
Al Bunduq field discovered in 1965.388 The parties agreed to an equal sharing of the 
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revenue from the joint agreement involving the field which was exploited from Abu 
Dhabi using a company which operates and manages the field.389 The Agreement 
provided that ownership of the field “shall be divided equally between the two 
parties.”390 Recently the parties have signed a new concession agreement to replace the 
expired one and have every intention to continue their joint development.391  This is a 
sign that their relationship is working and the simplicity of the arrangement may be its 
big advantage.  
 
Another example can be found in the 1958 Saudi Arabia / Bahrain Agreement by which 
Saudi Arabia with the consent of Bahrain agreed to develop the oil resources in the 
disputed area, the ‘Fasht bu Saafa Hexagon’ which is on the Saudi Arabian side of the 
boundary.392 This is on condition that half of the net income derived therefrom would 
be paid to Bahrain which also has inspection rights.393 Despite the advantages of this 
model it appears not to be suited to large areas but may work best in small areas where 
setting up a complex machinery to exploit the resources would be counterproductive. 
The Nigeria/Equatorial Guinea Joint Development Agreement394 follows this model. 
The already existing machinery for exploitation in Equatorial Guinea was used to 
manage the field in dispute for the benefit of both countries.395 A more recent example 
is the Brunei -Malaysia joint development in 2009.396 Under the Agreement the two 
countries agreed to establish a maritime boundary to settle overlapping claims which 
included concession blocks awarded by both states and situated near areas where 
substantial oil discoveries were made. The parties agreed that the area now belongs to 
Brunei, but Malaysia was allowed to participate in the exploitation on a commercial 
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basis and there was to be joint development for 40 years.397 This was the result of long 
and hard negotiations which progressed through 39 rounds of talks since 1979.398  
 
2.2.2. Joint Development Agreements in the Gulf of Guinea  
There are four instances of joint development arrangements regarding bilateral 
cooperation in the exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Gulf of Guinea, two of which are 
not active. It is interesting to note that they are mainly between Nigeria and its 
immediate neighbours Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon. The 
need for exploitation of oil reserves in the area may be a motivating factor for the states’ 
wiliness to have these arrangements. These are discussed below. 
 
I. Nigeria and Sao Tome Joint Development Agreement 
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe’s agreement signed in 2001399 was negotiated in 
the context  
the delimitation of the maritime boundary on hold as the two countries differences were 
irreconcilable.400 The Joint Development Zone (JDZ) covers an area of 34,540 Km² and 
includes the seabed, subsoil and the super adjacent waters.401  
 
To allow for secure investment for the various oil companies interested in the zone, the 
parties decided that the JDZ would be a long term arrangement with a minimum period 
of forty-five years.402 It is only after this period that the parties would then seek to agree 
a definitive maritime boundary if they so wished.403 In the meantime the parties 
provisionally agreed that the areas to the south of the JDZ would form part of Sao Tome 
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and Principe’s EEZ and the areas to the west part of Nigeria’s EEZ. 404 The treaty 
provided for revenues realised from the joint exploitation to be shared on the basis of 
60 percent to Nigeria and 40 percent to Sao Tome and Principe.405 This unequal sharing 
may have been motivated by among others the location of the oil resources and the 
potential maritime boundary as well as other political considerations. 
Figure 12: Nigeria-Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development Zone 
 
Source: David Colson and Robert Smith (ed), International Maritime Boundaries, (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2005) vol V, p.3648 
 
The Joint Development Treaty between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe has been 
touted as having achieved important political and economic strides.406 Politically, the 
fact that two disputing countries with different cultural background have been able 
come together to create a development zone to solve a dispute that had the potential of 
escalating is a great achievement. Economically, the two countries have reportedly 
achieved a total of $300 million through signature bonuses that were shared in the 
relevant proportion by the two countries. Six petroleum blocks were awarded, and the 
companies invested about $415 million and exploitation is ongoing. It has been claimed 
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that through the cordial atmosphere the JDA has created, Nigerians are more willing to 
invest in Sao Tome and Principe notable among them being NICON Insurance and 
Energy Bank.407  
However, the JDA has not been presented as a very successful one in the literature and 
its very structure and management style has been criticized. The JDA uses Model II 
which is the Joint Authority type management option. The structure is hierarchical, at 
the top of which is the Joint Ministerial Council made up of four appointees of the heads 
of state of the two countries who may be ministers or persons of equivalent rank.408 This 
body has overall responsibility for all matters relating to the exploration for and 
exploitation of the resources in the zone. These include supervisory powers over the 
Joint Authority, including approval of its functioning regulations, its budgets and 
audited accounts, as well as approve development contracts entered into by the 
Authority.409 It also has the responsibility of settling disputes in the Authority through 
consultation.410 At the level below is the Joint Authority which is responsible for the 
management of activities relating to exploration and exploitation activities in the zone 
but is responsible to the Council.411 It is the body that deals directly with the contractors 
– awarding contracts for the various contract areas and generally playing a supervisory 
role regarding their activities but all with the approval of the Joint Ministerial 
Council.412  
 
This structure of the Nigeria /Sao Tome JDA has been criticised in the literature. Some 
authors are of the view that its role can best be described as consultative and 
administrative and not as strong as the Thai – Malaysian Joint Authority which inspired 
this model.413 The latter has full rights and responsibilities under the Agreement. The 
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Authority is comprised of two joint chairmen, one from each country and an equal 
number of members from each country. From the current composition these are high 
government officials from the two countries Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Attorney 
General’s Chambers, Ministry of Energy, and Office of the Council of State among 
others. These work with a board and management staff through three departments- 
Exploration and Production, Finance /Account & Production Sharing Contractors 
(PSC), and Business Support and Legal Services.414 The rotation concept between 
Malaysia and Thailand officers and their secondment from certain departments and 
national oil and gas company is for a four-year term. This arrangement gives some 
certainty of tenure and appears more transparent and less prone to corruption than the 
Nigeria /Sao Tome one. The Authority also has power to directly grant licenses and 
generally given a free hand to manage the exploration and exploitation on behalf of the 
states unlike the Nigeria / Sao Tome one.415  
 
The Nigeria – Sao Tome JDZ has also been criticised for having, “a weak supervision 
mechanism and bedeviled by corruption”.416 Huang Wen –bo suggests that the 
membership of the Joint Ministerial Council which is not less than two and not more 
than four members with the same level designated by each country’s president appears 
to confer on the two presidents, power to wield considerable control and influence over 
the council, with the attendant risk of the power being used for private gain and stifling 
the Authority in the performance of its role.417  
The award of oil exploration and exploitation contracts has also not been free of 
criticism. Since 2003, the Joint Development Authority (JDA) has launched several 
licensing rounds and awarded blocks in the JDZ to several oil companies. Human Rights 
Watch raised issues about corruption and lack of transparency in these awards. 418 It is 
further alleged that Nigeria’s share of the signature bonuses received from the second 
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licensing round was largely mismanaged.419 In addition to corruption, mismanagement 
and undue political influence, the JDA has suffered from a serious lack of funds which 
has negatively impacted its ability to perform its functions.420 It appears therefore that 
the JDA is not performing at its optimum. Additionally, after all their investment, oil 
companies have not discovered oil in commercially viable quantities.421  
 
II. Nigeria /Equatorial Guinea cross- border unitisation 
Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea have a maritime boundary, but major oil resources 
straddle the boundary- the Ekanga oil field on the Nigerian side of the line and the Zafiro 
field, the larger of the two, on the Equatorial Guinean side of the boundary. The parties 
decided to jointly exploit these two fields for their mutual benefit hence Article 6.2 of 
the Treaty provides that the parties authorise, “the relevant government entities in 
association with the relevant concession holders to establish appropriate unitization and 
other arrangements” to enable the area specified in the treaty to be exploited in a 
commercially feasible manner.422  The two oilfields were at varying degrees of 
development with the larger Zafiro field already in active production. The Agreement 
created the legal framework for the implementation of four confidential associated 
commercial agreements, which have been signed by the respective concessionaires on 
each side of the boundary and has been approved by the two governments.423  The area 
of unitisation lies entirely on the Nigerian side of the maritime boundary which makes 
it all the more unique.424 
 
As between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, the relevant offshore oil activity has been 
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exploitation activities.425 The practice of the parties, namely Nigeria, Cameroon and 
Equatorial Guinea, in this regard has been to use the median line boundary.426 These 
lines formed a defacto maritime boundary that the states have adhered to for over 35 
years of oil practice.427  The two states were well aware that they had a converging point 
near the Equatorial Guinean island of Bioko (the tripoint) with Nigeria which they 
needed to determine amongst themselves.428 Thus for Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea 
the boundary negotiations was mainly a formalisation of the status quo.429  
 
Figure 13 
Map of the Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea Cross Border Agreement. The figure in the little box shows 
how the boundary cuts through the Ekanga oil field. 
 
Source: David Colson and Robert Smith, International maritime boundaries (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2005) Vol V 3626 
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The parties followed the Model III of Joint Development Agreements in which one state 
is responsible for the exploitation for the benefit of both states. This Agreement is 
unique in that the resources in the Nigerian Ekanga fields had not been exploited before 
the agreement and the quantity of oil it could produce was relatively limited when 
compared to Equatorial Guinea’s Zafiro field. This appears to be the reason why Nigeria 
agreed to Equatorial Guinea taking control. Additionally, the Zafiro field had extensive 
production facilities. The unitisation therefore permitted the effective development of 
the Ekanga field by using the existing Zafiro installation under the management of the 
operator of the Zafiro field.430  
 
Another unique arrangement of the agreement is that the applicable law is Equatorial 
Guinean law even though the activities of the oil company acting as operator take place 
on the Nigerian side.431 This has the advantage of the unit operator avoiding the 
difficulties and complications of having two sets of laws apply to a single operation.432 
Moreover, the agreement enjoins Equatorial Guinea to ensure that Nigeria’s interests 
relating to the Unit area are protected. The roles of the respective governments were 
clearly spelt out in the Protocol.433 Equatorial Guinea has legal authority for the unit 
operations regarding matters to do with safety, environment and other standards. 
Nigeria has the right to inspect unit installations and also to be consulted on a number 
of issues including the location of wells.434 The Agreement also provides for the two 
governments to conduct a redetermination of the amount of the reserves in the Unit 
Reservoirs.435  The shares the two states are to have of the resources and the existing 
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relationship the governments have with their concession holders is to continue 
unaltered.436 
The Equatorial Guinea / Nigeria unitisation agreement appears to be effective and 
performing well as it has been reported that production from the Ekanga field started a 
year after the agreement came into force and has continued without incident.437  
 
2.2.2.1. Joint Development Agreements signed but not implemented 
I. Nigeria and Cameroon Agreement 
Nigeria and Cameroon signed an Agreement on 11 March 2010 to develop jointly the 
oil and gas fields that straddle their maritime boundary south of the Bakassi 
Peninsula.438 The maritime boundary passes through prospective oil and gas fields and 
the same oil exploration company (Addax Petroleum) holds licenses for the Iroko 
concession area on the Cameroun side of the boundary and the concession block OML 
123 on the Nigerian side.439 However, implementation has not begun and some experts 
have suggested that it is likely that the petroleum company would be designated the sole 
operator for the joint exploitation of the resources.440 This shows that the parties are 
likely to have a unitisation agreement along the lines of the Nigeria – Equatorial 
Guinean one. In this case the fields would have developed as one field by the operator 
on behalf of the two states which would have to agree on a sharing formula. They would 
also have to agree on which side of the boundary to operate from as well as which law 
to use. These are weighty matters and no doubt the reason why a 2014 newspaper report 
alleges that in spite of the optimism expressed in March 2011 by the Nigerian 
representative at the negotiations that, “exploration of the oil wells would start this 
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year”441 (2011), this has not materialized. From all indications the region is rich in 
hydrocarbons and both countries would benefit greatly from jointly exploiting the 
resources. It would be important however for them to take note of the Sao Tome and 
Principe and Nigerian Joint Development Agreement and avoid the pitfalls of 
corruption and lack of transparency associated with it. Security concerns need to be 
addressed well in advance. Plans also need to be made for the management of the marine 
environment to prevent any incidents of oil spill as well as prepare for cleaning up in 
the event of a spill. 
 
Figure 14: Unofficial map showing the maritime boundary which passes through 




II. Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon Agreement 
Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon have officially agreed that two contiguous gas 
discoveries near their maritime boundary area would be jointly developed.442 The two 
discoveries –the Yolanda gas discovery located approximately 50 km east of Bioko 
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island in Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon’s Yoyo gas discovery is located east of the 
Yolanda discovery. These two fields which straddle the areas being claimed by both 
states were found in 2007 and are operated respectively by Noble Energy Equatorial 
Guinea Ltd and Noble Energy Cameroon Ltd. A Memorandum of Understanding has 
been signed by the two states on 10 July 2017, in which they recognise the gas fields as 
one resource for joint development.443 The parties had earlier signed a Data Exchange 
Agreement for these discoveries and the MOU was the next step towards unitisation of 
the gas discoveries.444 
III. Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire Strategic Partnership Agreement 
This judgment means that most of the important oil wells Ghana was exploiting are still 
on Ghana’s side of the boundary. However, there are some wells situated very close to 
the boundary on either side. This is depicted by figure…. 
 
An Agreement for joint development has been signed between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire 
in October 2017, named, ‘Strategic Partnership Agreement between Ghana and Cote 
d’Ivoire.’445 The Parties by this Agreement are seeking to cooperate in a variety of areas 
among which is the joint exploitation and management of transboundary oil and gas and 
other resources. The cooperation also involves oil research, hydrocarbon exploration, 
development and management and sharing of information.446 This is after the two 
countries have been through third party dispute settlement for the delimitation of the 
maritime boundary between them.447 The oil fields that Ghana laid claim to remained 
on its side of the boundary. However, there are indications that some oil fields may be 
located very close to or straddle the maritime boundary. This is an indication that the 
states in the region have the political will to cooperate in exploiting and managing the 
non-living resources of the area. When implemented, it would augment the state 
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practice in the region and promote cooperation between states in the management of the 
nonliving marine resources even when there is a maritime boundary. 
 
2.2.2.2. Areas of potential Joint Development for the exploitation of hydrocarbons 
in the Gulf of Guinea  
There are many areas in the Gulf of Guinea where joint development can be applied for 
the exploitation of their non - living resources.  The geography of the area shows how 
interconnected the states are and the likelihood that there would be oil discoveries that 
straddle their boundaries is very high. Coupled with this is the fact the states are usually 
not in agreement on the method of delimitation. It is suggested that the states would 
benefit from jointly developing the disputed areas and postponing maritime boundary 
delimitation. Negotiations for some of these boundaries have been ongoing for years 
without the states showing any commitment to settle the boundary. This section 
explores potential areas in the region where the states could benefit from cooperation in 
the exploitation and management of non-living resources.   
 
I. Ghana, Togo and Benin 
Ghana and Togo have not yet agreed their maritime boundary and currently the states 
have begun negotiations as discussed above. The basin the two states occupy, is part of 
the Ghana Keta, Togo, and Benin Basin which stretches across offshore and onshore 
Nigeria, Ghana, Togo and Benin.448 Discoveries in Ghana have heightened expectation 
for the exploratory potential of Togo’s offshore acreage and Italian oil company, ENI 
has acquired blocks which are located in the Dahomey Basin offshore Togo.449 Benin 
however does not have a vibrant oil and gas industry. It has been reported that it started 
producing oil in the 1970s, but output remained low and stopped by the end of the 1990s 
when funds for operations dried up.450  
 
448 Ghana Keta - Togo-Benin Exploration Basin' (Woodmac.com, 2018) 
<https://www.woodmac.com/reports/oil-and-gas-exploration-ghana-keta-togo-benin-exploration-basin-
22951982> accessed 24 May 2020. 
449David Brown, 'Africa's Booming Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and Production: National Security 
Implications for the United States and China' (United States Army War College Press 2013) 15 
450 'Benin Exploration Drilling Planned' (Offshore Engineer Magazine, 2014) 





In 2013, a Nigerian Oil firm SAPETRO made a discovery of a field with the potential 
of producing 87 million barrels of oil in offshore Benin.451 All this is taking place in the 
absence of an established maritime boundary. It is submitted that it would be in the 
interest of the three countries to start negotiations for joint development of any resources 
in the area. This is due to the complexity of attempting to delimit their maritime 
boundaries. If there is no agreement there is likely to be a protracted dispute, which 
could delay exploration and exploitation of resources in the area. Benin and Togo with 
their relatively small economies would benefit from cooperating with Ghana instead of 
wasting resources on determining a maritime boundary by third party dispute 
settlement. Depending on where the oil is found the three states could decide on using 
the joint venture model as this likely to give them more control of how the resources 
are exploited. 
 
II. Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea  
Regarding Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea which still have a pending 
maritime boundary dispute with Gabon, it appears from the sparse information available 
that even though in the past joint development was not high on their agenda, currently 
they have expressed a desire to cooperate in the development of hydrocarbons. In 2008,  
the president of Equatorial Guinea mentioned the possibility of the two countries, in the 
future having joint exploration of an oil bloc.452 In 2012, it was reported that, the two 
states have agreed on the establishment of a special zone for joint exploration to explore 
and develop cross border oil and gas reserves which the parties believe straddles the 
two states maritime area. The two states in their discussions were reported to have 
expectations for starting operations in October 2020. Equatorial Guinea is expected to 
bring its experience with Nigeria to bear on this Joint Development Arrangement. 
According to the report Equatorial Guinea has agreed to train students from Sao Tome 
and Principe in oil related courses relating to offshore oil and gas exploration, 
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production and monetization in Equatorial Guinea. The Country has also started 
becoming a player in the hydrocarbon industry as several international companies have 
started acquiring blocks and some have announced that they would start drilling in 
2020.453 
The parties also have to confront the issue of what to do with the several blocks 
straddling the maritime boundary that have already been awarded to exploration 
companies.454 This could cause complications. However, the parties could adopt the 
approach taken in the Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon Joint Development Agreement 
or the model 1 where each state concessionaires would have its own concessionaire and 
the concessionaires of the two states would then sign a joint operating agreement to 
manage the area. The states would have control by having to jointly approve the joint 
operating agreement. The challenge for these two states is that they both have serious 
internal financial constraints and would have to pursue this joint development in as cost 
effective a manner as possible. The Economist therefore gave a bleak forecast stating 
that it expected the establishment of the zone to be a slow process and for Sao Tome 
and Principe, it expected investment in oil exploration to be low and any hydrocarbon 
production to be far off.455 
 
III. Equatorial Guinea and Gabon 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon signed an agreement in July 2004 to draw up an accord 
on joint oil exploration in their disputed waters.456 Even though Equatorial Guinea is 
the third largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, the dispute over islands with Gabon 
has prevented the effective exploration of the area which is believed to have 
commercially exploitable reserves.457 Therefore this is a development in the absence of 
a maritime agreement. The July 2004 Agreement stated that “the parties will abstain 
from all behaviour and all acts that could compromise, impede, or endanger the 
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negotiation and execution of the accord.” 458 The dispute between the two states had 
been reportedly simmering since 1972, when Gabon's army chased Equatorial Guinean 
fighters from the island of Mbanie but in recent times it had lain dormant until the 
prospect of oil rekindled interest in their maritime boundary.459 The then presidents of 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon pledged in the accord to hold formal negotiations on a 
joint development zone. It was provided in the document that, "the maritime area in 
question as well as the terms and conditions of its joint development will be 
determined."460 It has been reported461 that Shell (Gabon) has rights to prospect the 
Mbanie zone according to its contract with the Gabonese authorities, but has put the 
project on hold because of the territorial dispute. Mbanie, and the nearby Corisco islands 
are small islands inhabited by people from the Benga ethnic group, present in both 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.462 
It would be beneficial if the parties considered establishing the zone in dispute as a joint 
development zone and use the Joint Authority model of joint development. In this 
regard the parties could set up a Joint Development Authority to oversee the exploitation 
of the resources in the JDZ. 
 
2.3. Obligation under UNCLOS to settle maritime boundary disputes peacefully 
 
States generally have an obligation under international law to settle disputes using 
peaceful means and without the use of force. Regarding maritime boundary disputes, 
Part XV of UNCLOS provides a dispute settlement regime which sets out compulsory 
dispute settlement procedures which are binding on a state once it becomes a party to 
the Convention.463 However, states have to first fulfil the requirements of peacefully 
settling the disputes through the means set out in Article 33 of the Statute of the ICJ. In 
this regard states can only invoke the compulsory jurisdiction provisions after fulfilling 
two obligations set out in Articles 281 and 282 as well as 283 namely the obligation to 
exchange views and the obligation to use existing agreements which they have adopted 
to settle the dispute. 
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2.3.1. Obligation to exchange views  
One obligation is under Article 283 which provides that the parties expeditiously 
proceed to an exchange of views regarding the settlement of the dispute by negotiation 
or other peaceful means. The parties would again have to exchange views where such 
negotiations break down or where there is a settlement, but the circumstances require 
such an exchange of views regarding its implementation.464 The extent of this obligation 
was considered in the Malaysia v Singapore case, where the Tribunal was of the view 
that there was no obligation on Malaysia  to continue with an exchange of views when 
it concluded that this exchange could not yield a positive result.465 So also the Tribunal 
in the Mox plant case466 was of the opinion that a state party is not obliged to continue 
with an exchange of views when it has come to the conclusion that the possibilities of 
reaching agreement are exhausted.467 
 
 
2.3.2. Obligation to use existing agreements on maritime delimitation dispute 
settlement 
The other obligation provided for under Articles 281and 282 is to use the dispute 
settlement mechanism options which the parties have adopted in binding agreement 
which also provides for a binding outcome. This provision allows parties to use means 
of settlement outside the UNCLOS mechanism. The international court or tribunal has 
first of all to determine whether the parties have in fact agreed to seek settlement of the 
dispute through peaceful means of their choice and whether the agreement provides for 
a binding outcome. It is also necessary to determine whether the agreement covers the 
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of maritime delimitation disputes. 
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna case468 the Annex VII Tribunal viewed a prior agreement 
of the parties as a bar to its jurisdiction. In its view the Agreement excluded further 
procedures even though this was not explicitly stated in the relevant provision. In the 
 
464 UNCLOS art 283 (2)  
465 Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v 
Singapore) (Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003) ITLOS Report 2003, 48. 
466 MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), (Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001) ITLOS 
Reports 2001. 
467 Ibid 60 
468 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (Provisional Measures, Order of 
27 August 1999) ITLOS Reports 1999, 280 
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Mox plant case after this, Judge Wolfrum, also stated that any agreement excluding Part 
XV must be expressed explicitly in the agreement.469 It is likely that this reasoning 
would be applied to future cases raising similar issues.  
 
Article 282 also takes into account states obligations under any general, bilateral or 
regional agreements when they entail a binding decision. It provides, “If the States 
Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or 
otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be submitted 
to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the 
procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree. 
”Some authors have concluded that the word ‘otherwise’ after ‘bilateral agreement’ was 
put there to include the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICJ by declaration made 
under Article 36 (2) which provides, that the states parties may at any time make a 
declaration that they accept ICJ jurisdiction on all legal disputes concerning 
international law.470 Therefore accepting ICJ compulsory jurisdiction can be considered 
an Agreement mentioned in Article 282. 
 
2.3.3. Compulsory procedures under section 2 
If the parties use the means stated in section 1 but fail to reach a settlement, they are 
obliged to use the compulsory procedures set out in Section 2. Regarding the forum for 
dispute resolution Article 287 provides states with four options for formal adjudication 
which states are free to choose from by means of a written declaration.471 These are the 
ITLOS, the ICJ, arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS or, in the cases of fisheries, 
protection of the marine environment, marine scientific research and navigation, special 
arbitration before panels of experts constituted in accordance with Annex VIII of 
UNCLOS.472 If however the parties to a dispute have chosen different fora, or not 
chosen any fora, then the default position is arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS.473  
 
469 MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), (Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, Sep. 
op. Wolfrum) ITLOS 2001. 
470 Anne Sheehan, ‘Dispute Settlement under UNCLOS: The Exclusion of Maritime Delimitation 
Disputes’ 
     [2005] UQLawJl 7 
471 UNCLOS Art 287  
472 UNCLOS Art 287  




There are however several exceptions to compulsory jurisdiction provided by Article 
298. One is where a state has made a declaration in writing that it does not accept any 
one or more of the forums provided under section two referred to above, respecting 
maritime boundary delimitation.474 However such a declaration does not mean that a 
party is no longer obliged to settle maritime delimitation disputes. The parties are still 
required to comply with section 1 as well as with the obligations under Article 298. In 
this regard Article 298 (1) (a) (i) provides that where the parties’ negotiations have 
failed to yield a settlement within a reasonable time, either one of them may institute 
conciliation proceedings using the procedure under Annex V section 2. This presumes 
a specific obligation to negotiate which in turn implies that the states cooperate.475  If 
the parties still cannot reach agreement, through conciliation, the parties have a further 
obligation to reach an agreement to select one of the procedures under section 2. The 
negotiation must be done in good faith but can only come into effect by mutual consent. 
 
The relationship between this provision and the acceptance of ICJ compulsory 
jurisdiction is worthy of comment.  If all the parties to a dispute accept the jurisdiction 
of the ICJ under Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the ICJ, then notwithstanding the 
optional exclusion declaration a state may have made under article 298 (1) (a), the ICJ 
may proceed to have jurisdiction over a maritime delimitation case, unless the party 
which made the optional declaration has made a declaration excluding the dispute from 
ICJ jurisdiction also.476 
 
2.3.4. Provisional measures under Article 290 of UNCLOS and Article 41 of the 
ICJ statute  
 
Where the parties have submitted their dispute to a court or tribunal, which determines 
that it has the requisite jurisdiction, the court or tribunal may prescribe provisional 
measures to “preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent 
serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision.”477 The relevant 
 
474 UNCLOS Art 298 (1)  
475 Anne Sheehan, ‘Dispute Settlement under UNCLOS: The Exclusion of Maritime Delimitation 
Disputes’ [2005] UQ Law Jl 7 
476 ibid 
477 UNCLOS art 290  
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provision, Article 290 (1) states, “If a dispute has been duly submitted to a court or 
tribunal which considers that prima facie it has jurisdiction under this Part or Part XI, 
section 5, the court or tribunal may prescribe any provisional measures which it 
considers appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the 
parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the 
final decision.” The ICJ Statute also makes provision for the Court to, “indicate if it 
considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be 
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.”  The Statute unlike the UNCLOS 
provision does not make the protection of the marine environment one of the objectives 
for the indication of provisional measures. Judge Wolfrum is of the view that where the 
two provisions conflict, Article 290 would prevail under the principle of lex specialis.478  
It can be concluded that as UNCLOS recognises the ICJ as a forum for Law of the Sea 
disputes the Court’s rules including Article 41 of the statute of the ICJ can be applied 
in Law of the Sea disputes alongside the UNCLOS provisions on the subject.  
 
The language used in Article 41of the ICJ statute specifically that the Court can 
‘indicate’ not order interim measures is unlike the mandatory nature of the language 
used in Article 25 of the ITLOS Statute which states that, “the Tribunal and its Seabed 
Disputes Chamber shall have the power to prescribe provisional measures.” This calls 
into question the binding nature of the ICJ provision. The Court addressed the issue in 
the case of Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide,479 where Bosnia filed two requests for interim measures. The court 
indicated measures the first time on 8 April 1993 and when they were not complied with 
Bosnia filed another request.480 Regarding the second request the Court did not find the 
need to make measures additional to those earlier indicated but was of the view that the 
measures already prescribed be immediately and effectively implemented.481 Due to its 
failure to comply with the orders for provisional measures, the Court found Serbia and 
Montenegro in breach of its international obligations and therefore obliged to pay 
 
478 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (Provisional Measures, Order of 
27 August 1999) ITLOS Reports 1999, 280 
479 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ 
Rep 43. 
480 Ibid paras 4 and 7  
481 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Further 
Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measure, Order) [1993] ICJ Rep 325 
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compensation to Bosnia and Herzegovina.482  Also in the case of LaGrand,483 Germany 
argued that the provisional measures ordered were binding whilst the United States 
argued that they were not due to the language and history of Article 41 and 94 of the 
Charter.484  The Court reasoned that the object and purpose of the Statute was that such 
measures should be binding.  According to the Court, its order “was not a mere 
exhortation” but “created a legal obligation for the United States” which the court found 
the latter had not fulfilled.485 This question does not arise under UNCLOS, as Article 
290 (6) of UNCLOS states, “the parties to the dispute shall comply promptly with any 
provisional measures prescribed under this article.” It is therefore logical to conclude 
that provisional measures under Article 290 are binding on the states to whom it is 
directed. 
 
An important feature of provisional measures under UNCLOS can be found in the 
difference between provisional measures ordered under Article 290 (1) and that ordered 
under Article 290 (5) which provides, “Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal 
to which a dispute is being submitted under this section, any court or tribunal agreed 
upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the 
request for provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or 
with respect to activities in the Area, the Seabed Disputes Chamber, may prescribe, 
modify or revoke provisional measures in accordance with this article if it considers 
that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that 
the urgency of the situation so requires…” Article 290 (1) is used when a dispute has 
been submitted to a court or tribunal and the tribunal has jurisdiction. Paragraph 5 
however, is used when the constitution of the arbitral tribunal is pending which is only 
until the setting up of an Annex VII Tribunal is complete.  Under Article 290 (5) two 
conditions have to be present- one that the tribunal to be constituted would have 
jurisdiction and the other that the urgency of the situation so requires the prescription 
of such measures.  
 
 
482 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ 
Rep  
 para 7. 
483 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), (Merits) [2001] ICJ Rep 466 
484 Ibid para 33. 
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On jurisdiction generally, ITLOS jurisprudence indicates that the obligation to 
“exchange views” required by Article 283 if not fulfilled by the disputing states is a bar 
to the tribunal assuming jurisdiction. It is a necessary precondition and the tribunal 
would make a determination on whether or not the condition has been fulfilled before 
proceeding further. It is important to note that under general international law states are 
not obliged to negotiate prior to the submission of their dispute to third party dispute 
settlement.486 However, where there exists a special rule in a convention requiring them 
to do so, this takes precedence. Article 283 of LOSC is one such special rule and is 
regarded as an “exception to general international law”.487 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
case,488 the Tribunal found that negotiations and consultations ad taken place between 
the parties and from the records both Australia and New Zealand considered these as 
being under the LOSC and the parties had stated that the negotiations had terminated.489 
It concluded that the negotiations should not be continued as the possibility of reaching 
an agreement had been exhausted and both sides in the dispute were in agreement about 
the situation.  
 
The Tribunal maintained a similar position in both the Mox Plant490 and Land 
Reclamation491 cases. In the former case, the Tribunal acknowledged that both Ireland 
and the United Kingdom had sought an exchange of views and that there had been a 
negotiation in which the LOSC was discussed.492  In the latter case, the Tribunal found 
among others that as both parties met and negotiated in a bid to settle the matter 
amicably but were not able to settle the dispute or agree on a means to settle it, the 
condition had been met.493  These three cases showed that the tribunal did not leave it 
in the hands of the parties to determine whether the condition had been met but went 
ahead to itself declare that consultations or negotiations had taken place, the parties had 
 
486 Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v 
Singapore) (provisional measures Order of 10 September 2003, Sep. Op. Jesus) ITLOS Reports 2003, 
53. 
487 M/V “Louisa” (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain) (Order of 23 December 
2010, diss. Op. Treves) ITLOS Reports 2008-2010, 3. 
488 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand -Japan, Australia-Japan) (Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility) (2000) XXIII RIAA 29. 
489 ibid 
490 MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), (Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001) ITLOS 
Reports 2001. 
491 Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v 
Singapore) (provisional measures Order of 10 September 2003) ITLOS Reports 2003.  




discussed the dispute and both parties were unable to settle the dispute. The Tribunal 
however took a slightly different view in the Louisa494 case where the evidence of the 
exchange of views consisted of two notes verbale sent by the Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines to Spain which simply requested information without making any reference 
to an international dispute under LOSC or even asking for an exchange of views.495  
Even though it found that Spain did not answer the notes verbale and Spain contended 
that there was no exchange of views, the tribunal still found that the condition had been 
met.496  
 
The Tribunal on the word of one party could still find that the condition had been met 
as was the case in the Ara Libertad case,497 where the Tribunal found that Ghana and 
Argentina had engaged in at least three undisputed exchanges of views.498  However, it 
was only on the word of Argentina that such exchange of views and negotiations had 
failed to resolve the dispute that the Tribunal held that the conditions had been met.499  
So also did the Tribunal consider the Netherlands view that the possibility of settlement 
was exhausted in the Artic Sunrise case,500 to make a determination that there had been 
an exchange of views.  It can be concluded that the tribunal has always demanded an 
exchange of views or negotiations or consultation and would use even a minimum 
expression of these to make a determination for the assumption of jurisdiction. 
However, it must be emphasised that the obligation must be discharged in good faith 
and the Tribunal is duty bound to determine whether this has been done.  
 
Other issues the Tribunal takes into account is the existence of alternative dispute 
settlement procedures that are to be utilized in lieu of those in LOSC, and whether the 
exclusions and limitations in Section 3 of Part XV of UNCLOS apply. If the latter is 
the case, it appears that the court or tribunal cannot make a prima facie finding of 
jurisdiction in respect of maritime boundary disputes, as a state may have issued a 
 
494 M/V “Louisa” (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain) (Order of 23 December 
2010) ITLOS Reports 2008-2010, 3 
495 Ibid p. 67,68 
496 ibid 
497 “ARA Libertad” (Argentina v. Ghana) (Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December 2012) ITLOS 
Reports 2012, 344-345  
498 ibid 
499 ibid 
500 The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (Kingdom of The Netherlands V. Russian Federation) (Provisional 
Measures, Order of 22 November 2013) ITLOS Reports 2013, 246-247 
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declaration under Article 298 excluding disputes concerning the delimitation of 
territorial seas, continental shelf or EEZ from compulsory procedures entailing a 
binding decision. 
 
On the requirement for urgency, under Article 290 (5) Judge Mensah emphasised that, 
the Tribunal must make the conclusion, not just that there is the possibility of prejudice 
to the rights of one or other of the parties (or serious damage to the marine environment) 
but also that the prejudice or damage would occur before the arbitral tribunal is 
constituted.501 This according to Judge Mensah, means that ITLOS may not prescribe 
provisional measures unless it is satisfied that some prejudice of rights or harm to the 
marine environment might occur prior to the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral 
tribunal, not prior to a final determination of the case.502 
 
The main purpose of provisional measures is as stated in Article 41 of the ICJ statute, 
“to preserve the respective rights of either party” in the case, pending the final decision 
on the merits. In this quest the court is concerned with the rights of both parties to the 
case.  Judge Mensah argues that in considering whether to grant provisional measures, 
a court or tribunal is of necessity faced with conflicting rights and it is obliged to weigh 
the different rights of the parties against each other.503 In addition to this reason, the 
other important reason for the prescription of provision measures can be found under 
Article 290 of UNCLOS which provides for provisional measures to prevent serious 
harm to the marine environment. Courts and tribunals have held that provisional 
measures protect the parties against irreparable prejudice to the rights in dispute and 
this was pointed out by the court in the Fisheries jurisdiction case.504  In this regard, the 
jurisprudence and practice have developed conditions and requirements that need to be 
satisfied before provisional measures are ordered. Some of these principles are that 
provisional measures are ordered only in cases where they are considered necessary and 
appropriate at the discretion of a court or tribunal which considers whether on the 
peculiar facts of the case, such measures are needed to achieve results that cannot 
 
501 Thomas A. Mensah, ‘Provisional Measures in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’ 
(2002) 62 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 44. 
502 Ibid p. 47. 
503 Ibid p. 43. 
504 Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Iceland) 
(Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection: Order) [1972] ICJ Rep 16 
108 
 
otherwise be achieved.505 It is also important that courts and tribunals do not order 
provisional measures unless they are convinced that prima facie they would have 
jurisdiction deal to with the merits of the dispute.506 Since the aim of the measures is to 
preserve the rights of the parties the courts or tribunals endeavour to use equity and 
justice to ensure that no party suffers any prejudice to their rights and interests.507 
Importantly provisional measures are only appropriate for cases where there is a matter 
of urgency in that serious and irreversible damage would be caused if provisional 
measures were not ordered.  
 
Where reparation is possible as in the Aegean Sea case,508 the ICJ is inclined to decline 
to order provisional measures. ITLOS and Annex VII tribunals also apply the test of a 
real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to the rights of the 
parties in dispute. In the Ghana / Cote d’Ivoire case, the Special Chamber determined 
that whatever prejudice was caused to Cote d’Ivoire by Ghana’s oil and gas activities 
could cause a risk of prejudice to Cote d’Ivoire sovereign rights.509 It further considered 
whether such damages could be easily remedied and decided that it would not, as the 
activities Cote d’Ivoire complained of are capable of resulting in, “significant and 
permanent modification of the physical character of the area in dispute.”510  However, 
the Special Chamber found that Cote d’Ivoire had not provided enough evidence to 
substantiate its request or harm to the marine environment but nevertheless issued a 
general direction that the parties should act with prudence and caution to prevent such 
harm and imposed a duty to cooperate with each other to achieve that aim.511  The 
Chamber therefore ordered Ghana, “to carry out strict and continuous monitoring of all 
activities undertaken by itself or with its authorisation with a view to ensuring the 
prevention of serious harm to the marine environment.”512 In compliance the parties had 
 
505 Ibid para 21 
506 Ibid para 15 
507 Thomas A. Mensah, ‘Provisional Measures in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’ 
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508 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey) (Interim Protection Order) [1976] ICJ Rep 3 
509 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the 
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several meetings where such cooperation was discussed in accordance with the order of 
the Chamber.513  
 
 In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case between Greece and Turkey in the ICJ, 
Greece requested the Court to order Turkey to “refrain from all exploration activity or 
any scientific research with respect to the continental shelf areas within which turkey 
has granted such licenses and permits or adjacent to the islands or otherwise in dispute 
in the present case”  and an order that both states “refrain from taking further military 
measures nor actions which may endanger their peaceful relations.”514  The ICJ held 
that it was not necessary for it to order provisional measures for two reasons: one was 
that the alleged breach by Turkey if it was established, could be remedied by reparation 
by appropriate means.  The second was that the UN Security Council was already seized 
of the matter and had “ordered the parties to do everything in their power to reduce the 
present tensions in the area so that the negotiation process may be facilitated.”515  Both 
parties were urged to avoid activities that would further aggravate the situation. 
Regarding provisional measures by ITLOS the most recent case is that between Ghana 
and Cote d’Ivoire where the Special Chamber citing the M/V “Louisa”  considered 
whether there was a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to 
the region of the parties in dispute and also whether there was any urgency. This is 
according to the Tribunal, because proof of urgency is required in order for the chamber 
to exercise the power to prescribe provisional measures. This must be a real and 
immediate risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to rights at issue before final 
decision is delivered.516  To make such a determination the court used the plausibility 
test which meant that the rights being sought by Cote d’Ivoire should be plausible. The 
court found that they were plausible and thus proceeded to order that no new drilling 
either by Ghana or under its control be undertaken in the disputed area pending the 
decision on the merits of the case.517 
 
 
513 Emelia Ennin Abbey, 'Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire Meet Over ITLOS Ruling Implementation' (Graphic 
Online, 2018) <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ghana-cote-d-ivoire-meet-over-itlos-
ruling-implementation.html> accessed 25 May 2020. 
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The Chamber however did not suspend drilling in areas where drilling had already taken 
place as in its opinion this would entail the risk of considerable financial loss to Ghana 
and its concessionaires.”518  The Special Chamber also took into account the risk of 
harm to the marine environment stating that a complete suspension of activities would 
pose, “a serious danger to the marine environment resulting in particular from the 
deteriorating of equipment.”519 It can be concluded that the Special Chamber 
determined more specific standards or criteria in addition to the Convention 
requirements that must be met in this regard, though largely dependent on the facts of 
the case. The ability of a court or tribunal to be quite creative in ordering provisional 
measures to be put in place between the parties pending a maritime boundary 
delimitation is underscored by the fact that the court or tribunal is not constrained to 
order only the measures requested by the parties, but may vary the requests, or devise 
new measures, as that court or tribunal sees fit.520 In addition to prescribing specific 
measures, ITLOS has determined that its power under Article 290 incorporates the 
authority to make recommendations as well as issue orders to parties.521  It is noteworthy 
that once the Annex VII Tribunal is constituted, any provisional measures previously 
made may be modified or revoked if the circumstances justifying their prescription have 
been changed or cease to exist.522  As such, the possibility exists that an appropriate 
order prescribed by a court or tribunal could be used as a basis for the parties to renew 
attempts at negotiating their own temporary arrangement and this agreement could then 
be grounds for revoking the order. 523 
 
It can be concluded therefore that the powers given to a court or tribunal under Article 
290 and the obligation on states to “make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements” under Articles 74 and 83 converge when proceedings for maritime 
boundary delimitation are instituted under Part XV of LOSC and the states in dispute 
have been unable to establish their own provisional arrangements.  
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2.4. Third party maritime boundary dispute settlement in the Gulf of Guinea  
Where negotiations fail to achieve an agreement, judicial settlement of maritime 
boundaries would have to be considered. In the region, there are only two instances of 
third-party dispute settlement of maritime boundaries namely between Cameroon and 
Nigeria and Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. Regarding the Cameroon and Nigeria case, 
Cameroon unilaterally instituted proceedings against Nigeria requesting among others 
that the court determine the course of the maritime boundary between them.524 The two 
states had made declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under 
Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the Court and this formed the basis of the court’s 
jurisdiction. The court however used the provisions of UNCLOS in adjudicating the 
matter as can be seen from the judgment.525 
 
As between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana unilaterally initiated proceedings by 
transmitting to the President of ITLOS a notification and statement of claim instituting 
arbitral proceedings under Annex VII of UNCLOS.526 During consultations held by the 
President of ITLOS, with the two states, a special agreement was concluded to submit 
the dispute to a special chamber of the Tribunal formed pursuant to Article 15 (2) of the 
statute of the Tribunal.527 This provision provides for the ITLOS to form a chamber of 
three or more elected members to deal with particular categories of disputes. Ghana had 
hitherto declared that it did not accept any of the procedures provided for in section 2 
of part XV of UNCLOS in matters related to maritime boundary delimitation in 
accordance with Article 298 (1) of UNCLOS.528 However, in 2014 before its case with 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana withdrew the declaration. Cote d’Ivoire had filed a declaration 
recognising the jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory on 29 August 2001.529 Thus with 
Ghana not having specified any forum and Cote d’Ivoire having chosen the ICJ, Ghana 
had to initiate arbitration proceedings under ITLOS. 
 
 
524 ‘Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea,’ Land and Maritime Boundary between 
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It is noteworthy that even after third party settlement proceedings, the states still had to 
negotiate and cooperate in the implementation of the judgment of the Court or tribunal. 
In the Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire case after the ruling of the Special Chamber, the parties 
established a joint committee to implement the ruling and develop a document that 
shows the plotted maritime boundary according to the ruling.530 In the 
Nigeria/Cameroon case after the judgment the parties established a commission called 
the Cameroon – Nigeria mixed  Commission which with the support of the United 
Nations was able to implement the Judgment.531 
 
2.4.1. Third party dispute settlement options for pending maritime boundary 
delimitation disputes in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
Regarding pending maritime boundary disputes, if negotiations fail, there are many 
different options available to the states depending on which forum they have chosen. In 
the case of Ghana Togo and Benin, the latter two have both opted for the ICJ. Ghana 
has not done so and so the default option of arbitration would have to be used. This 
applies also to the Ghana, Nigeria and Benin situation as they also have not chosen the 
same forum.  
 
Like the Ghana, Togo and Benin’s position, Nigeria and Cameroon have both accepted 
the ICJ as their preferred forum, whilst Equatorial Guinea has not opted for any forum. 
They would therefore also have to use arbitration. Regarding Equatorial Guinea and 
Gabon, as has been discussed above, they have been in conflict over Corisco Bay to the 
extent that it has brought them almost to the brink of war on several occasions. 532 In 
2004 both parties agreed to a UN mediation to peacefully resolve their sovereignty 
dispute which would facilitate the settlement of the maritime boundary between 
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them.533As the dispute had as its underlying cause access to resources in the oil rich 
region, the parties also decided to jointly exploit the resources as they continue to work 
on the border problem.534 The parties with the help of the UN have been in negotiations 
and in November 2016, signed a special agreement to resolve their differences 
peacefully by submitting to the ICJ, their sovereignty and maritime boundary dispute.535 
However it appears this has not yet been done.536 It is likely that if submitted to the 
Court, Sao Tome and Principe would join the matter as it has made a declaration 
recognising the jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
 
 
2.4.2. Settlement of maritime boundary disputes related to the Continental Shelf 
beyond 200 nm in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
Settlement of maritime disputes related to the continental shelf beyond 200 M is subject 
to the same regime as the EEZ and continental shelf within 200 M. One of the main 
issues which confronts parties during negotiation and in deliberations of international 
courts and tribunals is whether the maritime boundary in the continental shelf beyond 
200M can be delimited in the absence of a recommendation by the CLCS. The Special 
Chamber in the Ghana /Cote d’Ivoire case, was of the opinion that the 
recommendations of the CLCS are without prejudice to the lateral delimitation of the 
continental shelf between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.537 This is clearly set out in the 
recommendations of the CLCS to Ghana, which do not address the outer limit fixed 
point of the Continental Shelf (OL-GHA-9) as originally submitted by Ghana.538 The 
CLCS thereby acknowledges the right of the parties to settle the continental shelf 
beyond 200M by agreement. As pointed out by the Special Chamber, in the Ghana/Cote 
d’Ivoire case, the CLCS and the Special Chamber have different roles to play.539 
Whereas delineation of the continental shelf beyond 200 M, is within the remit of the 
 
533 Ibid p.88. 
534 UNGA ‘Report of Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation’ UN GAOR 59th Session Supp 
No.1 UN DOC A/59/1 (2004) 
535 ‘Gabon, Equatorial Guinea Agree to End Territorial Dispute Over Islands' (Africa Times, 2016) 
<https://africatimes.com/2016/11/17/gabon-equatorial-guinea-agree-to-end-territorial-dispute-over-
islands/> accessed 25 May 2020. 
536 The ICJ website does not show that the parties have submitted a dispute to the Court. 
537 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire) (Provisional 
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CLCS, the Special Chamber decides on the course of the lateral limits.540 Further, 
although those lateral limits have to intersect the outer limit, whatever decision is 
arrived at, would be without prejudice to the recommendations of the CLCS.541 The 
Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire case was the first in which a state has had a recommendation from 
the CLCS prior to the case being decided.542 However it does not appear that the position 
would have been different even if there had not been a recommendation. 
 
All the states in the region have made submissions to the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for an extended continental shelf. This is likely to put on 
hold the delimitation in the continental shelf beyond 200 nm until the Commission has 
made recommendations on the states’ submissions. There is a therefore a clear 
distinction between the delimitation of the continental shelf under Article 83 and the 
delineation of its outer limits under article 76. Under the latter Article, the Commission 
is assigned the function of making recommendations to coastal States on matters 
relating to the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf, but it does so 
without prejudice to the delimitation of maritime boundaries. The function of settling 
disputes with respect to delimitation of maritime boundaries is entrusted to dispute 
settlement procedures under article 83 and Part XV of the Convention, which include 
international courts and tribunals.  
 
2.5. Regional cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea for the promotion of joint 
arrangements pending maritime boundary delimitation and the peaceful 
settlement of maritime boundary disputes 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that due to the many overlapping maritime 
boundaries in the EEZ, Continental shelf and potentially the Continental shelf beyond 
200 nm, as well as the lack of a uniform dispute resolution mechanism, it would be 
more beneficial for the states to cooperate in the exploitation of the oil resources than 
to lay undue emphasis on delimiting the maritime boundaries appertaining to them. It 
is commendable that some effort has been made by some states on a bilateral basis to 
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exploit disputed oil and gas resources is problematic both political and legally. 
Politically it is not expedient for states to cede what they perceive as their entitlement 
to another state. Legally UNCLOS does not make provision requiring states to 
cooperate in the management of oil and gas as it does for fisheries. At best it envisages 
bilateral provisional arrangements. However, in the region some boundaries especially 
those found in the continental shelf often involve more than two states. This is the case 
between Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria as well as Cameroon and Nigeria. 
Entitlements to islands and the effect to be given to them as well as the cut off effect 
they produce, have also been one of the causes of maritime boundary disputes between 
Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and Gabon.  Significantly there is no 
successful case of provisional arrangements involving three or more states in the region. 
Even those that involve two states are few as can be seen from the above discussion and 
have not generally been as successful as envisaged by the parties.  
 
These challenges could be solved by the creation of a regional body that could 
coordinate cooperation efforts. Currently the only regional body which makes provision 
for all the states in the Gulf of Guinea to become members and which has some mandate 
involving the management of oil and gas resources is the Gulf of Guinea Commission. 
This is a body that was established by Treaty543 signed in Libreville, Gabon, on 3 July 
2001. Its member states include Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Congo, São Tomé and 
Principe,544Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea545and 
recently Ghana. Togo and Benin are taking steps to join. The Membership of GGC is 
limited to states bordering the Gulf of Guinea region.546 Its objectives include 
overseeing the exploitation of the natural resources of the Gulf of Guinea for the 
economic development and wellbeing of its peoples through cooperation.547 
Commitment to other international and regional bodies which are relevant to the 
achievement of these objectives is encouraged. Some of these are the Economic 
 
543 Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission (adopted 3 July 2001) (Cggrps.com) 
<https://cggrps.com/wp-content/uploads/Tratado-EN1.pdf> accessed 25 May 2020; 
Additional Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) Relating to the 
Ad Hoc Arbitration Mechanism (adopted July 2013) (Cggrps.com) <https://cggrps.com/wp-
content/uploads/Tratado-EN1.pdf> accessed 25 May 2020. 
544 Angola, Congo, Gabon, Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe were the original signatories in 2001. 
545 Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo acceded to the Treaty in 2008. 
546 Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission Art 2  
547 Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission Art 3 (c)  
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Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), the African Union, (AU) as well as the 
Economic Community of Central African States. These bodies have signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the aim of promoting cooperation especially 
regarding maritime security. These areas of cooperation include technical cooperation, 
training and capacity building, coordination of joint activities and management of sea 
borders.548 
The parties of the GCC believe that dialogue and negotiation remain the best ways of 
resolving  permanently any dispute in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter 
and African Union Charter and therefore propose to put in place an appropriate  
dialogue  and  consultation mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution 
of conflicts connected to the delimitation of borders, to the economic and commercial 
exploitation of the  natural  resources within the  territorial  boundaries, particularly in 
the overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the parties.549 It is clear from this 
objective that the states acknowledge that the offshore resources especially the oil fields 
are so interconnected that they can only be effectively exploited when there is 
cooperation between the states in the area.550 
 
The Treaty of the Commission also contains dispute resolution provisions which states 
could utilise for their mutual benefit. The treaty of the Gulf of Guinea Commission and 
its Additional Protocol provides for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Arbitration 
Mechanism of the Commission.551 The adhoc mechanism was created for the 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts arising from delineation of borders 
and the economic and commercial exploitation of common natural resources of Member 
States of the GGC.552 By the Treaty and the Protocol the parties are obliged to undertake 
to settle all disputes amicably. Where this fails, they are to refer the matter to the ad hoc 
 
548 Memorandum of Understanding Among the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea 
Commission on Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West Africa (signed 25 June 2013) art 4. 
Available at (Cggrps.com) <https://cggrps.com/wp-content/uploads/Tratado-EN1.pdf> accessed 25 
May 2020. 
549 Gulf of Guinea Treaty Preamble  
550 Gbenga Oduntan, ‘The Emergent Legal Regime for Exploration of Hydrocarbons in the Gulf of 
Guinea: Imperative Considerations for Participating States and Multinationals,’(2008) 57 
Int.Comp.Law Quart. 261 
551 Additional Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) Relating to 




Arbitration Mechanism or any other mechanism for the peaceful resolution of conflicts 
provided for in the United Nations Charter and the Treaty of the African Union.553 
Recourse to the Mechanism may be by interested parties, by one of the parties to a 
conflict, by the Council of Ministers or by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government.554 The Protocol provides that conflict between member states may be 
resolved through mediation, conciliation or arbitration.555 So far this provision has not 
been used and so its effectiveness cannot be evaluated. 
 
Information sharing is another important area where the Commission can be relevant. 
The states in the region could benefit from data on issues that pertain to oil and gas 
exploitation in the region. These include information on the petroleum and energy 
industry in the member states. A good example to follow would be the work of the 
Secretariat of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)556 
which compiles a data bank by using information from member countries and literature 
on oil and gas.557 This would be beneficial to the Gulf of Guinea states so that they do 
not have to duplicate efforts in their exploitation and management of the hydrocarbon 
resources of the region.  
 
The Commission could also act in an advisory and consultative capacity for the states. 
It could be resourced with the technical expertise so that it can advise the JDAs in terms 
of best practice and offer up to date scientific advice. It could also offer the member 
states legal advice on dispute settlement and joint development. Specifically, it could 
assist in drafting maritime dispute settlement agreements and work with the joint 
commissions to draw up the best agreements for the states depending on their peculiar 
circumstances. The states could also empower the Commission with the capacity to 
provide them with the administrative machinery for their joint development zones. This 
 
553 Ibid art 1(2) and art 20  
554 Ibid Art 9  
555 Ibid Art 12-18 
556 The Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) is a regional intergovernmental 
organization establishing by an agreement signed in Beirut on January 9 1968 by Kuwait, Libya and 
Saudi Arabia as the founding members. The membership was increased currently to eleven members all 
Arab oil exporting countries. y 
557 Gbenga Oduntan, ‘The Emergent Legal Regime for Exploration of Hydrocarbons in the Gulf of 
Guinea: Imperative Considerations for Participating States and Multinationals,’ (2008) 57 
Int.Comp.Law Quart. p.264 
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could include supervising joint developments and collecting information on how they 
are performing so as to use lessons learned in one JDZ for another with similar 
problems. This would make it more cost effective for states to have joint developments 
Agreements.  
 
However, one of the biggest challenges that may prevent the Commission from being 
empowered or enhanced to perform the functions, discussed above is inadequate 
funding. Member states do not currently fulfill their financial obligations to the 
Commission.558 There is generally a problem of a lack of political will to make the 
Commission work as it currently is. However the strategic importance of the Gulf of 
Guinea, which produces 5.4 million barrels of oil a day, cannot be underestimated in 
the socio economic development of the countries of the region.559 For the Commission 
to make the required impact it necessary for it to resolve the challenges enumerated 
above that impede its progress and for the states parties to recognize its ability to 




This chapter has demonstrated how states can settle their maritime boundary disputes 
by using the dispute settlement provisions under UNCLOS. The discussion above has 
shown that many of the states in the region have not made declarations opting for any 
of the dispute settlement mechanism in Section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS. Those that 
have done so have opted for different fora. Therefore, in the event of a dispute they each 
cannot use their preferred forum but have to use the default forum of an Annex VII 
tribunal. It would be prudent therefore for the states that anticipate going into third party 
dispute settlement to agree on a forum agreeable to them in advance, perhaps as part of 
their maritime boundary negotiations.  
 
558 ibid 
559 'Angola and the Gulf of Guinea: Towards an Integrated Maritime Strategy’, Report of the Angola 
Forum conference aboard HMS Dauntless in Luanda, Angola in Luanda, Angola, 29 June 2012	





Also important is the making of provisional arrangements of a practical nature pending 
the settlement of their disputes as provided by Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of UNCLOS. 
In this regard states can choose to make their own arrangements in the form of joint 
development pending the establishment of the maritime boundary. However, if the 
states are pursing third party dispute settlement an international court or tribunal, can 
also prescribe provisional measures pending the hearing of the case. Also, in the region 
there are examples of states which already have a boundary but have decided to have 
joint development arrangements to exploit the resources that straddle the boundary. It 
has been found from the above discussion that there are too few such arrangements in 
the region and in view of the many pending maritime boundaries the states would 
benefit from well-structured joint development arrangements.  
In this regard they would need a center for technical consultation and support in setting 
up joint development arrangements and ongoing support to ensure that the joint 
development arrangements work. In this connection, it has been suggested that the Gulf 
of Guinea Commission or any other body the states may set up could act as a regional 
forum for the states to discuss joint development as well as settle issues related to joint 
development. This would need a high level of political will and commitment. In this 
connection, Gulf of Guinea Commission can be an important institution for cooperation 
for the states in the Gulf of Guinea. Even though it currently has its challenges, it has 
the potential given the necessary powers by states to serve as a body that provides the 
member states with the forum needed to cooperate in the exploitation of the non-living 
resources of the region. The Commission can act in a consultative and advisory role in 
the administration of the joint development efforts that are ongoing and can advise on 
those yet to be negotiated. This may prove more useful that setting up a completely new 
body which would require more resources.  
 
However, one of the consequences of exploitation of hydrocarbons is pollution of the 
marine environment and the liability for damages arising out of such pollution which is 







REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR PROTECTING THE MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT FROM POLLUTION ARISING OUT OF EXPLOITATION 
OF HYDROCARBONS IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 
3.1 Introduction 
Despite challenges with maritime boundary delimitation and joint development 
agreements for the exploitation of hydrocarbons, the states in Gulf of Guinea region 
(GOG) are actively involved in the hydrocarbon industry. The region’s oil reserves 
account for about 3% of the global total.560 Additionally the crude oil from the region 
is known to be of better quality by international standards, when compared to that from 
Latin America.561. The states in the region are either oil producers or have made 
economic discoveries of oil and gas but a few like Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon and 
recently Ghana are net exporters.562  
 
Consequently, there is an increase in the number of offshore oil rigs, pipelines and 
various export and import oil terminals which exposes the entire GOG region to the 
devastating effects of oil pollution.563 In the midst of all the euphoria about oil finds and 
exploitation activities, it has been found that the quality of the marine environment is 
being insidiously degraded.564 Indeed, it has been estimated that 4 million tons of waste 
oil is discharged into the Gulf of Guinea marine environment annually.565 These 
incidents of pollution are related to actual exploration and production activity, including 
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product pipeline operations, marine and terminal operations as well as blowouts and oil 
spills.566 The devastating effects of this pollution is being felt across the whole region.567  
 
However, the regional and national frameworks for protecting the marine environment 
from pollution arising out of offshore drilling activities in the region and compensating 
victims of pollution are inadequate.568 Globally more attention has been given to vessel 
-source pollution than other types of environmental pollution hazards to the marine 
environment. Hence there is no global convention dealing specifically with pollution 
from offshore drilling and compensation for victims of such pollution.569 Discussions 
at the international level specifically the International Maritime Organisation point to 
regional cooperation as the solution. In this regard the Abidjan Convention which is the 
region’s main framework to address offshore oil pollution and compensation has made 
provision for this through its recently adopted Protocol on Additional Protocol to the 
Abidjan Convention on Environmental Norms and Standards for Offshore Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Exploitation Activities (the Offshore protocol).570 However, among the 
problems of the region, is the fact that there is generally noncompliance with global and 
regional conventions and protocols and this makes cooperative management of spills a 
challenge.571 
 
This raises the issue of how the states can cooperate to take preventive and contingency 
measures, to prevent such pollution, and to deal promptly with incidents of major spills 
especially as the impact of these discharges is a transboundary problem. Also important 
is the issue of liability and compensation for damages arising out of exploration and 
exploitation activities. The states in the region being developing states cannot on their 
 
566 Peter Scheren and Chidi Ibe, ‘Environmental Pollution in the Gulf of Guinea: A Regional Approach’ 
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own deal with any major liabilities that may arise out of pollution from oil exploitation. 
Best practice shows that it is only through cooperation in accordance with international 
law, that states can deal with such liability and also protect the marine environment. 
Even though there is some effort being made in the region in this regard, it is not 
adequate.  
 
This chapter discusses how the Gulf of Guinea states can cooperate to protect the marine 
environment from pollution arising from exploitation of the non-living resources. The 
first part presents an overview of the international law obligations states have to protect 
the marine environment from pollution arising from hydrocarbon exploitation. Within 
that framework there is an assessment of the regional and national regulation on oil 
pollution from exploitation in the Gulf of Guinea. The second part proffers proposals 
for regional cooperation in the protection of the environment in the Gulf of Guinea from 
pollution arising out of exploitation and liability and compensation for damages and 
conclusions are drawn in the last part. 
 
3.2. Protection of the marine environment from pollution arising from 
hydrocarbon exploitation in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
3.2.1. Overview of obligations arising out of international Instruments 
Pollution of the marine environment from exploration and exploitation activities on the 
seabed, is caused by the release of harmful substances resulting directly from the 
exploration, exploitation and processing of seabed materials.572 The impact of this 
pollution on the marine environment includes mainly, operative pollution derived from 
daily activities relating to oil exploitation such as discharge of substances and accidental 
pollution.573 It also includes the less discussed impacts like impact on fish stocks and 
marine mammals during seismic surveys and emissions through gas flaring.574 Pollution 
 
572 Philippe Sands, Jacqueline Peel, Adriana Fabra, Ruth Mackenzie, Principles of International 
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from exploitation of oil has been down played in the literature as constituting an 
insignificant amount of pollution of the marine environment. According to Sands and 
Peel,575 it accounts for just 1% of marine pollution from oil.576 The major oil pollution 
comes from shipping activity which is not the focus of this work and therefore would 
not be addressed. However, the consequences of even small oil spills and waste from 
oil exploitation installations and activities are extremely devastating for the marine 
environment. This is due to the toxicity, even in low concentrations, of oil to marine 
living resources and other ocean wildlife.577 For instance, in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, 
widespread spills occur, resulting in ecological and public health problems especially 
for women and children and the socio-economic impacts of oil spills are enormous.578  
 
Under international law, the means by which the environment is protected are by 
adopting standards to prevent and control pollution, by establishing liability regimes 
which facilitate compensation claims and where large scale pollution occurs 
coordinating emergency response.579 States are  required by international law to protect 
the marine environment and are obliged to prevent and remedy the effects of pollution 
on the marine environment and this is well established even at customary law.580 
Treaties between states and national laws have been developed to deal with the issue. 
Also international organisations and commissions have been involved in setting 
standards and measures.581Under UNCLOS coastal states are required to adopt laws and 
regulations to prevent, reduce and control the pollution of the marine environment in 
connection with seabed activities subject to their jurisdiction and from among others, 
installations under their jurisdiction using the best practicable means at their disposal 
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and according to their capabilities.582 These installations may be referring to drilling 
structures and fixed and mobile platforms for oil activities. These laws are to be no less 
effective than international rules, standards and best practice.583 States are further 
enjoined to enforce these laws.584 Most importantly UNCLOS emphasises cooperation 
by obliging states to harmonise their individual policies at the regional level and 
establish global and regional rules, standards and practices to prevent such pollution.585 
Thus, UNCLOS in general terms establishes the framework for later protocols and 
instruments dealing with control of marine pollution.586 However, rather than lay out 
detailed provisions UNCLOS lays more emphasis on regional harmonisation and 
standards, as well as assigning and allocating responsibility among states.587  
 
To deal with the eventuality of large scale damage to the marine environment through 
an accidental oil spillage, UNCLOS provides for global or regional cooperation.588 It 
provides for states upon becoming aware of a pollution incident or the danger of one, 
to immediately notify any other state which might become affected and also any 
competent international organization.589 This kind of cooperation has been exhibited by 
several regional conventions like the 1969 Agreement for Co-operation in dealing with 
Pollution of the North Sea by oil. Some states have bilateral agreements to deal with 
issues of large-scale pollution. A good example is the 1983 Canada /Denmark 
Agreement for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment.590 
 
These obligations were already reflected in the environmental principles formulated at 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. 
The Declaration at the end of the conference consists of a preamble featuring seven 
introductory proclamations and 26 principles. Subsequently, another conference held in 
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Rio de Janeiro built on the Stockholm Declarations and features a preamble and 27 
principles.591 These two Declarations are non-binding but the provisions negotiated in 
both documents reflected customary international law at the time or were envisaged as 
being the foundation for future standards and norms.592 Both instruments provide that 
states have sovereignty over their natural resources and have the responsibility not to 
cause transboundary environmental damage.593Other principles include the principles 
of cooperation, preventive action, sustainable development, as well as the precautionary 
principle, polluter pays principle and the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility.594 These principles have garnered broad support among states and are 
reflected in state practice on exploitation of marine resources and the protection of the 
marine environment through international legal instruments like UNCLOS discussed 
above and soft law instruments discussed below595 
 
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) is the United Nations 
programme for addressing environmental issues at the global and regional level. Its 
mandate is to coordinate the development of environmental policy consensus by 
regularly reviewing the global environment and bringing emerging issues to the 
attention of governments and the international community for necessary action.596 
UNEP’s Division of Environmental Policy Implementation in conjunction with its 
international and national partners provide technical assistance and advice governments 
in the implementation of environmental policy and strengthens capacity of developing 
countries.  
 
UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme launched in 1974, is an important tool to address 
the degradation of the world’s oceans and coastal areas through cooperation by states 
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sharing a common body of water.597 Currently there are about eighteen regional seas 
programmes established by UNEP facilitation. These function through a Regional 
Action Plan which in most cases is backed by a regional convention as a general legal 
framework but with more detailed provisions in protocols associated with the 
convention. 598To oversee implementation of the programmes and aspects of the 
Regional Action Plan, like marine emergencies, information management and pollution 
monitoring, Regional Coordinating Units (RCU) have been established aided by 
Regional Activity Centers (RACs).599 
 
Concerning offshore pollution of the marine environment from offshore mining, UNEP 
was one of the first institutions to develop guidelines for offshore mining and drilling 
within the limits of national jurisdiction.600 This was a result of a study it commissioned 
in 1977 on the ‘Legal Aspects Concerning the Environment Related to Offshore Mining 
and Drilling.’ A Working Group of Experts prepared a report which was endorsed in 
1982 by the Governing Council of UNEP. Subsequently the General Assembly 
recommended these Guidelines to states in the formulation of national 
legislation.601These guidelines described as the most “comprehensive and specific 
measures on record at the global international level,”602 relate directly to the need to 
protect the marine environment in the context of offshore mining and drilling. They 
follow Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and recognise the significance of the 
offshore oil industry to the economies of both developed and developing states and aim 
to facilitate the formulation of national, regional and global regimes based on best 
practice.603 It lays down basic standards that states need to incorporate in national and 
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regional rules, regulations, and practices so as to ensure that environmental 
considerations are reflected in the various national and international systems dealing 
with authorisation, environmental assessment, environmental monitoring, contingency 
planning as well as the important issue of liability and compensation.604  
 
It therefore recommends that offshore operations like the building of installations 
should be authorised by the competent national authorities following an environmental 
impact assessment. Authorisation should contain provisions requiring the necessary 
measures to ensure public health and protect against spillage and leakage waste. It also 
provides for post exploitation issues like the removal of installations and the restoration 
of the environment. Importantly the guidelines provide that national laws and 
regulations should be no less effective than international rules, standards and 
recommended practice and procedures. This provision is also found in UNCLOS and 
may have been influenced by the work of the 3rd UN Conference on the Law of the Sea 
which it coincided with.605However though they are global in scope, they have no 
binding force and are at best soft law.606 Also no dispute resolution mechanisms are 
included in the guidelines.607  
 
Another multilateral effort that deals with pollution arising out of exploitation is the 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 
(OPRC).608 This very important initiative of the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO), was the result of a conference of leading industrial nations (known as G7) in 
Paris in July 1990.609 This was necessitated by major oil spill pollution incidents like 
the 1978, Amoco Cadiz oil spill when 220,000 tonnes of crude oil was accidentally 
 
604 ibid 
605 Zhigno Gao and Chih-Kuo Kao, Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas (Kluwer Law 
International B.V, 1998) 114 
606 ibid 
607 ibid 
608 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (with annex and 
procès- verbal of rectification) (adopted 30 November 1990, entered into force 13 May 1995) 1891 
UNTS 78  
609 'International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-Operation' (Imo.org, 
2020) <http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-on-Oil-Pollution-Preparedness,-Response-and-Co-operation-(OPRC).aspx> accessed 28 
April 2020.  
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spilled near to the Brittany coastline and the 1989 Exxon Valdex spill of 40,000 tonnes 
of oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska. The purpose of the Convention, therefore is 
to provide a global framework for international co-operation in combating major oil 
spill incidents or threats of marine pollution.610 Contracting states nationally or in 
cooperation are obliged to formulate effective responses to such threats and to minimise 
the damage caused by oil spills.611 Operators of offshore units, under the jurisdiction of 
the States Parties, are required to have oil pollution emergency plans.612 The Convention 
is relevant to oil exploration and exploitation as “Offshore unit” has been defined to 
mean, “any fixed or floating offshore installation or structure engaged in gas or oil 
exploration, exploitation or production activities, or loading or unloading of oil”613 and 
the Convention acknowledges the serious threat posed to the marine environment by 
such offshore units.614  
 
A significant feature of the OPRC Convention is the prospect of states receiving 
assistance and support from the International Maritime Organisation to identify sources 
of provisional financing of the costs for which the parties agree that, “subject to their 
capabilities and the availability of relevant resources, they will co-operate and provide 
advisory services, technical support and equipment for the purpose of responding to an 
oil pollution incident, when the severity of such incident so justifies, upon the request 
of any Party affected or likely to be affected”.615  This is subject to the reimbursement 
of costs of assistance set out in the Annex to the Convention.616  
 
States parties are also to require masters or other persons having charge of offshore units 
to report without delay any event involving a discharge or probable discharge of oil, to 
the coastal State to whose jurisdiction the unit is subject.617 The Convention further 
 
610 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (with annex and 
procès- verbal of rectification) (adopted 30 November 1990, entered into force 13 May 1995) 1891 
UNTS 78 preamble 
611 Ibid art 1 
612 Ibid art 3  
613 Ibid art 2 (4) 
614 Ibid preamble 
615 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (with annex and 
procès- verbal of rectification) art 7 
616 Ibid Annex (1) 
617 Ibid art 4 
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promotes bilateral and multilateral co-operation in preparedness and response by 
providing that parties endeavour to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements for oil 
pollution preparedness and response.618 Copies of such agreements shall be 
communicated to the Organisation which should make them available on request to 
Parties.619 The Convention provides for IMO to play an important co-ordinating role.620 
In the Gulf of Guinea only two states – Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea 
are not party to the Convention.621  
 
3.3. Regional Framework for the protection of the marine environment from 
pollution arising out of exploitation of oil and gas 
3.3.1. Abidjan Convention  
In the Gulf of Guinea, UNEP has since 1995 spearheaded projects on the protection and 
conservation of the marine environment..622 Under its Regional Seas Programme, the 
states in the region in cooperation with other states in West and Central Africa, adopted 
the Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region (Abidjan Convention) 
together with its Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in Cases of 
Emergency (Abidjan Convention).623 This has become the main regional legal 
framework in West and  Central Africa for cooperation in the protection and of the 
marine environment from pollution arising out of exploitation of oil and gas. The 
Convention area extends across the marine environment, coastal zones and related 
inland waters fully within the jurisdiction of the states of West and Central Africa region 
 
618 Ibid art 6(2) 
619 Ibid art 10 
620 Ibid art 2(6) 
621 'International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-Operation' (Ecolex.org) 
<https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/international-convention-on-oil-pollution-preparedness-
response-and-co-operation-tre-001109/> accessed 26 May 2020. 
622 Chidi Ibe and Kenneth Sherman, ‘The Gulf of Guinea Large Marine Ecosystem Project: Turning 
Challenges into Achievements’ in Jacqueline McGlade and others (eds), The Gulf of Guinea Large 
Marine Ecosystem: Environmental Forcing & Sustainable Development of Marine Resources (Elsevier 
Science 2002) 
623 Convention for Cooperation in the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the Atlantic Coast of the West, Central and Southern Africa Region and 
Protocol concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in Cases of Emergency (adopted 23 March 
1981, entered into force 5 August 1984) (Abidjan Convention) Available at 'Home | Abidjan 
Convention' (Abidjanconvention.org, 2019) <http://abidjanconvention.org/> accessed 26 May 2020. 
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from Mauritania to Namibia.624 There are 22 signatories to the Convention, 19 of whom 
have ratified.625This area is wider than the area being studied in this research and all the 
states in the Gulf of Guinea with the exception of Sao Tome and Principe have ratified 
the Convention. This kind of cooperation is arguably in a non - mandatory way required 
of the Gulf of Guinea as a semi - enclosed sea under Article 123 of UNCLOS which 
provides that states bordering an enclosed or semi enclosed sea should cooperate with 
each other by endeavouring directly or through a regional organisation to among others 
coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.626  
 
One of the sources of pollution the Convention is concerned with, include exploration 
and exploitation of the sea bed and pollution from and through the atmosphere.627 
Regarding  preventive measures, Article 8 of the Convention enjoins the parties to take 
appropriate measures to prevent, reduce, combat and control pollution resulting from or 
in connection with exploration and exploitation of oil.628 The Convention provides that 
states as part of their environmental management policies, develop technical and other 
guidelines to assist the planning of the development projects in such a way as to 
minimise any harmful impact on the marine environment.629 The Convention further 
provides that each contracting party shall endeavor to include any planning activity 
entailing projects within its territory, particularly in the coastal areas, that may cause 
substantial pollution or significant harmful changes to the marine environment.630 
 
The Abidjan Convention stresses cooperation of all the states to deal with accidental 
discharges.631 The parties are obliged to cooperate in taking all necessary measures to 
deal with pollution emergencies in the area whatever the cause and to reduce or 
 
624 Abidjan Convention art 1  
625 The parties to the Abidjan Convention are Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, 
Mauritania Namibia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Sao 
Tome and Principe, and Gabon 
626 UNCLOS art 123 (b) 
627 Abidjan Convention art 8, 9  
628 Ibid art 8  
629 Ibid art 13  
630 ibid 
631 Ibid art12 
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eliminate damage resulting therefrom.632 In this regard, the Convention makes provision 
for any contracting party which becomes aware of a pollution emergency in the area 
covered by the Convention to notify the organisation or any other contracting party 
likely to be affected by such an emergency.633Additional detail is provided in the 
Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in Cases of Emergency634 
which requires that each contracting party act in accordance with the following 
principles in an emergency situation: make an assessment of the nature and extent of 
the marine emergency and transmit the results of the assessment to any other contracting 
party concerned; determine the necessary and appropriate action to be taken with 
respect to the emergency in consultation with the other contracting parties; make the 
necessary reports and request for assistance under the protocol and take appropriate and 
practical measures to reduce the effect of the pollution including surveillance and 
monitoring of the emergency situation.635 In carrying out all these responses, states are 
enjoined to act in conformity with international law and with international conventions 
applicable to the marine emergency response as well as inform the Organisation.636 
 
Regarding the pollution of the marine environment from pollution arising out of 
exploitation, the parties to the Convention have been slow at adopting the relevant 
protocol and have only recently in 2019 adopted the Additional Protocol to the Abidjan 
Convention on Environmental Norms and Standards for Offshore Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Exploitation Activities (the Offshore Protocol)637 This Protocol is the 
first environmental standard in Africa setting regional standards to regulate offshore oil 
and gas activities. It aims to prevent, reduce or eliminate pollution or damage to the 
marine and coastal environment resulting from offshore oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation.638 The Contracting Parties are mandated to individually or as part of 
 
632 ibid 
633 Ibid art 12 (2) 
634 Protocol Concerning Co-Operation in Combating Pollution in  
Cases of Emergency (adopted 23 March 1981, entered into force 5 August 1984) Available at 'Home | 
Abidjan Convention' (Abidjanconvention.org, 2019) <http://abidjanconvention.org/> accessed 26 May 
2020. 
635 Ibid art 10  
636 Ibid  
637 Additional Protocol to the Abidjan Convention on Environmental Norms and Standards for Offshore 
Oil and Gas Exploration and Exploitation Activities (adopted 3 July 2019, not yet in force) 
638 Ibid art 2 
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bilateral or regional cooperation, take all appropriate measures to prevent, mitigate, 
combat and control pollution in the Protocol Area resulting from offshore exploration 
and exploitation, and ensure, in particular, that the best available, environmentally 
effective and economically appropriate techniques are implemented.639 
 
The provisions of the Offshore Protocol are based on three principles – the 
precautionary principle that emphasises preventive measures; the ‘polluter pays 
principle’ which  ensures that the costs of preventing, mitigating and control of pollution 
is to be borne by the polluter; and the principle of public participation, whereby every 
person has the right to participate in the making of public decisions that affect the 
environment. To effectively implement the Protocol, the Contracting Parties are 
mandated to harmonise their policies and strategies and formulate and adopt 
programmes and measures that contain, as necessary, deadlines for implementation.640 
There are also provisions on the formation of Emergency Response Plans and mutual 
assistance in the event of oil spill harmonise legislation.641 
This Protocol is a positive development in the region. However, for it to be successful 
the states must ensure that it is implemented and enforced. Nevertheless, 
implementation has not been a strong point of the Abidjan Convention. A recent 
assessment of the Convention implementation found significant challenges with 
funding, coordination, and limited human resources.642.  
 
3.3.2. The Interim Guinea Current Commission (IGCC) and LME concept as a 
management and also cooperative tool 
To better promote cooperation, the Abidjan Convention is making efforts at using the 
Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) approach as a management tool, for the protection of 
 
639 Ibid art 4 
640 Ibid art 5 
641 Ibid arts 18, 20 
642 Harry Barnes-Dabban and Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, ‘The influence of the Regional 
Coordinating Unit of the Abidjan Convention: implementing multilateral environmental agreements to 
prevent shipping pollution in West and Central Africa.’ (2018) 18 Int Environ Agreements 469. 
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the marine environment.643 LMEs are wide areas of ocean space along the Earth’s 
continental margins, linked by estuaries and river basins seaward toward the outer 
margins of major currents or the edge of continental shelves. They are productive areas 
of the ocean, which support a rich diversity of marine living resources.644 The large 
marine ecosystem approach is science based and scientists have played leading roles in 
the international effort to establish a worldwide network of 66 Large Marine 
Ecosystems (LMEs).645 The countries that are part of these units have a shared stake in 
the coastal waters that make up these units. The Gulf of Guinea is part of the LME 
known as the Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME).646 The Guinea 
Current is an eastward flowing water mass sourced from the North Equatorial counter 
current off the coast of Liberia, and the Canary Current, extending from the Strait of 
Gibraltar to Bissagos Islands in South Guinea Bissau. It encompasses the EEZ of sixteen 
coastal states – those inside the hollow Gulf of Guinea which is the study area of this 
research – and those outside this Gulf area namely Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Congo Brazzaville, Congo and Angola.647 These states are all parties to 
the Abidjan Convention and have a shared stake in the protection of the marine 
environment from pollution which has been identified as one of the factors degrading 
the marine environment. One of the sources of pollution in the area is as a result of the 







643 'Decision-/CP.10/8. Environmental Standards for the Offshore Exploration and Exploitation 
Activities of Mining and Mineral Resources Off the Coasts of the States Parties', Decisions adopted by 
the 10th Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for Cooperation in the Protection, the 
Management and the Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Atlantic Coast of the 
West, Central and Southern African Region (Pointe Noire, Republic of the Congo, 2012). 
644 'LME Initiatives' (IUCN, 2020) <https://www.iucn.org/theme/marine-and-polar/our-
work/international-ocean-governance/large-marine-ecosystems/lme-initiatives> accessed 30 May 2020. 
645 Carlisle K.M., ‘The Large Marine Ecosystem approach: Application of an integrated, modular 
strategy in projects supported by the Global Environment Facility’ (2014) 11 Environmental 
Development 19–42. 
646 'Large Marine Ecosystems Hub' (Lmehub.net, 2020) <http://www.lmehub.net/> accessed 26 May 
2020 
647 GCLME, 'Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis' 
(GCLME Regional Coordinating Unit 2006) 71 
648 'Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis' (GCLME 
Regional Coordinating Unit 2006) 
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Figure 15: The Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem 
 
 
Source: 'Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary 
Diagnostic Analysis' (GCLME Regional Coordinating Unit 2006) 
 
There are two other LMEs in the Abidjan Convention area namely the Benguela and 
Canary Currents. The Benguela current is situated along the coast of south-western 
Africa, stretching from east of the Cape of Good Hope in the south equatorward to the 
Angola Front, near the northern geopolitical boundary of Angola. It encompasses one 
of the four major coastal upwelling ecosystems of the world which lie at the eastern 
boundaries of the oceans.649  The Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem (CCLME) 
is situated in the Atlantic Ocean on the north-western coast of Africa. Its boundaries 
extend from the northern Atlantic coast of Morocco (36°N, 5°W at the Strait of 
Gibraltar), south to the Bijagos archipelago of Guinea-Bissau (11°N, 16°W) and west 
to the Canary Islands (Spain). The countries within the recognized limits of the CCLME 
 
649 BCLME, ‘Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem Programme (BCLME) Transboundary 
Diagnostic Analysis’ (November 1999) <  
https://iwlearn.net/resolveuid/ccace4ef8c3d78021c69050a349d653e  > assessed on 22 September 2019 
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include Spain (Canary Islands), Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea-
Bissau. Both Cape Verde and the waters of Guinea are considered adjacent waters 
within the zone of influence of the CCLME.650 The parties to the Abidjan Convention 
have been cooperating with these three Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs), discussed 
above, so as to make them the framework for marine environmental conservation 
projects funded by the Global Environmental Fund (GEF).651  
Under the framework of the Abidjan Convention, the sixteen countries of the Guinea 
Current LME ultimately came together to form the Interim Guinea Commission (IGCC) 
one of whose objective is the sustainable management of the Guinea Current large 
marine ecosystem through regional cooperation.652  This is the culmination of a process 
which began in 1995 to develop for the Gulf of Guinea Large Marine Ecosystem 
(GOGLME) and Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME), a Strategic 
Action Plan (SAP) for the improvement of the coastal and marine environment of 
Western Africa which was identified as becoming heavily polluted due to human 
activity.653 Currently, the states that make up the Guinea current LME are committed to 
regional cooperation using the ecosystem approach to management of the GCLME. By 
their agreement at two meetings, they have decided to  transition the Interim 
Commission to a fully-fledged commission by 2020.654 Since its creation, the IGCC as 
a technical Committee has entered into agreements and forged partnerships with a 
number of institutions and bodies including the IMO for oil spill contingency 
planning.655 It also has a joint program with the International Petroleum Industry 
 
650 CCLME, ‘Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem (CCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis 
(TDA)’ (CCLME Project Coordination Unit, Dakar, Senegal 2015) 140 
651 The Global Environment Facility was established on the eve of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit to help 
tackle the most pressing environmental problems. Since then, the GEF has provided over $18.1 billion 
in 
grants and mobilized an additional $94.2 billion in co-financing for more than 4500 projects in 170 
countries including the Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem. See 'About Us' (Global Environment 
Facility, 2020) <https://www.thegef.org/about-us> accessed 26 May 2020. 
652 GCLME, 'Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis' 
(GCLME Regional Coordinating Unit 2006) 
653 ibid 
654 Twelfth Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection 
Management and Development of the Marine Environment and Coastal Areas of the Atlantic Coast of 
the West, Central and Southern African Region (Abidjan Convention) (2017) 
<http://cop12.abidjanconvention.org/> accessed 26 May 2020. 
655 Sarah Humphrey and Christopher Gordon, ‘Terminal Evaluation of the UNDP-UNEP GEF Project: 
Combating Living Resources Depletion and Coastal Area Degradation in the Guinea Current LME 
through Ecosystem-based Regional Actions (GCLME)’ (UNEP November 2012) 88 
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Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) on oil spill prevention and 
response.656 
The importance of the work of this Commission, when it is formally established, as well 
as the efforts of the Abidjan Convention, cannot be underestimated as the Gulf of 
Guinea region has major oil producers including Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, 
and Gabon and other countries, such as Ghana, which have recently joined this list. 
Thus, oil spill and pollution risks from exploitation activities to coastal GCLME 
countries make it increasingly imperative for the countries to be prepared for emergency 
responses to accidental oil spills and make provision for compensating victims of such 
pollution. In this regard, the 1995 Gulf of Guinea Pilot Project, referred to above, began 
this process by mainly dealing with training incorporating issues of major oil spills from 
among others offshore oil exploration and platform explosions.657 The training also 
involved emergency response and contingency planning at the national and regional 
level and thus promoted cooperation among governmental authorities through these 
interactions. The project also focused on the standardisation of analytical methods for 
data collection on such risks throughout the region.658Coordination in case of oil spills 
in GCLME waters was also enhanced through the formulation of Terms of Reference 
for a Centre of Excellence to coordinate intervention actions in case of oil spills in 
GCLME waters.659  
By way of further cooperation, at the Ninth Conference of Parties meeting of the Interim 
Guinea Current Commission, the parties adopted a Regional Oil Spill Contingency 
Plan, and created a Regional Centre for Coordination in Cases of Emergency.660 Under 
this framework, the states developed National Strategic Action Plans (NAPs) for the 
protection of the environment.661 The IGCC has coordinated the preparation and 
implementation of an Oil Pollution Contingency Plan by all major oil producing 
member states of the GCLME in collaboration with the International Maritime 
 
656 Ibid p. 93. 
657 ibid 
658 Towards Ecosystem-based Management of the Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem. (United 
Nations Development Programme 2013) p.17 
659 ibid 
660 Chika Ukwe and Chidi Ibe, ‘A regional Collaborative Approach to Transboundary Pollution 
management in the Guinea Current Region of Western Africa’ (2010) 53 Ocean and Coastal 
Management 503. 
661 Ibid 502 
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Organization (IMO).662 It also assisted the countries in harmonising action plans and 
developing mechanisms for sharing technology and expertise including assistance 
during actual spill event (including sharing of clean-up equipment and provision of 
expert advice).663 In addition, a regional policy to minimize transboundary impacts of 
oil pollution from activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of IGCC member 
states, in partnership with the organised oil operators (including multinationals) in the 
region have been developed and adopted by the countries. Several of the countries are 
currently internalising the regional policy which reflects the provisions of the OPRC 
90, through the adoption of corresponding national policies and oil spill contingency 
plans. 664 
Laudable as these initiatives are, the IGCC which envisaged to be the vehicle of 
implementation has not yet been fully established into a commission as noted above. 
One of the issues hindering the parties is how to legally establish it as a Commission. 
The parties have not made a decision whether to establish the Commission by Protocol 
under the Abidjan Convention or as a separate legal entity.665 However without a legally 
binding mandate, the Commission cannot be effective in its efforts at regional 
cooperation.  
 
3.3.3. The Gulf of Guinea Commission 
The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) which was discussed in the last chapter may 
also have a role to play in the regulation of oil pollution from exploitation and is a good 
development for the region. However, it does not currently have the requisite capacity 
to deal with pollution from offshore activities even though it has the biggest oil 
producers as members. It provides in its treaty one of its main objectives which is 
cooperation with the objective of transforming the sub region into a Zone of Peace and 





665 Report of Ninth Meeting of the Regional Steering Committee of the IGCC / GCLME Abidjan Cote 
d’Ivoire 9-10 May 2012 p. 4 para 3. 
666 Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission (adopted 3 July 2001) (Cggrps.com) 
<https://cggrps.com/wp-content/uploads/Tratado-EN1.pdf> accessed 25 May 2020; Article 5  
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hydrocarbons and protection of the marine environment, the Commission’s focus 
appears to be security issues and not oil pollution from exploitation. This may be 
influenced by the impact of crimes at sea on international shipping and navigation.667  
 
Regarding the management of the marine environment, the treaty is not detailed. There 
is just a brief mention in the objectives of the treaty, “to protect, preserve and improve 
the natural environment of the Gulf of Guinea and cooperate in the event of a natural 
disaster.”668 Since the exploitation of hydrocarbons is also mentioned as one of the areas 
of cooperation,669 it can be assumed that the treaty envisages the risks and potential 
hazards associated with exploitation of hydrocarbons like shipping accidents and oil 
spill which could be attributable to multinational oil companies operating in the region. 
The GGC could play a consultative and advisory role in the protection of the marine 
environment by providing expert advice to states on national regulations and generally 
supporting them in the preparation of their national response plans to combat pollution. 
This can be done in collaboration with other relevant regional bodies like the Abidjan 
Convention already discussed. Given the required expertise, it could also play a role in 
the implementation of the Offshore Protocol referred to above by for instance assisting 
states to harmonise their laws as required under the Protocol and providing a forum for 
states to consult with each other in the implementation of the Protocol. 
 
3.4. National framework 
As already noted above, majority of the states in the region are parties to the OPRC 90 
which deals with oil spill responses of states. By Article 6 the Convention obliges each 
state party to establish a national system for responding promptly and effectively to oil 
pollution incidents. At the minimum this shall include the competent national authority 
or authorities with responsibility for oil pollution preparedness and response; a national 
contingency plan for preparedness and response which includes the organisational 
relationship of the various bodies involved, whether public; or private, taking into 
 
667 Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi, 'Fault Lines in Maritime Security' (2013) 22 African 
Security Review. 
668 Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission (adopted 3 July 2001) (Cggrps.com) 
<https://cggrps.com/wp-content/uploads/Tratado-EN1.pdf> accessed 25 May 2020; Article 3  
669 Ibid Article 5  
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account guidelines developed by the International Maritime Organisation. To facilitate 
the implementation of this obligation, the Global Initiative for West, Central and 
Southern Africa (GI WACAF) Project which is a collaboration between the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and IPIECA670 was launched in 2006. Its 
objective is to enhance the capacity of 22 West, Central and Southern African states to 
prepare for and respond to marine oil spills in accordance with the OPRC 90. It 
accomplishes this by organising and delivering workshops, seminars and exercises, that 
aim to communicate good practice in all aspect of spill preparedness and response, 
drawing on expertise and experience from within governments, industry and other 
organisations working in this specialised field. It executes this through dedicated 
government and industry focal points. The project’s major objective during these 
exercises is to promote cooperation amongst all relevant government agencies, oil 
industry business units and stakeholders both nationally, regionally and internationally. 
Major contributors to GI WACAF for these purposes are the IMO and seven oil 
company members of IPIECA, namely BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Eni, Shell, Total and 
Woodside.  
 
3.4.1. Designation of competent national authority and laws on oil pollution 
In compliance with the OPRC 90, some of the states671 in the GOG that are party to the 
Convention have established national systems for responding promptly and efficiently 
to oil pollution incidents. They have competent authorities and National Spill 
Contingency Plans. Prominent examples include Nigeria, where the competent 
authority is the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) which 
was set up by statute. It is responsible for preparedness, detection and response to all 
oil spillages in Nigeria.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
The Statute also established the advisory, monitoring, evaluating, mediating and co-
ordinating arm of NOSDRA known as the National Control and Response Centre 
(NCRC)  The NOSDRA Act acknowledges that issues of protection of the marine 
 
670 IPIECA, at the request of  UNEP, was set up on 13 March 1974, (as the International Petroleum 
Industry Environmental Conservation Association)  with its headquarters in London, with the objective 
of developing a shared industry response to environmental and social issues  and remains the global oil 
and gas industry’s principal channel of engagement with the UN and has strong links with the IMO. 
671 Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea 
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environment from pollution are multi-sectoral and therefore provides for NOSDRA to 
co-ordinate and implement the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan for Nigeria. Also, 
in Ghana the competent authority is the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
designated as such by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Act 490 of 1994. 
The Agency is responsible for controlling pollution into the environment and 
enforcement of relevant laws relating to protection of the environment and is the 
Ministerial body responsible to Government for matters connected to the NOSCP. In 
Benin it is the Ministry of Transport National Oil Spill Response Centre of the 
Department of the Merchant Navy is the responsible authority. 
 
The two states with the most comprehensive regulatory frameworks in the region are 
Ghana and Nigeria. Ghana’s Maritime Pollution Act, incorporates most of the marine 
pollution conventions ratified by Ghana.672 It provides for the prevention, regulation 
and control of pollution arising from maritime activities in areas within Ghana’s 
maritime jurisdiction and other related matters.673 Even though the Act applies mainly 
to pollution from ships, it also applies to offshore oil installations.674 The Act provides 
special requirements for drilling rigs, other platforms and offshore installations which 
include floating production storage offloading facilities used for production and storage 
of oil and floating storage units used for storage of the oil that is produced in these 
installations.675 The Act further mandates operators of installations for oil exploitation 
to comply with requirements on equipment and the keeping of records on discharges as 
specified under the Act.676 The Act further provides administrative penalties for 
contraventions.677 
However, the Act has been criticised for not having specific provisions that require that 
companies have particular preventive or combative equipment during actual drilling. 678 
These include containment booms, containment chambers, chemical dispersants or 
 
672 Ghana’s Maritime Pollution Act 2016, (Act 932) 
673 Ibid preamble 
674 Ibid section 1 (iii) 
675 Ibid section 72  
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678 John Baker Amissah Glover, 'Prevention and Combat of a Spillage after Ghana's Oil and Gas 
Discovery: Is Ghana Ready to Face an Environmental Threat?' (Master of Science, World Maritime 
University, Malmo, Sweden 2017). 
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other such combating equipment. They are also not required by law to have testing or 
effectiveness of safety measures and equipment or to have actual “safety drills” on site 
to ensure that all crew concerned know what to do and are able to effectively perform 
their various roles in the event of a spillage.679There is only a weak requirement for 
them to cooperate with the National Coordinator in preparing the National Contingency 
Plan for preparedness and contingency.680 This gap has been filled by the Ghana 
National Oil Spill Contingency Plan, 2015, which requires operators to develop tactical 
oil spill contingency plans at their facilities and among the risks identified are blowouts 
which is an “out of control gas and / or pressure erupting from a well being drilled…”681 
However due to lack of capacity, the enforcement of these requirements is difficult. 
Nigeria like Ghana also has laws on oil pollution and by its Oil Pollution Act682 provides 
for measures on prevention of oil pollution, mitigation, clean-up and liability.683 The 
law further creates a comprehensive scheme ensuring sufficient financial resources are 
made available for oil spill clean-up and compensation.684 Under the Petroleum 
(Drilling and Production) Regulation,685 it is mandatory for oil companies to take 
precautionary steps to prevent oil pollution and when it does occur to take steps in 
controlling and stopping the pollution.686 Nigeria also has a law that requires oil 
companies to produce an Environmental Impact Assessment for proposed projects or 
activities that are likely to alter the environment.687 
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681 James Speight, Handbook of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations (1st edn, Elsevier Inc 1994). 
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683 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969. Section 25, Laws of the Federation of 
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3.4.2. National Contingency Plans for Preparedness and Response 
The states’ National Spill Contingency Plans (the Plan) are in various stages of 
development. Some are fully developed as in Ghana and Nigeria whilst others are in the 
process of being formulated or not yet formulated like the situation in Equatorial Guinea 
and Sao Tome and Principe.688 In States like Benin, Cameroon and Gabon, Togo and 
Sao Tome and Principe, there have been no major spills reported. However, they are 
also the states with inadequate response capabilities. At best the oil companies and the 
military are likely to assist during an emergency.689 Some of the states have also 
experienced a few considerable spills but do not have adequate capacity. Cote d’Ivoire 
is one such state but due to political turmoil in 2011, it is currently struggling to rebuild 
its capabilities.690 In the event of an incident, it is likely to rely on private resources. 
The Oil companies which have contingency plans would have to be involved. The 
Ivorian Refining Company (Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage (SIR)) operate spill 
response equipment and worked with CEDRE in updating their contingency plan in 
2011. Total's Ivory Coast subsidiary (TEPCI) started to develop its exploration and 
production activity in 2010 and also contracted Cedre to produce their own oil spill 
contingency plan.691 
 
Regarding accidental spills from the exploitation of oil, some of the states in the region 
have national contingency plans for oil spills. Per the internationally recognised system 
employed for categorizing and structuring levels of oil spill preparedness and response, 
Ghana and Nigeria’s National Oil Spill Contingency plans,692 are based on a three-tiered 
approach to all aspects of oil spill preparedness and response. In Ghana Tier 1 spills are 
small spills of up to 10 tonnes handled locally by the Combat Agency which would 
clean up a spill utilising its own resources.693 Tier 2 spills between 10 and 1000 tonnes 
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which is a medium spill requires regional and/or national assistance. The contingency 
plan provides for the resources of the Combat Agency to be supplemented by 
other resources from adjacent regions, or from adjacent industry operators under mutual 
aid arrangements.694 Large spills are Tier 3 spills above 1000 tonnes and these require 
national, regional, and possibly international assistance facilitated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency of Ghana.   
Similarly, in Nigeria, tier 1 spills are operational type spills, less than or equal to 7 
metric tonnes (50 barrels), that may occur at or near a company’s own facility, as a 
consequence of its own activities.695 In such a case the individual company would have 
to provide resources to respond to the spill under national law.696 A tier 2 spill is any 
spill greater than 7 metric tonnes (50 barrels) but less than 700 metric tonnes (5000 
barrels). In this case, in addition to the company involved, resources from another 
company, industry and even government response agencies in the area can be called in, 
on a mutual aid basis. The company is required to participate in local co-operatives such 
as the Clean Nigeria Associates (CNA) where each member pools its Tier 1 resources 
and has access to any equipment which have been jointly procured for the co-
operation.697 The large spill, greater than 700 metric tonnes (5000 barrels), would 
require substantial resources and support from a National (Tier 3) or International Co-
operative Stockpile, like the Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL).698 Such an operation 
is subject to government control and direction. It is important to recognize that a spill 
which receives a Tier 3 response may be close to, or remote from company facilities.699  
In spite of their comprehensive legislation and national plans, implementation is weak 
in both states. In Nigeria for instance, the NOSDRA Act provides for multi-agency 
response to oil spill incidents in Nigeria. However, lack of expertise, vital technology 
and inadequate funding are impediments that prevent NOSDRA from performing its 
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duties.700 Amnesty International reports that oil spill investigations are usually led by 
oil company personnel, not NOSDRA and it is they that provide the logistics for 
personnel of NOSDRA and generally take the lead.701 Thus these companies usurp 
NOSDRA’s functions due to its lack of resources. Regulatory response has therefore 
been tested due to numerous spills from pipelines, terminals and oil platforms.702 
Instances include, the FUNIWA-5 (1980) oil well blow-out involved the release of over 
54,000 tonnes of crude oil which caused extensive damage to mangroves.703 In 1998, 
14,300 tonnes of oil was spilt from a ruptured pipeline operated by Mobil and 2,900 
tonnes from a Shell pumping station at Warri.704 In other parts of the region, it is clear 
from the above analysis of that there is no adequate preparation made to respond to any 
oil spill. 
 
3.5. Framework for Liability and compensation for damage arising out of oil 
exploration and exploitation in the Gulf of Guinea 
3.5.1. Global framework 
There are currently no global mechanisms regulating liability and compensation for 
damage arising out of pollution to the marine environment from oil and gas activities. 
The only global convention on compensation for damage arising out of oil pollution 
concerns oil spillage from ships. This is the 1992 Civil Liability Convention705 which 
governs the liability of ship owners for oil pollution damage. This gap is clearly 
manifested by major incidents like the oil spill in 2010 from the Deepwater Horizon oil 
rig located in the Gulf of Mexico which discharged about 60,000 barrels of oil per day 
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into the Gulf and heavily polluting it.706Another instance is the effect of the 2009 
Montara accident in Australia.707 This latter incident involved an oil installation which 
suffered a blowout during the drilling of a well. The effects of this pollution were felt 
in Indonesian waters and Indonesia claimed that the oil slick had caused damage to its 
marine environment, and socio-economic hardship to communities that depended on it 
for their livelihood.708 Indonesia argued at the International Maritime Organization that 
there needed to be a uniform international standard which could be applied to such 
incidents as national measures alone would not suffice.709  
The matter had earlier been discussed at the IMO and had stalled but at its 99th session 
in 2012 the Legal Committee at the IMO Council’s request, revisited the issue of 
liability and compensation connected with transboundary pollution damage from 
offshore oil exploration and exploitation activities.710 It decided that bilateral and 
regional arrangements are the most appropriate ways to address the matter and agreed 
that there was no compelling need to develop an international regime on the 
subject.711The Committee decided to further analyse the liability and compensation 
issues, but only with the aim of developing guidance to assist States interested in 
pursuing bilateral or regional arrangements.  
 
Indonesia and Denmark provided the document, entitled ‘Guidance for 
Bilateral/Regional Arrangements or Agreements on Liability and Compensation Issues 
Connected with Transboundary Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Offshore 
Exploration and Exploitation Activities’ and at its 104th session, the Committee 
encouraged Member States and observer delegations to take the guidance into 
consideration when negotiating bilateral/regional arrangements or agreements 
connected with transboundary pollution damage from offshore exploration and 
exploitation activities.712 The Guidance is based on UNCLOS obligations on states to 
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make efforts to implement national laws and standards regulating seabed activities,713 
cooperate at the global and regional level to formulate rules and standards,714 and 
enforce these standards.715 UNCLOS also provides for states to ensure that there is in 
their legal systems the opportunity for prompt and adequate compensation to be paid 
and for states to cooperate in the implementation of existing international law and 
further, international law relating to responsibility and liability for the assessment of 
damage and the payment of adequate compensation.716  
 
The Guidance provides a list of elements that states could consider when negotiating a 
bilateral/regional arrangement on the issue. They include clearly specifying the 
facilities to be covered and defining the damage that is to be covered. The regulation 
should also specify the type of claims covered, deal with pollution prevention and 
emergency planning. There should be provision for reporting and cooperation in 
emergency situations. The Guidance also provides that states have reciprocity 
provisions that enable residents in the participating states to have access to the same 
rights. The polluter pays principle should be followed and issues of liability and 
limitation of liability should be addressed. Importantly also the guidance provides that 
states should specify how claims should be settled and recognition of judgments by 
courts in the contracting Parties and by courts of other States. The guidance should also 
provide for how an offshore facility is submitted to the jurisdiction of the State issuing 
the operating license and to Courts of other States covered by the agreement.717  
 
3.5.2. Regional framework: The Offshore Protocol of the Abidjan Convention 
In the region, the Abidjan Convention provides for states to co-operate to formulate and 
adopt rules and procedures for determining liability and the payment of compensation 
for pollution damage.718 However, the Convention did not provide for a protocol 
dedicated to dealing with liability from pollution from oil exploration and exploitation 
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activities. When the subject was dealt with at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties, to the 
Abidjan Convention in 2012, it was proposed that instead of having such a protocol, 
contracting states are to enact their own laws for compensation and reparation and the 
setting up of National Trust Funds to deal with such issues.719 The states decided that 
national laws should also define different types of compensatory or compensable 
damage as well as conditions with respect to civil liability and compensation for 
damages arising out of exploitation.720 The reason for this may be that most oil pollution 
arises from vessels. Additionally, offshore operations take place in areas that fall to 
national jurisdictions and therefore it stands to reason that national laws should be used 
to regulate liability and compensation issues.  
 
However, the states subsequently saw the need to have a regional mechanism and 
therefore adopted the Offshore Protocol. The Protocol obliges Parties to cooperate 
directly or through the Organisation, in order to develop and adopt appropriate rules, 
and procedures, as well as guidelines in accordance with international practices and 
procedures regarding the assigning of liability and fast, adequate reparation or 
compensation for damage resulting from activities in the Protocol Area, pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Abidjan Convention. Further the provision provides that pending 
development of such procedures and guidelines, each Contracting Party shall take all 
necessary measures to ensure that operators are liable for damage caused by their 
activities and are required to pay prompt and proportionally adequate compensation.721 
The states shall further ensure that operators are and remain covered by insurance or 
other adequate financial guarantees, whose nature and conditions shall be specified by 
the states so as to ensure compensation for damage caused by activities covered by the 
Protocol.722  Thus the states have the burden to ensure that liability is provided for, when 
they procure oil exploration and exploitation contracts. The Annex to the Protocol 
further gives guidelines on what state legislation is to cover. It provides for what the 
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legislation of the contracting states should include. These are specifically provisions to 
compensate for both traditional and environmental damage resulting from pollution of 
the marine and coastal environment.723 Traditional damage includes loss of life or 
personal injury and loss or damage to property as well as loss of profit as a direct 
consequence of harm. 724 Environmental damage means a measurable loss to a natural 
resource or measurable harm caused to a natural resource service which may occur 
directly or indirectly.725 
Annex VIII (7) of the Offshore Protocol is a rather controversial guideline which obliges 
the Contracting Parties to require that certain measures referred to in the Annex are 
taken by the operator. If the operator does not take such measures or cannot be identified 
or is not liable under these Guidelines, the Contracting Parties should themselves take 
such measures and charge the operator where applicable. This is likely to put excess 
financial burden on states. However, the Protocol, provides for compensation to be 
based on the ‘polluter pays principle’726 which is one of the core principles of 
sustainable development. The principle is often applied as a liability and compensation 
mechanism by which it is accepted that those who produce pollution should bear the 
cost of managing it to prevent damage to the environment.727 
Annex VIII of the Offshore Protocol deals with guidelines on liability and compensation 
for damage resulting from pollution of the marine and coastal environment in the 
convention area. It encourages the Contracting Parties to study the possibility of setting 
up a compensation fund in the Abidjan Convention area to provide compensation when 
the damage exceeds the liability of the operator or when the operator is not known.728 
In the event the state is not able to bear the cost of the damage and is not covered by a 
financial security, or when the State takes preventive measures in emergency situations 
and is not reimbursed for the cost of such measures the fund comes into play.729 
Additionally the Annex provides for financing of The Fund which should, if necessary, 
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be by regular contributions from Contracting Parties and the operators.730 There seems 
to be a reflection of the some of the provisions of the Civil Liability Convention in this 
provision. 
The provisions of the Offshore Protocol are generally progressive but parts of it are 
rather weak and would depend on a high level of political will by the parties as they are 
just encouragements to the states and are also non-binding. This applies mainly to the 
provisions dealing with compensation. In Annex VIII (D) (18) it is provided that the 
“…Contracting Parties should take measures to encourage the establishment of a 
compulsory insurance scheme or other instruments and financial security markets in 
order to allow operators to cover, through the financial guarantees, their liabilities under 
these Guidelines, and to require actual commitment” Also according to Annex VIII (D) 
(25), it is only after an assessment of the implementation of the Guidelines after three 
years from the date of adoption that the parties could decide to adopt a legally binding 
instrument. However, this may have some positive aspects to it by giving the states the 
time to work out the impact of the provisions on the states. Further the added burden of 
having to contribute to the Fund is also disincentive for the states bearing in mind the 
amount of financial burdens they already have regarding other cooperation obligations 
in the region. 
3.5.3. Provisions for the protection of the marine environment in Joint 
Development Agreements 
The lack of adequate regulations and weak implementation of existing regulation in the 
states is reflected in the joint development agreements discussed in the preceding 
chapter. The example of the Nigeria and Sao Tome Joint Development Agreement is 
instructive. Article 9 of the Agreement provides for the Joint Authority to be responsible 
for regulating marine scientific research and preserving the marine environment within 
the zone including preventing and remedying pollution of the marine environment.731 
Article 38 specifies the Joint Authority’s duties in more detail in this regard. It provides, 
for the Joint Authority to take all reasonable steps to ensure that, “development 
activities in the Zone do not cause or create any appreciable risk of causing pollution or 
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other harm to the marine environment.”732 To undertake this responsibility the 
Authority is to recommend, and the states parties shall agree necessary measures and 
procedures to prevent and remedy pollution of the marine environment resulting from 
development activities in the Zone.733 This includes the parties regularly providing the 
Authority with such relevant information they obtain from contractors or inspectors 
concerning levels of petroleum discharge and contamination. Major events of pollution 
and emergencies in the exploitation of the oil and gas are to be immediately 
communicated to the JDA.734 In addition to the Authority’s role the Treaty does not 
prohibit the states individually or jointly from jointly taking measures in the Zone 
proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or exclusive 
maritime areas from pollution or the threat thereof.735  
These provisions do not clearly detail what the Authority should do to remedy the 
pollution of the marine environment. It is limited to monitoring and being notified of 
events of pollution. It is ultimately up to the states to act. This makes the protection of 
the marine environment dependent on the parties to the treaty which can have dire 
adverse consequences for the entire region, if the states refuse or are slow to act. Also 
liability from exploitation is not addressed as it has been done in the Japan/ South 
Korean Agreement which has provisions for the nationals of both states to sue in the 
courts of either states for compensation.736 Nationals of third states affected by any 
pollution in the Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe situation have to rely on provisions 
of international law and customary international law.737 The situation in both countries 
as regards their preparedness in the event of a pollution arising out of exploitation, does 
not present a good picture. There are no government agencies in Sao Tome and Principe 
which have direct responsibility for oil pollution and no national contingency plan in 
such an eventuality.738 The principal port of Sao Tome operates a radio station although 
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it is irregularly manned and partially inoperative. In any case the country has had just a 
few spills from passing tankers.739  
Nigeria on the other hand, has a response plan in place as already discussed above. 
However, several challenges hinder its work. There is lack of adequate funding, 
requisite technology and manpower of its supervising agency NOSDRA.740 
Additionally the oil companies have a lot of control deciding when investigation should 
take place and providing technical expertise.  Thus, the spills detection and prevention 
responsibility of the agency is to a large extent weak.   
Regarding the Nigeria Equatorial Guinea cross border unitisation agreement, 741 there 
is also no detailed provision for the protection of the marine environment from pollution 
or even providing for liability and compensation. The provision that deals with pollution 
provides that , “ … the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea shall make 
every endeavour to ensure that operations carried out under the Agreements shall not 
cause pollution of the marine environment or damage by pollution to the coastline, shore 
facilities or amenities, or vessels or fishing gear of any country, and shall regularly 
consult with the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for these purposes. As 
has already been noted Equatorial Guinea does not have any strong contingency plans 
for pollution from exploitation. This leaves the parties to the Agreement in a precarious 
position in the event of a pollution incident. 
 
3.6. Proposals on the way forward - Regional Cooperation in the protection of the 
marine environment from pollution arising out of exploitation activities 
I. Proposals on institutional framework for the protection of the marine 
environment 
The region’s oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities are expanding as new 
offshore oil fields are being developed on a regular basis. This involves drilling, 
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dredging and seismic studies as well as the installation of oil rigs with the attendant 
risks of oil spills which have a negative impact on the marine environment. However, 
the legal framework for dealing with pollution from exploitation of oil and gas and the 
liability that arises is inadequate. The region therefore needs a robust mechanism to 
combat this kind of pollution as the effects are transboundary and have an impact on 
the entire ecosystem including living marine resources. 
The first step to having a successful framework for the prevention of pollution from 
offshore oil and gas activities in the Gulf of Guinea is for the states to decide on the 
institutional arrangement to use for such protection. The new Interim Guinea Current 
Commission discussed above, appears to fit the bill. It has the advantage of having an 
ecosystem approach which promotes cooperation. Currently the parties have not 
decided on how to set up the Commission which has already begun some important 
initiatives to protect the marine environment from offshore oil and gas activities through 
cooperation as discussed above. There are two options to choose from – one is 
establishing an independent GCC through a separate legal agreement and the other 
establishing a GCC through a protocol to the Abidjan Convention.742 The experts that 
debated the issue could not reach a consensus. Majority - experts from 12 of the 
countries recommended establishing the Commission by a protocol to the Abidjan 
Convention. They argued that it would save costs and ensure financial sustainability as 
well as avoiding duplication of activities.743 The experts in the minority from 2 states 
recommended the option of establishing the GCC by a separate legal agreement 
reasoning that there would be operational independence and effective service 
delivery.744  
 
The background to the debate is that the parties in 2006, established the Guinea Current 
Commission on an interim basis by a declaration they refer to as the ‘Abuja Declaration 
establishing the Interim Guinea Current Commission.’ The member states by this 
Declaration agreed, “…To institutionalize regional cooperation at the technical level 
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through the creation of an Interim Guinea Current Commission (IGCC) in the 
framework of the Abidjan Convention (1981) as provided in paragraph 37 of the 
approved Guinea Current LME Project Document signed by all the participating 
countries;”745 They further decided that a permanent Guinea Current Commission 
(GCC) would be constituted and adopted by the countries by 2009 to serve as the highest 
decision making organ for implementing the Strategic Action Plan which the parties 
had earlier negotiated to deal with the marine environmental challenges of the Guinea 
Current region.746 
Subsequently in 2010, the parties decided to establish the Guinea Current Commission, 
“in principle and in line with the Abuja Declaration.”747The states by that declaration 
also took into account the industrial and ecological disaster that befell the Gulf of 
Mexico. The states and their partners therefore decided that they must put in place 
effective national and regional systems for response to major pollution incidents as soon 
as possible.748 It would be prudent therefore for the states to carry out their intention to 
adopt the Additional Protocol and establish the Guinea Current Commission to 
implement it. Meanwhile the same parties were part of the Abidjan Convention 
discussing the draft of an Additional Protocol on the Environmental Norms and 
Standards for offshore oil and Gas Activities. What is important is that there is a need 
in the region for a strong body that can coordinate all the efforts of the states to protect 
the marine environment.  
However, what would make the Commission more effective is for it have the power to 
make decisions that are binding. The example of the Convention for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (the OSPAR Convention) is worth 
emulating. The Convention established the OSPAR Commission, which issues binding 
decisions and detailed technical recommendations in accordance with Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Commission is mandated to collect information about substances 
which are used in offshore activities and, on the basis of that information, to agree lists 
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of substances for the purposes of making decisions, recommendations and all other 
agreements adopted under the Convention.749 It is also to list substances which are toxic, 
persistent and liable to bioaccumulate and to draw up plans for the reduction and 
phasing out of their use on, or discharge from, offshore sources.   
 
Further it also draws up criteria, guidelines and procedures for the prevention of 
pollution from dumping of disused offshore installations and of disused offshore 
pipelines, and the leaving in place of offshore installations, in the maritime area. Such 
disused installation can only be left in the marine environment under authorisation or 
regulation by the competent authority of the relevant Contracting party. Interestingly it 
provides that any Contracting Party which intends to take the decision to issue a permit 
for the dumping of a disused offshore installation or a disused offshore pipeline placed 
in the maritime area after 1st January 1998 shall, through the medium of the 
Commission, inform the other Contracting Parties of its reasons for accepting such 
dumping, in order to make consultation possible. This promotes transparency and would 
ensure that states have good reason for their actions.   
 
These recommendations detail very specific technical requirements for the parties. The 
Commission is currently playing a supporting role for the Abidjan Convention. 
However, OSPAR has been successful because the Commission acts as a strong central 
body to issue the recommendations and technical requirements and enforce them. The 
Gulf of Guinea states on the other hand have no such body. Perhaps the Gulf of Guinea 
Commission when it is set up could perform this critical role. OSPAR’S approach which 
has been praised in the literature as being successful can be used by the IGCC instead 
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II. Proposals for enhancing the regional and national frameworks for liability and 
compensation for pollution arising out of exploitation 
Regarding liability and compensation for pollution arising out of exploitation and in 
line with the IMO guidelines the states in the region have been working towards 
enhancing both their regional and national frameworks in this regard. The regional 
framework which is the recently adopted offshore Protocol is a positive development 
which can be further enhanced. There are elements of the Civil Liability Convention in 
the Protocol like the principle of strict liability and the establishment of a fund750 as a 
second level of protection for victims. It is important as a matter of urgency for the 
states in the region to enact laws for developing the process for compensation which 
sets out how individuals can seek redress when they have suffered from pollution 
damage. These laws need to be harmonised so as to provide equal levels of protection 
for all citizens in the region. 
III. Proposals for protecting environment in JDAs 
One of the two main types of marine pollution likely to be encountered in a joint 
development is escape from the installations on the continental shelf of oil gas or other 
substance causing pollution effects. The other type is discharges from ships. In the Gulf 
of Guinea, the JDA as discussed above has paid minimal attention to the pollution of 
the marine environment from exploitation. However, since pollution is one of the risks 
associated with exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons and it is not known when 
such a risk could materialise, it is prudent for the states involved in the joint agreements 
to make provision for it. They also need to have a regime for liability and compensation 
in case of an incident within the joint development zone. These should be uniform 
throughout the zone to ensure that it effectively protects the marine environment. As 
the parties are party to the Abidjan Convention, they need to implement the provisions 
of the Offshore Protocol by having a bilateral agreement incorporating the provisions 
into the Agreement and into national legislation.   
 





IV. Proposals on coordinating activities of the various organisations with a 
mandate to protect the marine environment in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
As already discussed, in addition to the Abidjan Convention and the Interim Guinea 
Current Commission, the Gulf of Guinea Commission which generally deals with 
cooperation in the exploitation of natural resources, also has some mandate to cooperate 
to protect the marine environment.751 These bodies should be consolidated so as not to 
duplicate efforts and finances. The role of each organisation should be clearly clarified 
so that they come together to complement each other instead of working at cross 
purposes. The states in the region should also pool their resources and work with one 
strong implementing body. It is a good development to note that the IGCC is to initiate 
consultation with the Gulf of Guinea Commission with the aim to concluding an MoU 
to ensure complementarity of actions especially during the Strategic Action Plan 
implementation project.752  
The states need to find ways to pool resources. There are already several marine ecology 
projects underway in the region under the auspices of UNEP, as well as Commissions 
set up for each of the three LMEs affiliated to the Abidjan Convention - the Benguela 
Current, Canary Current and Guinea Current LME discussed above.  Coordinating these 
ongoing activities with the knowledge and personnel, would assure optimal benefits for 
all the LMEs involved. These efforts could also help alleviate the current need for 
marine pollution monitoring and enforcement by pooling available resources.  
A positive development is that the states are making efforts to take transfer the 
Secretariat of the Abidjan Convention to Cote d’Ivoire. Currently UNEP fulfils the role 
of Secretariat. This step towards independence is commendable. However, UNEP can 
still play a significant role in the implementation of the Offshore Protocol through 
gathering and analysing environmental data and providing training for state 
environmental officials. It could also assist in implementation and enforcement by 
 
751 Treaty establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission art 3 (f)  
752 Interim Guinea Current Commission, Seventh Regional Steering Committee Meeting (2010) 
(Diktas.iwlearn.org, 2010) <http://diktas.iwlearn.org/gclme-ac/meetings-
workshops/img_0/7th_scm_report_final.pdf> accessed 26 May 2020. 
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assisting states with enacting national laws that complement the offshore protocol, 
monitoring ongoing operations, and enforcing laws against repeat offenders.753  
The Offshore Protocol is a good starting point for dealing with pollution from offshore 
oil and gas activities. However due to the challenges associated with it as discussed 
above, it needs to be fine-tuned to serve the needs of the region as regards oil and gas 
pollution. Regarding licensing of operators and requirements for environment impact 
assessment, the Offshore Protocol has progressive provisions which require that the 
legislation of each Contracting Party should mandate a Competent National Authority 
(CNA) (or authorities) to undertake the Environmental and Social Assessment (ESA) 
process for all phases from exploration to production and decommissioning, including 
for appeals. It even takes cognisance of the fact that there may not be adequate capacity 
in the state. In such a case, the national authorities should have adequate capacity or 
alternate arrangements in place while their capacity is being enhanced.754 Annex IV of 
the Protocol sets out in detail matters which at the minimum should be addressed in 
environmental assessments.755  
 
The Annex commendably provides that before the CNA gives a decision on an activity 
for which an environmental (including social, health and fisheries) impact assessment 
has been conducted, the CNA shall give opportunity to government agencies, members 
of the public, experts in any relevant discipline and interest groups to comment on the 
environmental impact assessment of the activity.756 This though assisting with 
transparency could still benefit from the example of the Kuwait Protocol which provides 
that whenever a Competent State Authority has called for and received an 
environmental impact statement, it shall send to the Organization a summary of the 
potential environmental effects referred to in that statement. The Organization in turn 
is to send the summary to all the other Contracting States for their comments and take 
 
753 'Inputs to the Secretary-General's Annual Report to the General Assembly On the Ocean and Law of 
the Sea' (Un.org, 
2015)<https://www.un.org/depts/los/general_assembly/contributions_2015_2/UNEP_Contribution.pdf> 
accessed 26 May 2020. 
754 Additional Protocol to the Abidjan Convention on Environmental Norms and Standards for Offshore 
Oil and Gas Exploration and Exploitation Activities (adopted 3 July 2019, not yet in force) Annex IV  
755 Ibid Annex IV (B) 
756 Additional Protocol to the Abidjan Convention on Environmental Norms and Standards for Offshore 
Oil and Gas Exploration and Exploitation Activities (adopted 3 July 2019, not yet in force) Annex IV 
(B) (3)  
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into consideration those comments before issuing a license. This is however subject the 
right of the state to withhold information which might prejudice its national security.757 
The advantage of including this kind of provision is to ensure that all the states know 
what is happening in each other’s EEZ or continental shelf which would be likely to 
adversely affect the marine environment and take early measures to curtail it. There 
should be provisions however requiring the reasonable use of such a provision in the 
Offshore Protocol in order for states not to interfere in another’s legitimate economic 
activities or domestic affairs. 
 
V. Proposals for addressing noise pollution 
Seismic Surveys also need to be better addressed in the Protocol. Oil and gas explorers 
use seismic surveys to produce detailed images of the various rock types and their 
location and use this information to determine where to find oil and gas reservoirs.758 
Marine seismic surveys use intense sound impulses to explore the ocean bottom for 
hydrocarbon deposits. With the exploitation of oil comes an expansion of seismic 
survey in the region which is the source of another kind of pollution -noise- to the 
marine environment. The harmful effect of such noise on marine mammals has been 
documented and thus any protocol dealing with pollution from oil and gas activities 
needs to incorporate measures minimising the impact of seismic surveys.759 The 
Offshore Protocol has listed Seismic surveys as one of the activities that trigger the 
requirement for the Environmental and Social Assessment process in the offshore oil 
and gas sector.760 Annex V 1(d) also provides that the types and magnitudes of seismic 
surveys shall be taken into consideration in the issuance of authorisations in the form 
of permits. The Offshore Protocol also requires the Contracting Parties to take special 
 
757 Protocol Concerning Marine Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the 
Continental Shelf (adopted 29 March 1989, entered into force 2001) (Kuwait Protocol) Article IV (1) 
(c) - available at (Ropme.org) 
<http://www.ropme.org/Uploads/Protocols/Continental_Shelf_Protocol.pdf> accessed 26 May 2020. 
758  'Seismic Survey | Description, Methods, & Facts' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020) 
<https://www.britannica.com/science/seismic-survey> accessed 26 May 2020. 
759 Douglas Nowacek and others, ‘Marine seismic surveys and ocean noise time for coordinated and 
prudent planning front’ (2015) 13 Ecol Environ 378. 
760 Annex IV (C) of Kuwait Protocol 
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measures with regard to sensitive areas and migration corridors of species in order to 
prevent the harmful effects of seismic surveys on the marine environment.  
An interesting innovation is the use of marine mammal observers that look out for 
marine mammals in areas of seismic surveys and if observed the survey should be 
delayed until they have moved out of the area.  
 
VI. Proposals for addressing gas flaring 
Gas flaring is a major source of pollution in the region particularly in the Niger Delta. 
It is reported that gas flares in the Niger Delta are even visible from space. This 
contributes to dangerous greenhouse emissions which seriously affects the health of the 
community. The Offshore Protocol at Annex V provides that for the issuance of permits 
during the exploration phase, one of the factors to be considered are the main source of 
air emissions including greenhouse gases. The Offshore protocol could require that 
produced gas be either sold to the market or reinjected into the underground 
formation.761 Flaring and venting should be permitted only in emergency venting and 
operational safety. Any continuous flaring or venting should require prior government 
approval.762  
3.7. Conclusions 
The importance of regional cooperation in the protection of the marine environment has 
been highlighted in the chapter. This is necessitated by the fact that the region’s oil and 
gas exploration and exploitation activities are expanding with new discoveries being 
made which has made the region a beehive of activities ranging from drilling, dredging 
and oil rig installation. This comes with the obvious risks of oil spills and the issue of 
liability from damage as a result of such pollution.  
In the Gulf of Guinea, the national framework for addressing every stage of the 
exploitation process is inadequate. States legislation are not comprehensive and 
 
761 Carlos Moreno, ‘Oil and Gas Exploration and Production in the Gulf of Guinea: Can the New Gulf 




harmonised and so makes it a challenge to deal with issues of pollution in the region in 
a coherent manner.  However, the effects of pollution are transboundary and therefore 
require a regional framework. This is especially so with regard to liability for damage 
arising out of exploitation of oil and gas. However, on the latter issue, the current global 
environmental law framework has significant gaps and as discussed in this chapter, it 
appears to be the global consensus that these gaps must be filled by regional, 
multinational, and national legal frameworks.  
In the region the Abidjan Convention is the main framework for dealing with pollution 
from exploitation.  Nonetheless the Convention has significant challenges with funding, 
coordination and limited human resource. Currently it has managed to adopt a Protocol 
for dealing with offshore oil pollution which also addresses the issues of liability. The 
Protocol has made provision for states to develop standards and guidelines regarding 
the assignment of liability. However, as this has not yet been done, states have to take 
the necessary measures to ensure operators are made liable for damage caused by their 
operations. Taking into account the length of time it took to formulate and adopt the 
Protocol, the states may not have any such guidelines for long to come unless there is 
some urgency attached to the issue in view of the threats of oil spills looming over the 
region. 
It has been suggested that the states need an institutional framework to coordinate oil 
pollution activities. There are two potential bodies – one already set up which is the 
Gulf of Guinea Commission, and the other which is still in the process of being set up 
which is the Guinea Current Commission. Both these bodies have as part of their 
mandate the protection of the marine environment from oil pollution. However, these 
two bodies need strengthening in terms of technical, financial and human resource. 













MANAGING FISHERIES AND CONSERVING THE 




Conservation and management of marine living resources is another major concern in 
the Gulf of Guinea. The marine species in the region are declining rapidly due to over 
exploitation of commercially valuable fish stocks and destruction of critical habitats.763 
This is mainly due to illegal or harmful fishing activities involving artisanal and 
industrial fishers, including from the European Union, Eastern Europe, Korea and 
Japan, which exploit species ranging from demersal fish species like croakers, Ariomma 
bondi (Silver-rag drift fish), found especially in Cameroon and Nigeria, to penaeid 
shrimps.764 The latter species pose a particular challenge due to their being 
amphibiotic765. They are caught as juveniles in the lagoons by artisanal fishers and as 
adults at sea by industrial fishers. This in addition to damage to mangroves, their nursery 
grounds, has led to the collapse of this particular stock in the region.766 Other marine 
resources on the decline are cetaceans like whales and dolphins found mainly in Gabon, 
Cameroon, Benin, and Nigeria, and four species of marine turtles, classified as 
endangered,767 which have their spawning grounds in Cameroon (Ebodje), Equatorial 
Guinea (Corisco Bay and Ureka) and Congo (Conkouati).768 These are often caught as 
bycatches as a result of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the 
region.769 However due to lack of adequate legislation and monitoring and enforcement 
 
763 'Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis' (GCLME 
Regional Coordinating Unit 2006) 35 
764 Ibid p.39 
765 Juveniles in the lagoons and adults at sea 
766 'Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis' (GCLME 
Regional Coordinating Unit 2006) 39. 
767 International Union for the Conservation of Nature (INCN) red list of endangered species. 
768 'Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis' (GCLME 
Regional Coordinating Unit 2006) 40 
769 Ibid p.127. 
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capacities of the states in the region, these problems have exacerbated in recent times 
causing considerable concern to the coastal states in the region. 
 
Nonetheless, these fisheries resources are important sources of food and livelihood for 
the region’s populations and generate income for the states as well as contribute to the 
general viability of the marine ecosystem. Attempts have therefore been made by the 
states in the region, to regulate harvesting, in national legislation and policies and by 
regional regulatory mechanisms. However, these have been largely unsuccessful. 
 
Against this background, the focus of this chapter is cooperation in the sustainable 
management of the transboundary marine living resources specifically fisheries in the 
Gulf of Guinea region. 
 The first part presents an overview of the global rules relating to the conservation and 
management of fisheries which shows an emphasis on regional cooperation and the 
recognition of the ecosystem approach. The second part assesses the existing regional 
and national legal regimes for conservation and management of fisheries in the region 
in the light of the global rules. In so doing the challenges to management and 
conservation as well as the inadequacies to the regulatory framework, are identified and 
discussed. The third part then attempts to proffer solutions to these challenges within 
the framework of regional cooperation based on the ecosystem approach to the 
management and conservation of fisheries. 
 
4.2. Global framework for the conservation and management of living  
       marine resources 
 
4.2.1 UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement 
 
UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement770 constitute the main global framework for 
the conservation and management of fisheries. Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS, place 
an obligation on coastal states to cooperate, either directly or through a sub-regional or 
 
770Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (adopted 4 August 1995, entered into force 11 December 2001) 2167 
UNTS 3 (Fish Stocks Agreement). 
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regional organisation, in relation to the conservation and management of stocks 
straddling their EEZs.771 They are under the same obligations regarding the fish stocks 
that straddle the outer limit of their EEZs and the high seas. However, in that case, all 
states whose nationals fish in that area are also required to cooperate with the coastal 
states.772 In similar vein Article 64 which deals with the highly migratory species also 
mandates cooperation between the coastal States and other States whose nationals fish 
in the region for the highly migratory species the list of which have been provided in 
Annex I of UNCLOS. The object of such cooperation which is either directly between 
the states or through appropriate international organisations, is to ensure the 
conservation of these fish stocks and promoting their optimum utilisation throughout 
the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone.773 Indeed international 
organisations are so important to these arrangements, that where none exists, the 
provision requires the coastal States and other States whose nationals harvest these 
species in the region to cooperate to establish them and participate in their work.774  
Article 118 relating to the High Seas also contains identical provisions.  
These provisions have been implemented by the Fish Stocks Agreement which uses the 
main approach of regional cooperation. Article 8 provides the main mechanisms for 
international cooperation for the conservation and management of straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks. It specifically provides in mandatory terms for such cooperation 
in Article 8 (3) as  follows: “…where a sub-regional or regional fisheries management 
organization or arrangement has the competence to establish conservation and 
management measures for particular straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish 
stocks, States fishing for the stocks on the high seas and relevant coastal States shall 
give effect to their duty to cooperate by becoming members of such organization or 
participants in such arrangement, or by agreeing to apply the conservation and 
management measures established by such organization or arrangement. States having 
a real interest in the fisheries concerned may become members of such organization or 
participants in such arrangement. The terms of participation in such organization or 
arrangement shall not preclude such States from membership or participation; nor 
 
771 UNCLOS art 63 (1)  
772 UNCLOS art 63 (2) 




shall they be applied in a manner which discriminates against any State or group of 
States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned.” 
  
This provision is an acknowledgment of the fact that by the biology and the ecology of 
these fish stocks they are no respecter of boundaries and are essentially shared resources 
and therefore no single state can on its own manage them. As the above provisions are 
legal obligations, all states parties must comply with them. However, in the region four 
of the states are not party to the Agreement namely Togo, Cameroon, Sao Tome and 
Principe and Equatorial Guinea. 775 It is not clear therefore how well the Agreement can 
be implemented by the Gulf of Guinea States. However, it appears that if the states are 
parties to the RFMOS set up in region, they may still be complying with the Agreement 
without being party to it  
 
4.2.2. Supplementary International Agreements and other Soft law means to 
protect and   preserve living marine resources 
Aside from UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement, there are other legally binding 
and non - binding international Agreements adopted by states. These include the 
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (Compliance Agreement).776 This is an 
Agreement to combat the practice of reflagging of vessels which is usually done to 
circumvent compliance with national or international fisheries conservation and 
management measures.777 It obliges the State parties to take all necessary measures to 
ensure that fishing vessels entitled to fly their flag do not engage in any activity that 
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May 2020. 
776 ‘The Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas’ (adopted November 1993, entered into force 24 April 





undermines the effectiveness of international conservation and management 
measures.778 In the region, this convention has been ratified by only Ghana and 
Benin.779 
To address concerns about pressure on high seas fisheries, the FAO Committee of 
Fisheries in 1991 requested that the FAO hold an international conference for 
responsible fishing which held in Cancún, Mexico from 6–8 May 1992. This resulted 
in a non-binding agreement–the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 
1995.780 Parts of the Code are based on relevant rules of international law, reflected 
through UNCLOS. To address issues raised in the Code of Conduct, the FAO 
introduced four International Plan of Actions (IPOA)781 including one dealing with 
fishing capacity and one on Illegal Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU). These 
are also non-legally binding instruments that incorporate measures to address the 
pressing issues regarding fisheries. Implementation of each IPOA is voluntary and left 
to the states for adoption of specific measures and address issues arising both in EEZ 
and on the high seas. 
 
Regarding the ecosystem approach the international community recognised its 
importance and sought through the Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in 
 
778 Ibid 
779 'UNTC' (Treaties.un.org, 2020) 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028007be1a> accessed 30 May 2020. 
780FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO Rome, 1995) 41 
781 FAO, ‘International Plan of Action for reducing incidental catch of seabirds in longline   
fisheries; International Plan of Action for the conservation and management of  
sharks; International Plan of Action for the management of fishing capacity’ (FAO Rome, 1999). 
Available at  
< http://www.fao.org/3/X3170E/X3170E00.htm >accessed on 27 May 2 
The International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries 
(IPOA Seabirds) is designed to reduce the incidental catch of seabirds in longline fishing. All States 
whose fishers engage in longline fishing are expected to take a number of actions to reduce the 
incidental bycatch of seabirds.  
1999. The International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks (IPOA-Sharks) 
is designed to ensure the conservation and management of sharks and their long-term sustainable use.  
The objective of the International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-
Capacity) 1999 is to reduce excess fishing capacity in world fisheries. This is to be achieved through 
assessment plans to reduce capacity and the strengthening of national and regional organizations to 
better manage capacity issues. Priority is to be given to those fisheries and fleets which show the effects 
of over- capacity and over-fishing.  
The International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing, 2001  
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the Marine Ecosystem, 2001 to encourage states to have regard to the sustainable 
management of fisheries incorporating ecosystem considerations which entails taking 
into account the impacts of fisheries on the marine ecosystem and the impacts of the 
marine ecosystem on fisheries.782 The Conference represented an important opportunity 
for all fisheries stakeholders to jointly assess the means for including ecosystem 
considerations in fisheries management.783  
 
To deal with IUU fishing, the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,784 was adopted by the FAO 
Conference in 2009. This Agreement seeks to address illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing through the implementation of stringent port state measures. 
State parties to the Agreement, in their capacity as port states, are required to prevent 
fish caught by foreign fishing vessels engaged in IUU fishing activities from being 
landed and entering international markets. The Agreement provides for minimum port 
states measures and is binding on State parties.785 In the region, five states have ratified 
the convention namely Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe and Togo.  
 
Some International Environmental Law Instruments also have a bearing on fisheries 
management notable among which are the Stockholm and Rio Declarations of 1972 and 
1992 respectively. The Stockholm Declaration, sets out the duty to safeguard the natural 
resources and natural ecosystems through carefully designed management plans and 
maintain, restore and improve the capacity of the earth to produce vital renewable 
resources.786 The Rio Declaration emphasises the principles of the Stockholm 
 
782 FAO, 'Report of the Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem, 
Reykjavik, Iceland, 1-4 October 2001. FAO Fisheries Report' (FAO 2002) 
<http://www.fao.org/3/y2198t/y2198t01.htm> accessed 27 May 2020. 
The Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem was held in Reykjavik, 
Iceland, from 1 to 4 October 2001. The Conference adopted the Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible 
Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem, which is given in Appendix I to this report. 
783 ibid 
784 'Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing' (adopted 22 November 2009, entered into force 2016) (Fao.org, 2020) 
<http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/037t-e.pdf> accessed 27 May 2020. 
785 Ibid. 
786 Declaration on the Human Environment in the Report of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, (16 June 1972) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 Rev.1 
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Declaration pertaining to safeguarding the environment and the ecosystems. It also 
deals with the protection of the oceans and coastal areas including the protection, 
rational use and development of their living resources including fisheries.787A key 
problem associated with voluntary instruments is their non-binding nature, which can 
and does significantly impede the effectiveness of the instruments due the lack of legal 
force they carry.788 If these instruments are to be successful there must be some 
enforcement mechanism mainly at the domestic level. However, the implementation of 
such mechanisms can be facilitated through the regional institutions that promote the 
harmonisation of laws and policies on fisheries conservation and management.  
 
4.3. Regional legal framework for conservation and management of living marine 
resources in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
The Gulf of Guinea region abounds with efforts at cooperation. Cooperation for 
fisheries conservation and management takes the form of Regional Fisheries Bodies 
(RFB) which are intergovernmental bodies through which states cooperate to manage 
fisheries in specific regions.789 Some of these have mandates to adopt legally binding 
measures and are referred to as Regional Fisheries Management Organisations or 
Arrangements (RFMO/A).790 When it is an arrangement, states cooperate to adopt 
conservation and management measures that does not provide for the establishment of 
an organisation.791 RFMOs fulfil two conditions.  One is having competence under 
international law to adopt legally binding conservation and management measures 
regarding fisheries.792 The second is the area to which this legal competence applies 
 
787 ibid 
788 Martin Tsamenyi, Lara Manarangi-Trott and Shilpa Rajkumar, ‘The International Legal Regime for 
Fisheries 
Management’<https://unep.ch/etu/Fisheries%20Meeting/submittedPapers/MartinTsamenyiLaraManara
ngiTrottShilpaRajkumar.pdf>accessed on 27 May 2020 
 
789 ‘Regional Fishery Bodies | Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems | Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations' (Fao.org, 2020) <http://www.fao.org/in-action/vulnerable-marine-
ecosystems/background/regional-fishery-bodies/en/> accessed 27 May 2020. 
790 Ibid  
791 Ibid  
792  Stefán Ásmundsson, 'Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (Rfmos): Who Are They, What 
Is Their Geographic Coverage on the High Seas and which Ones Should Be Considered As General 
Rfmos, Tuna Rfmos and Specialised Rfmos?' (Cbd.int, 2020) 
<https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/mar/soiom-2016-01/other/soiom-2016-01-fao-19-en.pdf> accessed 
27 May 2020. 
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includes a part of the high seas.793 Such RFMOs are therefore organisations that provide 
a medium for states to fulfil their duty to cooperate regarding fisheries in the high seas, 
as set out in the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention and described further in the 1995 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement.794 There  are three types described in the literature. One 
type are General RFMOs like the North Pacific Fisheries Commission which has 
competence for “all fish, mollusks, crustaceans and other marine species caught by 
fishing vessels within the Convention Area”.795 Another type  are the Tuna RFMOs that 
have a narrower mandate that relates to “tunas and tuna-like species” as well as  “highly 
migratory fish stocks”796. The third type are the Specialised RFMOs which have a much 
narrower mandate related to specific types of fisheries expressly stated in their 
mandates.797 
 
In the Gulf of Guinea, six regional fisheries bodies including one tuna RFMO are active, 
namely the Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF); International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT); Ministerial Conference 
on Fisheries Cooperation among African States bordering the Atlantic Ocean 
(ATLAFCO); Regional Fisheries Commission of the Gulf of Guinea (COREP), and the 
Fishery Committee of the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC).  
 
I. International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)798 
The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) is a 
regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) established by the Convention for 
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, (Tuna Convention) which entered into force in 
1969. It has 53 members, six of which are from the Gulf of Guinea.799 Three states are 





796 Examples are International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), 
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Programme (AIDCP) (sister organisation to 
IATTC) Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) 
797The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO) and the North Pacific Anadromous 
Fish Commission (NPAFC) are examples of Specialised RFMOs. 
798 'ICCAT·CICTA·CICAA' (Iccat.int, 2020) <https://www.iccat.int/en/> accessed 27 May 2020. 
799 Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and Gabon 
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parties, they were invited by the Commission to its 2016 annual meeting.800 Cameroon 
since 2012 has been attending as an observer.801  
 
The Tuna Convention’s area of competence is both high seas and areas within national 
jurisdiction.802 Its mandate is the conservation of tunas and tuna-like species in the 
Atlantic Ocean and adjacent waters with the aim of maintaining tuna populations at 
levels which permit the maximum sustainable catch for food and other purposes and 
ensure their effective exploitation.803 In order to carry out the objectives of the 
Convention, ICCAT monitors and studies the populations of approximately thirty tuna 
species, including the Atlantic bluefin, skipjack, yellowfin, albacore, bigeye tuna, 
swordfish, blue marlin, various mackerels and Atlantic bonito.804 This function of 
ICCAT necessitates that it oversees and coordinates scientific research on various 
aspects of Atlantic tuna fisheries in line with the provisions of the Convention.805 It does 
this by  making recommendations, based on such scientific evidence, on the 
maintenance of the populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes that may be taken in the 
Convention area at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch. 806 Its 
recommendations especially the ones dealing with tuna conservation are binding but a 
few are not, like its recommendation Res 15-12, concerning the use of a precautionary 
approach in implementing ICCAT conservation and management, are non-binding807 
ICCAT has taken some management and conservation measures regarding overfishing 
which are worthy of note. As the major tuna stocks are in a depleted state, it has adopted 
multiyear management and conservation plans for several stocks like Big Eye Tuna, 
Swordfish, Blue Fin tuna, Blue Marlin and White Marlin.808 The Commission has made 
efforts to reduce by catch to protect target fishes and protect biodiversity by adopting 
minimum size limits and time and area closures for several tuna species and 
 
800 ICCAT, 'International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas: Report of the 
Independent Performance Review of ICCAT (ICCAT Madrid, 2016). 
801 ibid 
802 'ICCAT·CICTA·CICAA' (Iccat.int, 2020) <https://www.iccat.int/en/> accessed 27 May 2020. 
803 ibid 
804 ibid 
805 ibid  
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807 ICCAT, 'International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas: Report of the 
Independent Performance Review of ICCAT (ICCAT Madrid, 2016) 34 
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Swordfish.809 It  also has measures to encourage the release of live discards of billfish 
and bluefin tuna.810 Measures to protect sea turtle have also been put in place.811 
Scientific studies designed to understand the bluefin tuna species and to assist in the 
identification of their spawning grounds and critical habitats for protection has been 
initiated.812  
In keeping with Article 18 of the Fish Stocks agreement on duties of flag states, ICCAT 
has made recommendations to combat IUU fishing by its members who are flag 
states.813 These include a recommendation concerning the establishment of an ICCAT 
record of vessels over 24 meters authorised to operate in the convention area obliges 
parties to send a list of such vessels to assist ICCAT in developing a list of vessels 
authorised to fish in the convention area (the white list).814 This means that all vessels 
not on the list can be classified as IUU vessels. Under the recommendation concerning 
the recording of catch by fishing vessels over 24 meters authorised to fish ICCAT stocks 
in the convention area, ICCAT has a manual for states which specifies data the members 
are to mandatorily submit which includes data on catch and effort, size sampling, catch 
by size and fleet size.815 To improve the capacity of the states to detect violations, 
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ICCAT has put in place a compulsory vessel monitoring system for members for 
commercial vessels over 20 meters in length.816  
In spite of these measures the species protected by ICCAT has not seen much 
improvement. This is mainly due to non-compliance by states of ICCAT 
recommendations. For instance regarding vessel monitoring systems, violations occur 
on a regular basis due to the ineffectiveness of the inspections, as evident by the large 
number of vessels still engaged in illegal fishing for tuna in the Atlantic.817 The reliance 
on inspectors from the member states on fishing vessels, also contributes to this lack of 
effectiveness as the states themselves lack the capacity.818 Admittedly, there is a scheme 
for joint at - sea boarding and inspection of the states’ EEZ,  but the scheme is limited 
to the high seas and then only for ICCAT species and if the vessel is suspected to be 
stateless.819 
Another area in which the ICCAT has not been effective is the fact that it does not 
expressly incorporate the ecosystem approach in that it does not take account of 
multispecies. Efforts are being made to  develop a pilot ecosystem plan for one 
ecoregion within the ICCAT convention area to, “progress on how best to provide 
advice at an ecosystem level”.820 However, the challenges of using the ecosystem 
approach were acknowledged as there is very little knowledge of the food web dynamics 
and species interactions in the ecosystem selected. It was concluded that the ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management looks ambitious on paper and hard to put into 
practice.821 
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Concerning ICCAT’s effort at replenishing depleted stocks, the Performance Review 
Report of 2008 shows that it has not been altogether successful as some species have 
not shown improvement.822 Its scientific research programs are limited by lack of 
information as states do not comply with its recommendations to supply data as well as 
have misreporting issues.823 The ICCAT has been criticised for being too slow to 
modernise by its continued use of the single species management approach instead of 
adopting the ecosystem approach.824 It has also been suggested that the objectives of 
ICCAT is at variance with the precautionary approach.825 An instance can be seen in 
the stock assessment for blue and white Marlin which showed that it was difficult to 
determine if conservation measures were working due to inconsistent results. The 
Commission instead of providing precautionary advice recommended that the existing 
measures be continued.826 This was against the advice of the Standing Committee on 
Research and Statistics (SCRS) which were of the opinion that fishing mortality of these 
stocks be reduced as a precautionary measure.827 
ICCAT’s slowness at implementing the ecosystem and precautionary approaches may 
be due to its main challenges of non-compliance and lack of enforcement by member 
states of the management and conservation measures recommended. Compliance 
among the member states in the Gulf of Guinea is inadequate due to lack of resources 
for monitoring and enforcement. Meanwhile the amended ICCAT Convention, does not 
provide for the necessary competence regarding MCS, IUU fishing, compliance, 
enforcement or implementation, in contrast to other RFMOs like the South Pacific 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) and the North Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (NPFC).828 There is clearly a lack of commitment by the states 
in the Convention area including the states of the GOG to implement an ecosystem-
based approach to fisheries management as well as the objectives of ICCAT.  
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II. Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF)829  
Another RFB active in the region is the Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central 
Atlantic (CECAF). It was established in 1967 to develop and use the fishery resources 
of the region, a large part of which includes the high seas.830 CECAF’s area of 
competence stretches from Cape Spartel (in Morocco, close to the Straits of Gibraltar) 
to the mouth of the Congo River, and into the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.831 Among 
its 34 members are all the GOG states being studied in this work as well as other African 
Countries – Cape Verde, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and Sierra Leone. Developed fishing states, 
which fish in the GOG namely the EU United States of America, France, Greece, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Spain are also members. 832 
Since its establishment, numerous events with implications for fisheries management 
have taken place in the region. The states in the region were decolonised, long distance 
fishing fleet had started to deploy in the region and changes in the Law of the Sea had 
occurred as well as an awareness of the importance of regulating fishing in the region.833 
To adapt to these changes the Committees created four bodies respectively to deal with 
regulatory measures for demersal stocks, implementation of management measures of 
resources within the limits of national jurisdiction, and fisheries statistics.834 
Unlike ICCAT, CECAF is a consultative body under Article VI of the FAO Constitution 
and has no regulatory powers. Its recommendations are not binding on Committee 
Members. It operates under a Main Committee and a Scientific Sub-committee, which 
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provides scientific advice.835  This is a rather large organisation whose objective is to 
promote the sustainable utilisation of the living marine resources within the Atlantic 
region by the proper management and development of the fisheries and fishing 
operations.836 Some of the functions the Committee performs are to review the state of 
the resources and industries based on them, coordinating research into the living 
resources, collection of information on marine fishery information and to establish the 
scientific basis for regulatory measures leading to the conservation and management of 
marine fishery resources. They also make recommendations and advice on measures for 
the adoption and implementation of these measures.837 The Committee is also to provide 
advice in the area of monitoring, control and surveillance as well as fishing craft, gear 
and techniques. It also has the mandate to prompt cooperation with other regional 
organisations.838 
The achievements of CECAF can best be appreciated by examining its background. The 
body was formed at a time when there was little scientific knowledge of the marine 
fisheries it sought to protect.839 The data available was inadequate and was not broken 
down by geographic area, and species. It was generally not suitable for assessing 
resources and estimating levels of exploitation.840This was exacerbated by the lack of 
cooperation by foreign countries who had the data, to share it.841 Thus, the need to 
accelerate the acquisition of knowledge, and to transfer this expertise from foreign 
laboratories to those in the region was pursued. This was with the aim of regulating 
fishing effort on the most appropriate basis and thus a Working Group on Resource 
Evaluation dealing with statistics and the state of the stocks  was set up, at its third 
session in December 1972.842 Over the years, with the coming into force of UNCLOS, 
CECAF has attempted to modernise and incorporate the provisions of UNCLOS in its 
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terms of reference.843 Within its advisory role, it has continued to carry out scientific 
assessments of the fisheries in the region and currently about 90 species are being 
assessed or monitored. These include 26 small pelagic species and 78 demersal species. 
Most of these species are shared by two or more states in the region and 
recommendations for research and management have been made to members.844 
Importantly, CECAF has given member states a forum for the exchange of experience 
and knowledge on a range of issues which has promoted scientific collaboration through 
discussions and sharing lessons-learned in fisheries management, on the ecosystem 
approach to fisheries and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, among 
others. 845 
However, the Performance Review of CECAF conducted in 2015 has not shown much 
progress in solving the region’s fisheries management problems. The main challenge of 
the Committee is that it has been severely underfunded and undermanaged. The 
members are not committed to the work of the Committee. For instance, out of 
CECAF’s 34 member States, only 13–24 member States actually attended the last five 
biannual Committee Meetings.846 At a number of meetings at which decisions were 
taken, there was no quorum contrary to the rules governing the CECAF meetings.847 
This calls in question the legality of the organization’s decisions. Additionally, though 
the Committee is headquartered in Accra, Ghana with offices provided by the FAO 
Regional Office for Africa but it has no Secretary and is practically inactive.848 This 
lack of commitment can be seen from the fact that its members have never had to 
contribute to its work including the important work of fisheries scientists across the 
region. This has been left to FAO and international development projects. Also the 
states do not implement the Committee’s recommendations.849 Regarding issues that 
are of importance to GOG states like assessment of IUU fishing or catch certification 
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As with ICCAT, although the CECAF mandates were updated in 1992 and 2003, they 
do not contain the Ecosystem Based Approach to Fisheries or the precautionary 
principle.851 It has also been criticised for lack of transparency and not being open to 
the special needs and requirements of developing countries.852 Additionally it does not 
have dispute resolution mechanisms.853 CECAF also does not address questions of 
fishing capacity among its members and there has been very little work on Monitoring, 
Control and Surveillance of fishing ships, and on capacity building among member 
States’ fisheries officers and fisherfolk.854 An issue of concern raised at the eighth 
session of the scientific subcommittee is the continued expansion of the fishmeal 
industry.855 Large amounts of small pelagics in the region are being caught for fishmeal 
factories abroad. This could have a negative impact on access to fish by millions of the 
region’s populations.856 
Another constraint CECAF has is its status as an Article VI body under the FAO 
Constitution. This means it does not have an autonomous budget and states are not 
expected to make regular contributions to it.857 Members have so far preferred to keep 
it that way even though they have discussed transforming it into an Article XIV body 
with increased decision-making powers and an autonomous budget. So far CECAF is 
financed by FAO and donors and it is increasingly becoming difficult to keep it running 
smoothly. 
In addition to the above challenges, there is also the fact that there are four other regional 
fisheries bodies with an area of competence that overlaps that of CECAF – ATLAFCO, 
FCWC, COREP, SRFC and ICCAT.858 This duplication of effort is perhaps another 
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been discussing how to improve its work for almost 20 years there is no indication that 
it is able to solve the region’s fisheries conservation and management problems.  
III. Regional Fisheries Commission of the Gulf of Guinea (COREP)859 
The Regional Commission of Fisheries of Gulf of Guinea (COREP) was founded in 
1984 to co- ordinate, harmonise and develop the sustainable exploitation of fisheries 
resources with regard to shared stocks found within the Exclusive Economic Zones of 
its Member States (Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Congo DR, Sao Tome and 
Principe and Equatorial Guinea) within the waters of the Gulf of Guinea situated 
between Cameroon and Angola.860 It is an intergovernmental organization and a 
specialized agency of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).861 
The Convention was revised in 2010 to take account of developments in the 
international law concerning fisheries and the fact that the organisation was not having 
the desired impact. It also needed to take account of its new status as a specialised 
agency of EECAS.862 The COREP's mandate like those of CECAF discussed above, 
involves collecting, analysing and making available scientific data as well as 
information and techniques for fisheries and aquaculture.863 Additionally it is to 
harmonise members’ national regulations with a view to having a unified regulation 
fixing the conditions of fishing and the control of fishing operations in the area covered 
by the Convention as well as harmonise fisheries policy and legal frameworks of 
parties.864 It is also to assess the stocks of shared and transboundary fisheries.865 It also 
provides for the involvement of other landlocked States Parties in fisheries conservation 
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and management measures in the Gulf of Guinea.866 The organisation’s functions are 
performed through four bodies which are the Council of Ministers, Technical 
Committee, Executive Secretariat and  Scientific Subcommittee.867 
Among the positive contributions COREP has made to fisheries management in the 
region, is in the areas of MCS. It has a training programme for officers of members 
states involved in MCS operations.868 It has also developed a manual for operational 
procedures for monitoring and control of fisheries. Like ICCAT, COREP has also 
promoted the development of a national and regional registers of industrial fishing 
vessels to assist in the identification of fishing vessels operating in the convention area 
and the monitoring of such vessels.869  
The organisation has adopted a Strategic Action Plan for the period 2016-2020.870 The 
objective is to strengthen the institution and to allow better management of fisheries in 
the Gulf of Guinea area. This action plan includes among others a plan to combat illegal 
fishing, and a protocol for the establishment and management of an information system 
on fisheries and aquaculture in Central Africa. To achieve this goal, the Member States 
would have to mobilize the necessary resources for its operation, and this is the real 
challenge. The organisation as with the other bodies in the Gulf of Guinea also does not 
appear to have any clear approach and can be said to be only a consultative one and has 
not been as effective as envisaged. 
 
IV. The Fishery Committee of the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC)871 
 
The Fisheries committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC) was established 
in 2006 to facilitate cooperation in fisheries management between the member countries 
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several shared fish stocks. Its mandate is quite similar to that of the COREP and is to 
provide a forum for discussion on fishery-related matters, to improve the livelihoods of 
small-scale fishers and processors, including the devising of appropriate measures to 
deal with migrant fishers. It is also like COREP mandated to harmonise fisheries 
legislation and regulations among the Contracting Parties and enhance cooperation in 
their relations with distant water fishing countries. It is also to strengthen sub-regional 
cooperation in monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement, including the 
progressive development of common procedures.873  It is also to promote the 
development of fisheries research capabilities; promote the development of standards 
for the collection, exchange and reporting of fisheries data; develop and promote 
common policies and strategies, as appropriate, in the sub-region to enhance sub-
regional standing in international meetings; and promote sub-regional cooperation in 
the marketing and trading of fish and fish products.874 
 
The Committee’s area of competence is all marine waters under national jurisdiction of 
the Contracting Parties as well as to all living marine resources, without prejudice to 
the management responsibilities and authorities of other competent fisheries 
management organizations or arrangements in the area. The Convention acknowledges 
the existing frameworks for fisheries cooperation in the West African region, with 
particular reference to the Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic 
(CECAF), the Ministerial Conference on Fisheries Cooperation among African States 
bordering the Atlantic Ocean (ATLAFCO), the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the African Continental Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Committee (CFAC). 875To strengthen governance and increase 
cooperation across the six member States, the FCWC has put in place several 
conventions and plans of action including the 2009 FCWC Regional Plan of Action on 
IUU fishing;  the 2013 Convention on Minimum Requirements for Access to the Fishery 
Resources of the Area of the FCWC and the 2014 Convention on the Pooling and 







One of the most significant contributions to fisheries management that the organisation 
has achieved is the established a West Africa Task Force (WATF) in 2015.876 This is to 
provide a regional approach to fisheries enforcement to tackle the problem of illegal 
fishers operating in the region.877 This is in recognition of the fact that the migratory 
nature of the shared resources needs a regional cooperative effort. The West Africa Task 
Force thus identifies, tracks, gathers evidence and mounts enforcement and prosecution 
actions against illegal fishing operators. It would in the end be the foundation for long 
term regional and sustainable MCS structure in the region.878 The Task Force model 
was based on lessons learned from the Task Force in the Western Indian Ocean region 
– ‘FISH-i Africa’.  
One of the achievements of the task force is that, it has assessed how the states have 
domesticated the FCWC Conventions and plans of action referred to above, into the 
legal frameworks within each FCWC country and assessed the strengths and 
weaknesses in national legislation to combat IUU fishing.879 The review, conclusions 
and recommendations include a plan of action for completing the domestication of 
FCWC provisions within national frameworks. The assessment identified the most 
common violations of fisheries legislation in the FCWC region as a means to evaluate 
the provisions of the existing legal frameworks so as to be able to propose changes.880  
Some positive results have been recorded in the area as there is increased awareness 
when flagging and licensing vessels. More attention has been drawn to illegal fishing 
and the trade in illegal fish in the region which is leading to new approaches, activities 
and priorities with the involvement of relevant agencies in the region.881 The Task force 
has a communication platform that has been instrumental in dealing with issues of 
information sharing and has worked with the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission 
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vessels operating or present in West Africa and verified information on licences, 
flagging and inspections. For example, its enquiries in April 2016 into the registration 
and activities of the British flagged vessel, ‘Blue Gate’ revealed inconsistencies in the 
vessel documents and information. 883 Another example was in December 2015 
regarding the JU YUAN 1, a Côte d’Ivoire flagged fishing vessel sending distress 
signals, which was given port access in Benin after claiming to have been hijacked. 
Benin conducted a vessel inspection and found purse seine nets and fish aggregating 
devices (FADs) on board along with 16 tunas in the hold.884 Benin used the WATF 
Communications Platform to inform and share images with the flag state Côte d’Ivoire 
on the inspection, particularly the fact that the vessel’s fishing licence was to target 
sardines, but tuna were found in the hold.  
Côte d’Ivoire found another ship with similar gear belonging to the same operator and 
was of the opinion that the presence of FADs on board indicated that the vessel was 
deliberately targeting tuna. This led to the vessel Operator being fined 10 million CFA 
(15 000 EUR) per vessel, the tuna purse seine gear was seized, and the vessels’ fishing 
licences were suspended for a period of six months.885  
The work of this task force shows just how much the states can achieve with a high 
level of commitment to the cause of conserving and managing fisheries in the region. 
However, in spite of its vigilance and operations in the region, IUU fishing is still 
rampant as well as the other challenges to fisheries conservation and management 
identified above.  At its eighth meeting in May 2019, it was stressed by an official of 
the host country, Cote d’Ivoire, that illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is still 
one of the major challenges for sustainable fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea due to weak 
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V. The Ministerial Conference on Fisheries Cooperation among African States 
bordering the Atlantic Ocean (ATLAFCO)887 
The Ministerial Conference on Fisheries Cooperation among African States bordering 
the Atlantic Ocean (ATLAFCO)888 is an intergovernmental organisation established in 
1989 by the Convention on Fisheries Cooperation among States bordering the Atlantic 
Ocean. It has 22 members made up of coastal states from Morocco to Namibia.889 Its 
main objectives are the promotion and strengthening of regional cooperation on 
fisheries development and the coordination and harmonization of efforts and capacities 
of stakeholders for the conservation and exploitation of fisheries resources. Its principal 
mandate like the other fisheries bodies is promotion of cooperation in the field of 
fisheries management. Its specific objectives are promoting cooperation in fisheries 
management and development; develop, coordinate and harmonise Member States’ 
efforts and capabilities to preserve, exploit, develop and commercialise fisheries 
resources; strengthen solidarity with landlocked African States and geographically 
disadvantaged countries in the region. Its action points include the development of 
fisheries research and marine sciences and implementation of laws and regulations on 
responsible fishing.  
 
The Organisation appears to be mainly an advisory body that encourages its members 
to consult each other and cooperate in MCS activities.890 It also encourages its members 
to develop marine scientific research and share this research through the coordination 
of their institutes. Additionally, it urges its members to intensify their efforts to ensure 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment as well as seeking to 
strengthen the bilateral, sub regional and international cooperation mechanisms related 
to the management of coastal areas in the region. Regarding the harmonisation of 
policies, it encourages member states to harmonize their legislation, exchange 
 
887 MEDASYS Solutions, 'COMHAFAT | Bienvenue' (Comhafat.org, 2020) 
<https://www.comhafat.org/fr/> accessed 27 May 2020. 
888 Better known by its French acronym, COMHAFAT, Conférence ministérielle sur la coopération 
haleutique des États Africains riverains de l’Océan Atlantique) 
889 Angola, Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dem. Rep. of the Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Togo. 
890 MEDASYS Solutions, 'COMHAFAT | Bienvenue' (Comhafat.org, 2020) 
<https://www.comhafat.org/fr/> accessed 27 May 2020. 
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information on their regulations, and collaborate with international institutions in order 
to adopt common policies and positions in fisheries negotiations.891 
It can be concluded that the last three bodies discussed above are simply to bring the 
states together to consult and advice each other on fisheries issues. They have no 
binding powers and are largely cash strapped and so cannot be effective. 
 
4.4. Other regional organisations  
 
I. The Abidjan Convention 
The Abidjan Convention discussed in the preceding chapter is an important regional 
organisation with a broad mandate which includes some aspects of fisheries 
management. The Convention though mainly concerned with cooperation in the area of 
environmental pollution issues, is also concerned with cooperation in the management 
of marine living resources as it seeks to consolidate cooperation between three Large 
Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) in the region, namely the Guinea Current LME, the 
Benguela Current LME, and the Canary Currents Large Marine Ecosystems (LME). 
These LMEs have been granted special status as advisors to the Abidjan Convention 
Secretariat.892 The Convention’s role is therefore envisaged as coordinating and 
monitoring the activities of the LMEs, two of which already have Commissions in 
place.893 However the states realised that fisheries management was becoming a major 
issue in light of the growing illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing adversely 
affecting the maritime economic areas of Contracting States and that the Abidjan 
Convention was deficient in this area. They therefore decided at the tenth meeting that 





893 The Benguela and Guinea Currents LMEs already have Commissions in place. The Canary Current 
LME currently does not have a Commission and the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (composed of 
Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, and Sierra Leone) supports the 
implementation of the Abidjan Convention in the Canary Current LME area. 
894 ‘A supplementary provision on fisheries management in national areas and marine areas beyond 
national jurisdiction’, Tenth Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention for Cooperation in the 
Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Atlantic 
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These measures may include, among others, the harmonisation of fishing quotas, the 
implementation of mechanisms to combat illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, 
the maintenance of common identification lists of fishing vessels operating in the 
jurisdiction area of the Convention, the harmonisation and coordination of regulations 
relating to fishing licenses, seizure of offending vessels and finally the adoption of 
sanctions against offending vessels (restricted access to fishing areas of all Contracting 
States – payment of surety - confiscation of fishery products - payment of damages, 
etc.). It was decided further that the parties should take measures to ensure the 
conservation of biodiversity, including the management and conservation of offshore 
fisheries, through cooperation aimed at identifying marine protected areas beyond areas 
under their jurisdiction by adopting plans whose coverage would be binding on the 
Contracting States. It is noteworthy that this decision has not yet been implemented. 
 
An important feature of the Convention is the strengthening of already existing National 
Focal Points, in each state. These would be responsible for working with government 
agencies which are involved in conservation and management projects as well as with 
the Convention and the LMEs.895 It was each member state’s responsibility to set up 
multi-sector national committees for this coordinating purpose by providing reports on 
the national, coastal and marine environment and on the status of implementation of the 
relevant Abidjan Convention work programs to the Secretariat of the Convention. 896 
The coordinating role of the Secretariat is complemented by the Regional Coordinating 
Unit (“RCU”) located in Cote d’Ivoire, a body that oversees the implementation of the 
Action Plan and works in cooperation with the Abidjan Convention Secretariat.897 It 
was envisaged as one of the objectives of the programme to transfer the secretariat from 
Nairobi Kenya to Abidjan in Cote d’Ivoire.898 
 
 
Coast of the West, Central and Southern Africa Region (Pointe Noire, Republic of the Congo, 12-16 
November 2012) Para .7 UNEP(DEPI)/WACAF/COP.10/12  
895 David Dzidzornu, ‘Marine Environmental Protection under the Nairobi and Abidjan Regimes: 
Working Toward Functional Revitalisation?’ (2012) 26 Ocean Yearbook 26 38 
896 Convention for Cooperation in the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the Atlantic Coast of the West, Central and Southern Africa Region and 
Protocol concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in Cases of Emergency (Abidjan Convention) 
Article 16  
897ibid  
898 David Dzidzornu, ‘Marine Environmental Protection under the Nairobi and Abidjan Regimes: 
Working Toward Functional Revitalisation?’ (2012) 26 Ocean Yearbook 26 38 
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The Abidjan Convention relies on pre-existing capabilities already available throughout 
the region and on the support of other regional and international organizations. The 
FAO, the Fishery Commission for the Eastern Central Atlantic, the International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, and the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) have all partnered with the Abidjan Convention to 
develop a regional networking mechanism to monitor and manage fisheries mangroves 
and their ecosystems.899 This partnership also assists with stock assessment and the 
conservation of endangered species and promotes sustainable fisheries policies and 
legislation.900Regional and international cooperation is promoted in order to implement 
joint programmes to protect coastal and marine habitats.901  
 
There are many challenges that undermine the Convention’s effectiveness. For instance, 
under the Convention various studies were done on the legal resourcefulness of the 
states to implement the convention and the action plan as well as scientific information 
gathering. However, the implementation of the projects at the local level was not 
prioritised.902 Thus the general populace is not well informed of the work the 
Convention is doing in order to give it their full support. The parties also have not taken 
ownership of the initiatives under the Convention but view them more as UNEP 
undertakings.903 The Convention deals mainly with pollution and related matters and 
does not have clear mandate to deal with fisheries issues apart from coordinating the 
three LME which have fisheries related mandates. Further the Convention articulates 
various aspirations, but members do not seem to have the political will to be committed 
to them. With regard to funding, the work of the Abidjan Convention is too heavily 
dependent on donor funds.904 The states frequently fail to pay up their contributions.905 
 
899 'IW:LEARN | Documents -> Legal Frameworks -> Abidjan Convention' (Iwlearn.net, 2020) 
<https://iwlearn.net/documents/legal-frameworks/abidjan-convention> accessed 27 May 2020. 
900 ibid 
901 Twelfth meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection, 
Management and Development of the Marine Environment and Coastal Areas of the West, Central and 
Southern African Region (Abidjan Convention) Additional Protocol to the Abidjan Convention on 




902David Dzidzornu, ‘Marine Environmental Protection under the Nairobi and Abidjan Regimes: 
Working Toward Functional Revitalisation?’ (2012) 26 Ocean Yearbook 359.  
903 ibid 




For instance contributions to the Abidjan Convention Trust Fund from states was 
supposed to amount to US$ 1 million, but from 2004-2007 contributions amounted to 
only US $112,500 and in 2008, US $18,600.906 This is perhaps due to the fact that they 
do not view the convention obligations as priority or just cannot afford to pay their 
contributions. However, the wide reach of the convention would have provided the 
platform for cooperation for monitoring the marine area from one end to the other to 
solve at least the problem of illegal fishing and take steps to slow down the decline in 
fish stocks. 
Figure 16: Membership of Gulf of Guinea States in Regional Fisheries Bodies  
 
Table showing fragmentation of regional regimes for the management of fisheries 
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4.5. National legal frameworks for the conservation and management of 
fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea: assessment and challenges 
These international instruments are all soft law thus there is the need for states to 
implement the provisions in them through national policies, laws, & institutions. Thus, 
all the states in the region have adopted legislation in line with the international 
instruments discussed above dealing with the conservation and management of marine 





Agreement as well as other non-binding instruments.907 There are however some 
variations depending on the level of emphasis placed on the various aspects of fisheries 
management and conservation that the states determine should be made a priority. The 
following subsections discuss the key tools used by the states in order to assess their 
adequacy to solve conservation and management problems as well as to identify any 
challenges. 
 
I. Regulation on licensing and setting Total Allowable Catch (TAC)  
Under UNCLOS908 coastal states are to determine the allowable catch of the living 
resources in their respective EEZs. These measures are designed to maintain or restore 
populations of harvested species at levels which promote the maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY) taking into account any relevant environmental and economic factors.909 
These include the special economic needs of the fishing communities and developing 
states, fishing patterns, the interdependence of fisheries stocks and any accepted 
minimum standards determined at the sub regional, regional or global level. Though 
there are some arguments against it, the MSY objective for fisheries management, is 
that however large the catch, it should be sustainable in the long term.910 This involves 
setting the harvest rate to a level that produces a catch of MSY and not anything more 
or less.911 This entails the exchange of scientific data through international organisations 
as well as states’ nationals allowed to fish in the EEZ.912 It also require national laws 
on licensing, species caught, catch quotas and data collection among others as provided 
by Article 62 of UNCLOS.  
 
 However, there is a dearth of national regulation or management plans regarding the 
setting of TACs by GOG states in their agreements with third states fishing in the 
region. The notable exception is Sao Tome and Principe which has taken steps to set 
TACs in its fishing agreements. In that country, between 1983 and 1986, the fishery 
 
907 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (adopted 4 August 1995, entered into force 11 December 
2001) 2167 UNTS 3 (Fish Stocks Agreement). 
908 Ibid Article 61(1)  
909 Ibid Article 61 (3) 
910 Andre Punt and Anthony Smith, ‘The Gospel of Maximum Sustainable Yield in Fisheries 
Management: Birth, Crucifixion and Reincarnation’ in John Reynolds and others, Conservation of 
Exploited Species (Cambridge University Press 2001) 41. 
911 ibid 
912 Article 61 (5) 
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potential for coastal pelagic species was determined to be about 8,500 tons a year and 
for demersal species, it was 3,500 tons a year.913 To conserve the fisheries, the state 
limited the TAC to 6,000 tons a year for both species.914 Sao Tome has fishing 
agreements with the EU and the TAC beyond 12 NM is fixed at 8,500 tons a year.915 
This is significant, as being an island state, they have an EEZ that is larger than land 
mass and depend greatly on fishery resources.916 
 
It is noteworthy that the majority of states in the region, have not emulated this example. 
They do not incorporate TACS in their fisheries access agreements with third states. 
For example, Gabon has fisheries agreements focusing on tuna with Japan and the EU 
which have paid for access to the fishing grounds.917 Regarding its agreement with the 
EU918, nothing is said about a TAC. Article 3 of the said Agreement, however, cedes 
collection of data on catch to the EU, whilst Gabon itself has not put in place any 
procedure under the Agreement to set a limit on how much or which species is caught. 
There is also nothing in the agreement requiring the EU to make available the data on 
the fisheries caught to Gabon, which hinders effective management. Cote d’Ivoire also 
has a fisheries partnership agreement with the EU for which it is paid 682,000 Euros 
yearly including 352,000 a year for two years and 407,000 a year to support the fisheries 
sector.919 This amount it is submitted hardly compensates for the amount of fish that the 
EU vessels haul out of Ivorian waters. It appears with the exception of Tuna species, 
for which ICCAT has set the TACs, the states do not have the political will to set TACs 
for other fish species. This means once the third states have paid for fishing access, they 
can fish without regard to any TAC.  
 
 
913 Helen Davies (eds) The Fisheries of the Gulf of Guinea Current: An Overview and Country Reports 
(GCLME/UNIDO, 2012) 292. 
914 ibid 
915 Ibid p. 299 
916 Mé-Chinhô Costa Alegre, 'Towards A National Ocean Policy In Sao Tome And Principe' 
(Fellowship, The United Nations-Nippon Foundation Fellowship Programme 2009). 
917 Ibid 331 
918 Council Regulation (EC) No. 450/2007 of 16 April 2007 on the Conclusion of the Fisheries 
Partnership Agreement between the Gabonese Republic and the European Community [2007] OJ L 
109/3.  
 
919 Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1095 of 26 July 2018 on the allocation of fishing opportunities under 
the Protocol on the implementation of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European 
Union and the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (2018-2024) [2018] OJ L 197/1.  
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Admittedly setting TACs can be very difficult especially for the developing states of 
the Gulf of Guinea. This is due to the fact that adequate scientific data is required to set 
quotas that would ensure sustainability. This is an expensive exercise for any state 
especially in view of the fact that the fisheries of the region are multi species and 
multiple types of gear are used to capture them. Additionally, in the Gulf of Guinea 
states do not conduct surveys frequently to update the situation of fisheries. Outdated 
statistics indicate that the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) of coastal demersal 
resources, in western and central GOG was within the range of 64,000 and 104,000 
metric tonnes while annual landing was about 105,000.920 In the northern GOG, MSY 
ranged between 18,000 and 95000 metric tonnes with annual landings in this range921 
meaning the demersal resources were being exploited at their maximum. Marine 
biologist thus concluded at the time, that, “coastal demersal resources in the whole of 
the Gulf of Guinea are either fully exploited or over exploited. This state of affairs 
appears not to have changed judging from the state of the fisheries in the Gulf of 
Guinea.922 Thus, the access agreements currently signed with third states including 
landlocked states as provided for under Article 69 of UNCLOS are not based on solid 
scientific evidence of stock levels which is a problem for management and conservation 
in the region. 
 
Vessels that fish in the region are subject to licensing regimes as provided for under 
UNCLOS. The legislation in the region, takes into consideration two main types of 
fishers - artisanal and industrial (including semi-industrial). Artisanal fishers usually 
referred to as, “small scale, traditional, inshore, subsistence or municipal fishers” are 
the regions local fishers who mainly live along the coast and fish for a living or for 
subsistence.923 They exploit both pelagic and demersal fish stocks924 using small 
vessels. The industrial fishers which have had a long tradition in the region, are made 
up mainly of the foreign fishing fleets from the EU, Eastern Europe, Korea and 
 
920 Martin Mensah and Samuel Quaatey, ‘An Overview of the Fishery Resources and Fishery Research 
in the Gulf of Guinea’ in Jacqueline McGlade and others (eds) The Gulf of Guinea Large marine 
Ecosystem (Elsevier Science 2002) vol. II 227-239. 
921 Jacqueline McGlade and others (eds) The Gulf of Guinea Large marine Ecosystem (Elsevier Science 
2002) vol. II 232  
922 'Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis' (GCLME 
Regional Coordinating Unit 2006). 




Japan.925These use sophisticated fishing gear including industrial trawlers and purse-
seiners. The fisheries legislation in the region make provision for the licensing of these 
artisanal and commercial fishing vessels as well as reefer vessels operating in their 
respective waters. The states have various criteria for granting, refusing or cancelling 
permits. In Nigeria, the law accords licensing officers the wide discretion to cancel a 
license or suspend it.926 Appeals are to the Minister who also has the discretion to take 
any decision he deems fit and such decision shall be final.927 The challenge with this is 
that it is likely to breed corruption and not be effective. This is unlike the situation in 
Ghana which has a Fisheries Commission that deals with applications for licenses and 
appeals are made to a Fisheries Appeal Board with further right of appeal to the 
courts.928 This is more transparent and therefore more effective. In Cameroon, the 
Fisheries law929 provides for authorisation and license for fishing rights at the industrial 
level, and for a permit or authorization for semi-industrial and artisanal fishing.930 
However the country does not have control over licensing of fishing vessels and many 
vessels operate without licenses for all or part of the year.931 The regulations are also 
silent on false declarations made in relation to fishing activities.932  Between 2004 to 
2007, Cameroon did not license any vessels in 2006, but there were vessels operating 
in its waters.933 In 2007, operators were issued their licenses late in May which meant 
that they had operated for five months without licenses.934 This is a situation that 
continues to happen and thus is a setback for conserving and managing the fishery 
resources in that country. The reason for this is not immediately clear from the literature 
and as the catches are not reported, determining how much fish have been caught is 
impossible. Also, there could be lost revenue from licensing fees.  
 
 
925 Ibid p. 39 
926 Ibid section 4 (5) 
927 Ibid section 7 
928 Ghana Fisheries Act 2002, Act 625 Sections 69 and 78  
929 Decree n° 95/413/PM of 20 June 1995, providing the conditions for access to fishing. see 
ENVIREP-CAM, 'Overview of Management and Exploitation of the Fisheries Resources of Cameroon, 
Central West Africa' <http://hdl.handle.net/1834/5228> accessed 27 May 2020.> 
930 ibid 
931 ENVIREP-CAM, 'Overview of Management and Exploitation of the Fisheries Resources of 
Cameroon, Central West Africa' <http://hdl.handle.net/1834/5228> accessed 27 May 2020.> 
932ibid. 
933 ibid 
934 Ibid  
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The presence of foreign fishing vessels in EEZ waters have been known to cause 
maritime insecurity and conflict. In the region, domestic fishing fleets tend to be small-
scale and artisanal, using small boats and gear. Foreign vessels, especially those from 
distant-water fleets that have travelled thousands of miles to fish, are larger, faster, and 
use larger sets of gear. This can cause direct conflict between domestic and foreign 
vessels. In some African countries, foreign vessels have been accused of destroying 
artisanal gear, crowding out smaller boats, destroying marine habitat, and depleting 
fisheries resources.935 An example is the illegal practice known as ‘saiku’ which is 
carried on by trawlers in Ghanaian waters.936 These trawlers, mostly of Chinese origin, 
fish illegally by targeting juvenile and small pelagic fish which are reserved for local 
fishers. This illegally caught fish is then transhipped at sea to local fishers, in specially 
adapted canoes called ‘Saiku’.937 These are forced to buy it, because as a direct result 
of ‘saiko’, they are struggling to catch enough fish to sustain their livelihoods. This has 
contributed to the rapid deterioration of Ghana’s fisheries resources.938  
  
Some of the states do not permit foreign interests to engage in the industrial fishing 
sector by way of joint ventures. An example is Ghana where this restriction applies to 
all local (i.e. Ghana-flagged) industrial and semi-industrial vessels, with the exception 
of tuna vessels.939 The restriction ensures that the financial benefits of the trawl sector 
are retained in Ghana. However, this regulation is circumvented by Chinese companies 
operating through Ghanaian “front” companies to import their vessels into the Ghanaian 
fleet register and obtain a licence to fish.940  
Thus the legislation of the states in the region make provision for regulating fishing by 
foreign fishing vessels and protecting artisanal fishers. However, the legislation in the 
 
935 (Fao.org, 2020) <http://www.fao.org/3/k7480b/k7480b06.pdf> accessed 27 May 2020. 
936 '‘Stolen at Sea: How Illegal 'Saiko' Fishing Is Fuelling the Collapse Of Ghana's Fisheries' (EJF and 
Hen Mpoano 2019). 
937 ibid 
938 ibid 
939 Isabella Kaminski and others, 'Ghana’s Fish Stocks Decimated by Illegal Fishing' (chinadialogue 
ocean, 2018) <https://chinadialogueocean.net/4731-ghanas-fish-stocks-decimated-by-illegal-fishing/> 




region is not uniform. Some legislation is liberal whilst others are restrictive. The 
foreign vessels therefore operate where they know the regulation is weakest.941 
 
II. Regulation of fishing zones and fishing gear 
The states in the region have used restrictions on fishing gear within specified zones or 
define limits near the coast to control fish catch. In Cameroon for instance, the law 
prohibits the use of trawlers or fishing vessels with trawling gear “within a 3 nautical 
mile zone of the basic line fixed by decree”.942 The other states have different limits 
within 5 nautical miles from the coast. The reason for this restriction may be the large-
scale destruction that such trawling gear could cause to the seabed and its effect on 
marine living resources on the seabed. Mesh size for fishing nets are also regulated. 
These measures especially those concerning mesh size are important to protect the 
nursery grounds of the fish stock. It is also to protect the small pelagics, which are more 
heavily distributed in Benin, Togo, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.943 The main objective is 
to allow juvenile and young fish to escape.944 Regulation becomes necessary due to the 
fact that the beach seine,945one of the dominant marine artisanal gears used along the 
coast of West Africa is highly destructive to juvenile fish and the ecosystem.946 It is one 
of the main contributory factors to the reduction of the spawning potential of small 
pelagic stocks shared by countries in the region.947  
 
941 ibid 
942 Section 127 Cameroon law No. 94/01 
943 A. Aziable and others, ‘Distribution and abundance of the main pelagic fish stocks in the Western 
Gulf of Guinea (Benin, Togo, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire)’ in Serge Garcia and others (eds.) Science and 
Management of Small Pelagics: Symposium on Science and the Challenge of Managing Small Pelagic 
Fisheries on Shared Stocks in Northwest Africa, 11–14 March 2008, Casablanca, Morocco (FAO, 
2012) 493–502.  
944 Njomoue Pandong Achile and others, ‘Assessment of the Selective Properties and Optimization of 
Mesh Size of Pelagic Trawl Codends, Used for Fishing Mackerel (Trachurus Spp) in the Gulf of 
Guinea’ (2013) 3 Open Journal of Marine Science 103-111. 
945 A beach seine is a seine net operated from the shore. It is composed of a bag and long wings often 
lengthened with long ropes for towing the seine to the beach. The headrope with floats is on the surface, 
while the footrope is in permanent contact with the bottom and the seine is therefore a barrier which 
prevent the fish from escaping from the area enclosed by the net. See ‘FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture - 
Fishing Gear Type' (Fao.org, 2020) <http://www.fao.org/fishery/geartype/202/en> accessed 28 May 
2020. 
946 Francis Nunoo, and others, ‘Abundance, biomass and species composition of nearshore fish 
assemblages in Ghana, West Africa,’ (2006) 28 African Journal of Marine Science 3. 
947 ibid  
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In Ghana, for example, the Fisheries Law948 and Fisheries Regulations949 contain 
provisions that seek to regulate beach seining.950 These laws prohibit the use of seine 
nets in inland waters,951 and the use, sale manufacture and importation of seine nets, the 
mesh size of which is less than 25 mm in stretched diagonal length in coastal waters.952 
The use of seine nets for tuna fishing is also prohibited.953 Additionally the law prohibits 
the use of beach seine nets in estuaries and areas designated as marine protected areas 
by the Ghana Fisheries Commission.954 However, managing beach seine fisheries in 
West Africa is a formidable task as artisanal fishers depend on it and multispecies are 
caught through this method.955 Management is also challenged by the lack of integrated 
strategies and law enforcement.956 Across the region, the mesh size of the bag of the 
beach seine nets range between 5 and 25 mm and 25 mm is rare.957 The methods used 
to measure meshes also varies.958 The states also have legislation regarding the weight 
and size limits of certain specific fisheries.959 However, these vary from one law to 
another and the unit of measurements may also vary.960  
III. Regulation of fishing techniques 
The states’ legislation prohibits harmful fishing methods such as the use of explosives, 
chemicals, poisons, electrical currents and any device likely to destroy aquatic fauna 
and the aquatic environment.961 These are not even allowed on board vessels under 
some of the legislation like the Ghana Fisheries Act.962 Despite these laws some of the 
 
948 Fisheries Act, 2002 Act 625 
949 Fisheries Regulations L.I. 1968 (2010) 
950 Fisheries Act, 2002 Act 625 and Fisheries regulations L.I. 1968 (2010) 
951 Ghana Fisheries regulations L.I. 1968 (2010) Section 6  
952 Ibid Sections 10 and 12 (4)  
953 Ibid Section 2010 
954 Ibid Section 9  
955 Francis Nunoo and Dogbeda Azumah, ‘Selectivity Studies on Beach Seine Deployed in Nearshore 
Waters near Accra, Ghana’ (2015) 7 Int. J. Fish. Aquac. 112. 
956 ibid 
957 Ibid  
958 ibid 
959FAO, ‘Regional Compendium of West African Fisheries’ (CECAF Region, 1983) 7 
960 ibid 
961 Nigeria Sea fisheries Act, Ghana Fisheries Regulations (L.I 1968), Cote d’Ivoire’s Law No. 86-468 
of 01/07/1986 on fishing are examples. 
962 Ghana Fisheries Act section 88. 
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states still record high rates of poisonous chemical use in fishing. In Cote d’Ivoire some 
fishermen use poisonous products as a means to catch fish.963  
IV. Regulation on conservation of fisheries 
i)Area-based management – Marine Protected Areas 
“Marine Protected Areas” (MPA) have been discussed in the literature and used in 
practice to describe “any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its overlying 
waters and associated fauna, flora, historical and cultural features, which has been 
reserved by legislation to protect part or all of the enclosed environment” 964 According 
to the World Wide Fund (WWF) it is, “an area designated and effectively managed to 
protect marine ecosystems, processes, habitats, and species, which can contribute to 
the restoration and replenishment of resources for social, economic, and cultural 
enrichment”.965 An MPA thus provides an integrated approach to the protection of the 
environment as it takes into account the whole ecosystem. MPAs take various forms 
and include spatial limits on fishing areas, no take areas where entry is prohibited and 
areas with ocean zoning schemes among others.966 The levels of protection, and the 
range of activities allowed or prohibited within these protected areas varies from area 
to area.967 However in the literature, no-take reserves have been identified as the 
strongest form of conservation for fisheries, but these are not well distributed across 
the globe.968 They are also not popular with states that depend on commercial 
fishing and therefore it is to be expected that throughout the world, the fishing industry 
is the most powerful opponent of no-take zones.969 
 
963 Angaman Konan and Gabin Kponhassia, 'The Traditional Management of Artisanal Fisheries in 
Cote d'Ivoire: The Case of Aby Lagoon', Fisheries Co- Management in Africa: Proceedings from a 
Regional Workshop on Fisheries Co-Management Research (Institute for Fisheries Management and 
Coastal Community Development 1997) 288. 
964 Graeme Kelleher and Richard Kenchington, 'Guidelines for Establishing Marine Protected Areas A 
Marine Conservation and Development Report' (IUCN 1992). 
965 Emilie Reuchlin-Hugenholtz and Emily Mckenzie, 'Marine Protected Areas: Smart Investments in 
Ocean Health’ (WWF, Gland, Switzerland, 2015) (Wwf.panda.org) 
<https://wwf.panda.org/our_work/oceans/solutions/protection/protected_areas/> accessed 28 May 
2020. 
966 FAO, Report and Documentation of the Expert Workshop on Marine Protected Areas and Fisheries 
Management: Review of Issues and Considerations, Rome, 12-14 June 2006 (Fisheries Report No. 825 
FAO 2007) 307-309. 
967 ibid 
968  'Marine Protected Areas' (Marine Conservation Institute, 2020) <https://marine-
conservation.org/what-we-do/program-areas/mpas/> accessed 28 May 2020. 
969 National Society, 'No-Take Zone' (National Geographic Society, 2020) 





There are two outstanding no-take reserves: the UK’s Pitcairn Marine reserves and 
the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monuments. The Pitcairn Islands Marine 
Reserve was established by the UK government in March 2015. It has been touted as 
the largest single reserve in the world.970 The islands are administered by the UK as a 
territory. The island residents requested the UK government to create the reserve due to 
illegal foreign fleet fishing there and degrading the area.971 The British government 
signed legislation on its establishment.972 By section 8 of the Ordinance fishing is 
among the activities that is prohibited in the area. There is however an exception made 
for residents of the island to fish. Further Section 9 provides that they can fish provided 
that such fishing is conducted while in transit to or from other islands in or outside the 
Pitcairn Islands Marine Protected Area, for consumption during that trip. The method 
of fishing is by an attended line (whether or not with a rod); and conducted in 
accordance with any Marine Conservation Regulations and Fisheries Management 
Plan.973 Fishing for scientific research is also provided for under permit provided for 
under the Ordinance and marine conservation regulations.974 The area is so protected 
that the law even prohibits diving, anchoring, discharging of ballast water and other like 
activities which are regulated.975 
The Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument is within the central Pacific 
Ocean from Wake Atoll in the Northwest to Jarvis Island in the Southeast. Under US 
jurisdiction they have been said to represent one of the most widespread collection of 
marine living resources protected area on the planet under a single state’s jurisdiction. 
Fisheries related activity seaward from the 12 nm refuge boundary out to the 50 nm in 
monument boundary are managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). This area is a refugia for fish and wildlife species that are 
being destroyed. These include pearl oysters, giant clams, and coconut crabs among 
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habitats for millions of marine living resources. This unique refugia was established by 
presidential proclamation.976  
 
This in line with the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) which obliges states to adopt 
MPAs to protect biodiversity as provided for in the CBD and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets.977 This is to be done through effective, equitably managed and well-connected 
systems of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures. 
Additionally, by 2020 the extinction of threatened species should have been prevented, 
their conservation status improved and sustained. Also, traditional knowledge and 
practices of indigenous communities that are relevant for conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity is to be promoted, as well as the full participation of local 
communities in such conservation at all levels.978 With these plans as a framework 
parties are to develop their own national targets using the Aichi Biodiversity Targets 
but with some flexibility depending on national priorities and capacities.979 
 
The Convention on Biodiversity has been ratified by all the states of the Gulf of Guinea. 
However apart from Ghana which has submitted its national report on these targets, 
none of the other states have been actively working at achieving these targets. 
 
976 Proclamation 8336 established the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument in 2009 and it 
was subsequently expanded in 2014 by presidential proclamation 9173 see NOAA Fisheries Pacific 
islands Fisheries Science Center) Presidential Document Federal Register Vol. 74 No.7 Monday January 
12 2009 
Proclamation 8336 of January 6, 2009 Establishment of the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National 
Monument 58646 Federal Register/ Vol.49, No.188/ Monday September 29 2014/ Presidential 
Document. 
977 It has been recognised that the protection of biodiversity is essential for the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals and therefore the parties to the Convention on Biodiversity, in 2010 in 
Nagoya, Japan adopted a ten-year plan specifically for biodiversity – the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 
2011-2020. This constitutes a framework for action by all countries and stakeholders to save biodiversity 
and under it, five strategic goals, were set which includes safeguarding ecosystems, species, and genetic 
diversity. According to the Strategic Goal C, by 2020, at least 10% of coastal and marine areas especially 
those of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystems services are to be conserved.                                                                            
978 Aichi Biodiversity Targets - Target 11 states that by 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and 
inland water, and 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively and equitably managed, 
ecologically representative and well connected systems of protected areas and other effective area-
based conservation measures, and integrated into the wider landscapes and seascapes. 
(Wedocs.unep.org, 2020) 
<https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/11106/swio_wg1_pre%20%285%29.pdf?sequ




Nevertheless the states are well aware of the importance of conserving the ecosystem 
and biodiversity especially mangroves which are important in the region’s fisheries 
management and conservation.980 These mangroves perform the important function of 
providing nursery and spawning areas for commercially important fish and shell fish 
species as well as providing ‘stopover’ sites for migratory species.981 Nigeria has over 
35% of the mangroves in the region especially in the Niger Delta area (about 9.7 million 
hectares) whilst Cameroon and Gabon have about 300,000 hectares each. There are also 
numerous deltas like the Volta River in Ghana that has a complex lagoon system 
surrounded by mangroves which are important to migrant fish.982 However, these 
mangroves are mostly polluted and degraded. In recognition of this, the legislation in 
the region make provision for their preservation.983 In 1995, Benin, Cameroon, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo participated in a project984 to adopt a common 
approach in solving the problems of marine environmental degradation.985 The project 
conducted a study on mangroves in the region. Using remote sensing and geographic 
information systems the study mapped out the actual area of the mangrove forests, 
determined the levels of degradation of the ecosystem and developed criteria for 
selection of potential sites for restoration.986 Various degrees of degradation, were 
identified in each country due to over-cutting to domestic and industrial pollution or 
combination of these  factors.987  
 
Since the study was conducted, there has been no clear-cut policies on MPAs as part of 
a fisheries conservation programme in the region. There are some coastal protected 
 
980UNIDO/UNDP/UNEP/GEF/NOAA. (2003). Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem Transboundary 
Diagnostic Analysis. Regional Project Coordinating Centre, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire 
981 Ivan Valiela, Jennifer Bowen, and Joanna York, ‘Mangrove Forests: One of the world’s Threatened 
Major Tropical Environments’ (2001) 51 Bioscience 807 at 811. 
982 Chika Ukwe and others, ‘Achieving a Paradigm Shift in Environmental and Living Resources 
Management in the Gulf of Guinea: The Large Marine Ecosystem Approach’ (2003) 47 Marine 
Pollution Bulletin 219 
983 ibid 
984This was a pilot project, named, ‘Water Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation in the Gulf 
of Guinea Large Marine Ecosystem’ See 'IW:LEARN | Projects - Water Pollution Control And 
Biodiversity Conservation In The Gulf Of Guinea Large Marine Ecosystem (GOGLME)' (Iwlearn.net, 
2020) <https://iwlearn.net/iw-projects/393> accessed 28 May 2020. 
985 ibid 
986 Chika Ukwe and others, ‘Achieving a Paradigm Shift in Environmental and Living Resources 
Management in the Gulf of Guinea: The Large Marine Ecosystem Approach’ (2003) 47 Marine 
Pollution Bulletin 219 –225  
987 'Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis' (GCLME 
Regional Coordinating Unit 2006) 13-14. 
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areas in the region but many of them do not have specified boundaries.988 In spite of the 
fact that the states have legislation providing for the establishment of MPAs, there are 
no known marine or coastal protected areas in some of the states namely, Benin, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Togo.989 For instance, Ghana’s law on fisheries makes provision for the 
Minister of Fisheries to declare any area of the fishery waters and the sea bed underlying 
the waters to be a marine reserve.990 There is however no evidence that this has been 
done. One challenge is that mangrove forest policies in the region are often located 
under forest and wildlife management policies and there is not enough emphasis on 
fisheries.991  
 
Across the region there is a paucity of legislation specifically targeted at MPAs.992 The 
legislation in the region shows the duplication of efforts in the institutions that have as 
part of their mandate to deal with mangroves. These are usually not resourced and do 
not always deliver on their wide mandates.993 The most notable effort in the areas of 
marine protected areas in the region is Gabon which has recently designated the largest 
network of marine protected zones which will protect 26% of the country’s seas and 
cover more than 50,000 square kilometres.994 This is in compliance with their Fisheries 
law.995 They did not need to pass any new law but simply enforced the existing law on 
fisheries which provided for the preservation of the breeding area of marine living 
 
988 ibid p. 42 
989 ibid 
990 Ghana Fisheries Act 2002, Act 625 Section 91 
991 For instance, in Cameroon under Law No. 94/01 of 20 January 1994 on Forestry and Wildlife 
Regulations Law no. 96/12 of 05 August 1996 on management of environmental resources; in Cote 
d’Ivoire by 1965 Loi n° 65-425 du 20 décembre 1965 portant Code Forestier. 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ivc2229.pdf (accessed 5 April 2019) and 1995. Loi n° 95-553 de 17 
Juillet 1995 portant Code Minier. (Mining Code; in French). http://www.droit-
afrique.com/images/textes/ Cote_d’Ivoire/RCI%20-%20Code%20minier.pdf (accessed 5 April 2019) 
and 1996a. Décret n° 96-634 du 09 August 1996 déterminant les modalités d'application de la loi du 18 
juillet, 1995 portant Code minier. (Decree on Implementing Regulation, Mining Code; in French). 
http:// www.cepici.gouv.ci/userfiles/file/DECRET_code_minieer.pdf (accessed 5 April 2019); in Ghana 
by The Forest and Wildlife Policy of 1994, Forest & Plantation Development Act of 2000 (Act 583), 
Timber Resource Management Act, 1997 (Act 547), Ghana Timber Resources Management 
Regulations, 1998  
992 Zebedee Feka, ‘Sustainable Management of Mangrove Forests in West Africa: A New Policy 
Perspective?’ (2015) 116 Ocean & Coastal Management 341 at 352. 
993 ibid 
994'Gabon Announces Vast Marine Protected Area Network at UN Ocean Conference > Newsroom' 
(Newsroom.wcs.org, 2017) <https://newsroom.wcs.org/News-
Releases/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/10114/Gabon-Announces-Vast-Marine-Protected-Area-




resources.996Scientist have called this the most sustainable fisheries management plan 
in the region which should be emulated by other states in the region.997 However, in the 
greater part of the region, the management of important habitats of fisheries like 
mangroves, has been neglected and inadequate legislation and policies are contributing 
factors to their rapid degradation. 
 
ii). Closed seasons for spawning  
Closed seasons to allow fishery to spawn is becoming a feature of the legislation in the 
region. Ghana is one of the countries that has such legislation. Under section 84 of the 
Fisheries Act, 2002 Act 625, the Fisheries Commission of Ghana may declare by 
gazette, closed seasons for fishing, including their duration. This is for fishing in 
specified areas of the coastal waters. In Nigeria also a commissioner of fisheries may at 
his discretion, declare as closed for fishing within the jurisdiction of a state, any area or 
season as he may deem fit under section 9 of the Inland Fisheries Act, of 28 December 
1992. Where resources are shared between two federal states in Nigeria, then it is the 
minister who may at his discretion declare a body of water shared by such two states as 
closed.998 Closed seasons for spawning is an important management tool especially to 
manage over exploited species. This due to the fact that all fish that survive until the 
start of the spawning period would likely be able to spawn and thus increase the size of 
the stock.999 However for closed seasons to make an impact on fisheries management, 
it must be based on scientific data in order for the law to regulate the process. For 
instance, they must reduce fishing of older fish stock that are most valuable in the 
reproductive process, to avoid the negative effects of fishing on spawning habitats.1000  
 
iii). Illegal, unregulated and Unreported fishing  
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is used in the literature as a broad 
term that captures a wide variety of fishing activity occurring both in the EEZ and on 
the high seas. It is often associated with organized crime and involves all aspects of the 
 
996 Gabon Code of Fisheries and Aquaculture Law No. 015/2005 
997Chris Symth and Quentin Hanich, 'Large Scale Marine Protected Areas Current Status and 
Consideration Of Socio-Economic Dimensions' (Pew Charitable Trusts 2019) 
<https://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4850&context=lhapapers> accessed 28 May 2020 
998 ibid 
999 Harriet Overzee and Adrian Rijnsdorp, ‘Effects of Fishing During the Spawning Period: 
Implications for Sustainable Management’ in Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, (Springer 
International Publishing Switzerland, 2014) 12 
1000 Ibid p. 14-15 
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capture and utilisation of fisheries.1001 Edeson1002 is of the view that the terms “illegal”, 
“unreported” and “unregulated” have not been used in a precise way but, used to 
identify in a general way the nature of a continuing problem in the area of fisheries. He 
was referring to the definition in the FAO’s International Plan of Action to Prevent, 
Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, (IPOA -IUU). This 
is a voluntary non-binding instrument, within the framework of the FAO Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. The instrument defines ‘illegal fishing’ as referring 
to activities conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under a state’s 
jurisdiction without its permission or in violation of its laws and regulations.1003 It also 
refers to fishing activities engaged in by vessels flying the flag of States parties to a 
regional fisheries management body but operating in violation to that organisation’s  
conservation and management measures or relevant provisions of the applicable 
international law. Included also are activities in violation of national laws or 
international obligations, including those undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant 
regional fisheries management organization. 
‘Unreported fishing’ has to do with not reporting or misreporting fisheries activities. 
This may be to the relevant national authority when undertaken within its jurisdiction 
or to an Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) when undertaken in its 
area of competence.1004 ‘Unregulated fishing’ is mainly conducted in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction and within the area of competence of a relevant RFMO by stateless 
vessels or vessels flying the flag of third states or by a fishing entity in a manner that 
contravenes the conservation and management measures of that organisation. 
RFMOs usually operate in the majority of high seas areas that have major deep-
sea fisheries. They are usually tasked with collecting fisheries statistics, assessing 
resources, making management decisions and monitoring activities. However, not all 
unregulated fishing is a violation of the relevant international law.1005  
 
 
1001FAO, Report of the Expert Workshop to Estimate the Magnitude of Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing Globally, Rome, 2–4 February 2015’ (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Report No. 
1106 Rome, 2015) 53  
1002 William Edeson, ‘Tools to Address IUU Fishing: The Current Legal Situation Document’ (FAO, 
2000) 13  
1003 FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO Rome, 1995) paras 3.1 and 3.1.1 
1004 Ibid  
1005 Ibid  
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IUU fishing anywhere it occurs undermines national and regional efforts to conserve 
and manage fisheries making it difficult or almost impossible to achieve the goals of 
long-term sustainability and responsibility. It threatens marine biodiversity and food 
security for communities that depend on fisheries for food and livelihood. In the Gulf 
of Guinea, it has put additional pressure on stocks that are already being fished at 
unsustainable levels, complicating stock management. While most IUU fishing is done 
by foreign industrial fleets (usually from Asian countries), vessels from the West 
African countries are also part of the problem as neighbouring countries often cross 
each other’s EEZs or venture inside the five nautical mile coastal zone reserved for 
artisanal fishing. 1006 It is thus a major contributory factor to the depletion of fish stocks.  
The IPOA-IUU referred to above, is a collective solution by states to combat the 
problem of IUU fishing. It applies to all states and entities and to all fishers. The 
measures emphasis the responsibilities of all states, flag State responsibilities, coastal 
State measures, port State measures, internationally agreed market-related measures, 
research and regional fisheries management organizations. The special requirements of 
developing countries are also considered.1007 Specifically the Agreement requires states 
parties to deny port access (landing, transhipping and processing of fish) and port 
services (refuelling, resupplying and repair) to foreign vessels which may have engaged 
in, or supported, IUU fishing. ‘Vessels’ are defined broadly to include both fishing 
vessels and support vessels (such as supply and freezer vessels). Even though Parties 
are required to apply the provisions of the Agreement to foreign-flagged vessels, they 
must also ensure that equally effective measures are in place regarding their own 
vessels.  
The IPOA stresses that the success of the implementation of the measures depends 
mainly on all States cooperating with other States, or indirectly through relevant 
regional fisheries management organizations or through FAO and other appropriate 
international organizations. There would also need to be close and effective 
coordination and consultation, and information sharing to reduce the incidence of IUU 
 
1006 Alfonso Daniels, and others,‘Western Africa’s Missing Fish: The Impacts of Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing and Under-Reporting Catches by Foreign Fleets’ June 2016.< 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10665.pdf> accessed 12 May 2020 
1007 FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 




fishing, among States and relevant regional and global organizations. States would also 
need to address the issue in their national legislation. These should contain appropriate 
deterrent sanctions.1008 
All the states in the region are parties to the Agreement and as part of their obligations 
they are to adopt within three years of ratification of the IPOA, national plans of action 
to further achieve the objectives of the IPOA and give full effect to its provisions as an 
integral part of their fisheries management programmes and budgets.1009 Ghana is one 
of the states that has developed its national plan of action in accordance with the terms 
of the Agreement.1010 It has also put into statute, powers that will enable the revocation 
of licenses for non-compliance. However, a number of gaps currently exist in Ghana’s 
fisheries legislation and management practices which require improvement to enable 
Ghana to adequately combat IUU fishing. These include the lack of specific legal 
measures to prevent, deter or eliminate IUU fishing activities committed by vessels 
flying the flag of Ghana, fisheries management and monitoring, control and surveillance 
(MCS). The main challenge as with the other countries in the region that have similar 
legislation is implementation.  
Another Agreement dealing with IUU fishing is the Agreement on Port State Measures 
(PSMA) which is the first binding international agreement to specifically target illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Its objective is to prevent, deter and 
eliminate IUU fishing by preventing vessels engaged in IUU fishing from using ports 
and landing their catches. The provisions of the PSMA apply to fishing vessels seeking 
entry into a designated port of a State which is different to their flag State. The 
Agreement further requires parties to designate the ports which may be accessed by 
foreign- flagged fishing vessels. These vessels are required to request permission for 
port access ahead of time and transmit information on their activities and the fish they 
have on board. This will give port State authorities an opportunity to identify in advance 
vessels of potential concern. The Agreement commits parties to conduct regular 
inspections of vessels accessing their ports and outlines a set of standards that will be 




1010Ghana National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (May 2014) 
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gear, examining catches and checking a ship's records to reveal if it has engaged in IUU 
fishing. All vessels may be subject to inspection by port States under the proposed 
Agreement, and States are required to take follow-up action in response to any 
inspection reports indicating that a vessel flying their flag has engaged in IUU fishing. 
Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe and Togo are the only states in the region that 
are parties to the Agreement.’ The implementation of these measure all over the region 
is rather weak.1011 
 
iv). Bycatches 
In the region large amounts of bycatches are made both shore wards and offshore of the 
continental shelf at considerable distances from fishing ports where fish is landed.1012 
Fisheries bycatches result when fish which is not the target of fishers is accidentally 
caught during fishing expeditions.1013 This is a key threat to especially cetacean species 
in the Gulf of Guinea like dolphins, marine turtles and sea birds. Some of the states in 
the region like Ghana have provisions in their legislation on incidental catches. 
Regulation 31 of the Ghana Fisheries Regulation prohibits the taking of gravid 
(pregnant) lobsters, crustacea as well as juvenile fish during fishing.1014 Any such fish 
accidentally caught is to be returned to the sea immediately.1015 This is to ensure 
sustainability of the fish stocks. This also applies to sea mammals which have long 
lifespans and low rates of reproduction.1016 Other legislation prohibit the taking or 
offering for sale, lobsters or crabs less than 7 cm or 6 cm respectively as well as any 
berried crab or lobster 1017 caught by whatever means to be returned to the waters.1018 
Further, to avoid accidentally catching rare sea turtles, the Ghanaian Fisheries 
regulation makes provision for shrimp fishers to use  a Turtle Excluder Device and to 
 
1011 Tanga Biang, ‘The Joint Development Zone Between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe: 
A Case of Provisional Arrangement in the Gulf of Guinea International Law, State Practice And 
Prospects for Regional Integration’ The United Nations – The Nippon Foundation of Japan Fellowship 
Programme 2009-2010 
1012 Rikas K., ‘An overview of fisheries and sea turtle bycatch along the Atlantic coast of Africa.’ 
(2013) 1 Munibe Monographs Nature Series 71-82 
1013 ibid 
1014 Fisheries Act, 2002 Act 625 Section 89  
1015 Ibid 
1016 Ibid 
1017 Berried crabs are crabs carrying eggs see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/berried 




immediately release any turtle caught accidentally.1019However, IUU fishers do not 
have regard to these laws and fisheries management plans regarding these categories of 
fish and thereby pose the greatest danger for sustainability. This state of affairs has been 
blamed on “weak governance system, corrupt practices by fisheries’ officials, lack of 
cooperation between countries across the region and a perceived sense of lack of 
maritime domain awareness.”1020 
The challenges discussed above stem from the fact that the states lack effective 
mechanisms for fisheries monitoring, surveillance, control and enforcement to ensure 
compliance with their conservation and management measures  as well as those adopted 
by sub regional or regional organizations or arrangements.1021 The FAO Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fishing, requires states to have such mechanisms.1022  
Monitoring is used to measure the capacity of fishing fleet.1023 Control deals with 
regulatory conditions contained in national fisheries laws, as well as other provisions 
agreed at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, under which the fishery 
resources may be exploited.1024 Surveillance concerns the regulation and monitoring of 
fishing activities to ensure that national legislation, the terms and conditions of access 
to fishing, and management measures are enforced. The MCS system involves 
regulatory measures for access to fishery resources, the obligation to provide 
information on fishing activities, the boarding of observers and seafarers, the control 
and monitoring of transhipments, the register of fishing vessels, the marking of vessels, 
the strengthening of fisheries research and the declaration of entry and exit from the 
waters under national jurisdiction.1025  
Some of the states in the region have in their legislation made provision for all the 
above. Some have had to review their laws or make new ones to bring them in 
 
1019 Regulation 16 of the Ghana Fisheries regulation. 
1020 Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwoo, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for countries in the Gulf of Guinea,’ (2019) 99 Marine 
Policy 414-422. 
1021 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries Article 7.1.7 
1022 ibid 
1023 Ibid Article 7.6.3 
1024 Erik Bergh and Sandy Davies, ‘Fishery Monitoring, Control and Surveillance’ in Kevern Cochrane 
(ed), A Fishery Manager's Guidebook - Management Measures and Their Application, (FAO 2002) 424  
1025 For instance, Equatorial Guinea as part of its MCS obligation passed a law in 2004 regulating 
fishing activities in its waters and adopted a national plan of surveillance of fisheries activities. In Togo 
the MCS system can be found in its law of 1998. 
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compliance with UNCLOS and the FAO Code of Conduct.1026 Most of the legislation 
make provision for inspection and boarding of any foreign fishing vessels for the 
purpose of ensuring compliance with national laws.1027  Powers are accorded to 
authorised officials by their fishery or other laws to inspect vessels to determine whether 
offences have been committed, to stop and board vessels, make arrests and detain them 
in their ports on suspicion of an offence having been committed.1028 In such a case, the 
laws make the presumption that all fish on board have been caught illegally. What is 
done with these seizures varies in the countries. In Cameroon the law allows for the sale 
of the catch and holding of the proceeds pending trial.1029 Some other countries allow 
release of the vessel on payment of a bond or other security pending judgment of a 
court.1030 Some legislation empowers the court to order the confiscation of the vessel, 
fishing gear and the catch taken as the Ghanaian and Nigerian provisions have.1031  The 
states have penalties for illegal fishing involving foreign vessels  and local fleet and 
these are specified in foreign currency for foreign vessels and local currency for local 
fleet.1032 Ghana law has a noteworthy provision which rewards any Ghanaian registered 
vessel for reporting the sighting of an apparently unlicensed or unregistered vessel 
fishing in the EEZ of Ghana if such a sighting leads to arrest prosecution and conviction 
of illegal fishers.1033 However the literature does not show that this law has made any 
meaningful impact on fisheries management.  
 
4.6. The way forward – Proposals for the effective conservation and management 
of living marine resources in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
The solution to the kind of challenges encountered in the Gulf of Guinea region 
regarding fisheries conservation and management, should be looked at from two 
perspectives- within national legal framework and within the regional cooperative 
 
1026 Gabon is one such country in the region that has recently revised its fisheries legislation with a 
significant component of the MCS. Others Benin and Côte d’Ivoire drafted new laws. In Gabon MCS 
policy is implemented by the Directorate General of fisheries and its technical services. 
1027 Fisheries Regulation of Ghana Section 37  
1028 FAO, ‘Regional Compendium of West African Fisheries’ (CECAF Region)’ p.11 
1029 Ordinance 63-72 dated 29 August 1972 Article 7 of 
1030 FAO, ‘Regional Compendium of West African Fisheries (CECAF Region)’ p.11 
1031 Ghana Fisheries Act, 2002 Act 625, Nigeria Sea Fisheries Act, [1992 No. 71] Section 10  
1032 FAO, ‘Regional Compendium of West African Fisheries (CECAF Region)’ 
1033 Ghana Fisheries Regulations 2010 (L.I 1968) Section 34  
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framework.  This is important as the national legal framework is important for the 
successful implementation of the regional framework which is indispensable to 
conservation and management of the fisheries as a shared resource. This section 
attempts to proffer solutions to the challenges of the national regulatory framework and 
those associated with the regional regulatory framework. 
 
I. Proposals regarding challenges with national regulatory frameworks for 
fisheries conservation and management in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
i). Harmonisation of national laws 
Harmonisation of the national fisheries laws and regulations in the region is a 
prerequisite for the effective conservation and management of the marine living 
resources of the region. It would be counterproductive if the efforts of some of the states 
in conservation and management is undermined by the lack of regulation by other states 
in the region. Harmonisation is needed in the area of sharing fisheries data specifically 
data on fleet, industrial fish landings and gear. It is also important that all the states have 
similar laws on fisheries conservation measures. In this regard pair trawling should be 
banned by the laws of all the countries. Laws on transhipment at sea is also another area 
of harmonisation states should consider. Trawl cod-end and mesh sizes should be 
harmonised to conserve fisheries. This harmonisation should be done through the 
establishment of regional instruments. Even though this has been on the agenda of the 
regional organisations discussed above, the states have not taken steps to pursue such 
harmonisation perhaps due to lack of commitment to these organisations.  
Harmonisation is indispensable for countries sharing the same stocks, not only for 
substantive conservation and management measures, but also in the case of methods of 
implementation and enforcement. The penalty regimes should also be harmonised to 
prevent illegal fishers from operating in areas with the lowest penalties as well as laws 
requiring vessel monitoring systems to be installed on fishing vessels. If sub-regional 
surveillance and enforcement schemes are adopted, it would be advisable to harmonise 
enforcement and reporting procedures and powers as well.  
The states of the region themselves must also collectively have laws that prohibit IUU 
fishing or support for it by their nationals. They must comply with IPOA-IUU which 
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requires states to ensure that their nationals do not support or engage in IUU fishing.1034 
Sometimes nationals of member states are masters and crew of vessels which trade in 
illegally caught fish. These have to be dealt with by states adopting similar laws and 
also by the RFMO ensuring that its members take appropriate action. State action can 
be informed by the example of the USA’s Lacey Act which makes it unlawful for any 
person to “import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase ... any fish or 
wildlife taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of any law or regulation of 
any State or in violation of any foreign law”.1035 This law was used to prosecute many 
cases of illegal trade in fish in violation of the laws of some pacific island states.1036 In 
the region few states have  such laws. Ghana’s Fisheries law for example gives the 
police the power to deal with offences concerning illegally caught fish. However, the 
provision is not as comprehensive as the USA one and not as effective.1037 If all the 
states in the region have similar legislation, it would be difficult for offenders to slip 
through. In the case of foreign fishing activities, it will no doubt be seen as desirable to 
harmonise regulatory policies and regulations on a regional and sub-regional level, both 
in the interests of the coastal countries, with a view to easier enforcement.  
Harmonisation of legislation is always a delicate matter insofar as it affects the exercise 
of sovereign rights of states. Nevertheless, due to recent changes in the law of the sea, 
it is apparent that several coastal states of the area have decided to make changes in 
their legislation, to deal with issues of enforcement among other emerging issues in 
fisheries management. The time seems particularly favourable for harmonisation 
efforts. The CECAF Project and the Regional Fishery Law Advisory Programme 
(CECAF region) are ready-to offer their assistance to those states in the area who make 
such a request.  
 
ii). Laws on marine protected areas (MPAs)  
 
1034 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing  
(FAO Rome, 2001) para 18,19 
1035 Lacey Act 18 USC 42-43 16 USC 3371-3378  
1036 Michael Lodge and others, ‘Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations: Report of an independent panel to develop a model for improved governance by 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’ (Chatham House 2007) 65. 
1037 Section 96 of the Ghana Fisheries Act. 
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As already discussed, even though UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement reserves 
to coastal states, the right to exploit and conserve the marine living resources, states are 
to cooperate in their protection. With respect to highly migratory and straddling fish 
stocks, UNFSA Article 7.3 provides that, “In giving effect to their duty to cooperate, 
States shall make every effort to agree on compatible conservation and management 
measures within a reasonable period of time.” UNFSA Article 7.4 further provides that 
“If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, any of the States 
concerned may invoke the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided for in Part 
VIII.” In determining compatible conservation and management measures, under 
UNFSA Article 7.4. States are among others to take into account the biological unity 
and other biological characteristics of the stocks, the respective dependence of the 
coastal States and States fishing the stocks concerned on the high seas and ensure that 
measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine resources as a whole. 
Additionally, Article 8 of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) provides for the 
establishment of protected areas where special measures need to be taken to conserve 
biological diversity. 
To fulfil the above obligation depends on the appropriate planning and management of 
fishing activities, within states EEZ and areas beyond. Area-based management tools 
(ABMTs), such as marine protected areas, and fisheries closures, have been recognized 
as effective management tools to ensure the sustainability of fish stocks.1038 The Pacific 
Remote Islands Marine National Monument discussed above is a good example of 
conservation and management that has an ecosystem approach that is exemplary. The 
states in the region need to have an approach that reserves some of the resources in such 
no-take zone even though they need to exploit the fisheries today, there is room to 
protect a part of it for future generations and to avoid a complete extinction of some 
species and others not yet discovered. Legislation in this direction would be important.  
In the GOG region, studies have already been conducted on where the mangroves, and 
other such areas that need protection are.1039 All that is left is for the states to collectively 
 
1038 Area-Based Management - Ocean Governance for Sustainability' (Ocean Governance for 
Sustainability, 2020) <https://www.oceangov.eu/working_groups/area-based-management/> accessed 
28 May 2020. 
1039 Chidi Ibe and Kenneth Sherman, ‘Gulf of Guinea Large Marine ecosystem Project: Turning 
Challenges into Achievements’ in Jacqueline Mc Glade and others, The Gulf of Guinea Large Marine 
Ecosystem (Elsevier Science 2002) 33. 
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decide that they would set them up if their laws provide for it. If not, they need to pass 
laws that allow for the setting up of such areas to conserve and manage the living 
resources. It would also be necessary to not only to clearly define the agency responsible 
for mangrove or other marine protected area management and enforcement, but to also 
engage them in the strategic planning stage of the process.  
The Gulf of Guinea needs to develop MPAs as a tool for conservation and management 
of living marine resources by making a deliberate effort to establish these MPAs by law 
in a coordinated fashion both at the national and regional levels. Nationally the states 
need to have management plans for marine protected areas. The MPAs should be 
identified and properly demarcated like US and UK areas discussed above. If possible 
or if there is the need for it some can be designated no -take reserves as part of the 
general plan for an ecosystem approach to management. Special attention needs to be 
given in the law to the criteria for designating a site as an MPA like the fact that it is a 
breeding ground or is on the migratory path of certain species. It would also be 
necessary to give the MPAs their own specific legal identity and designate a particular 
national body responsible for overseeing their management. This body should be 
coordinated with the body overseeing fisheries resources and managed in an integrated 
way.  
It is also important that the fisherfolk be involved in the creation and management of 
MPAs to ensure success. In this regard, it would be beneficial for the GOG to look to 
the examples of  Tanzania and Kenya respectively where Collaborative Fisheries 
Management Areas (CFMAs) or Community Conservation Areas (CCAs) are an 
emerging approach to fisheries management and marine conservation.1040 This 
approach was inspired by the concept of Locally Managed Marine Areas (LMMAs) that 
has developed in the Pacific. This is unique because these two states took the concept 
and adapted it to their needs. In Kenya the CCAs and in Tanzania the CFMAs connect 
a network of villages which co-operate through their Beach Management Units 
(BMUs).1041 They identify a shared management area, develop and implement a 
management plan and set of bylaws to improve fisheries sustainability and reef 
 
1040 Steve Rocliffe and others, ‘Towards A Network of Locally Managed Marine Areas (LMMAs) in 





conservation. They used a combination of management tools like permanent, temporary 
or seasonal closures thereby combining spatial management with other fisheries 
management.1042 This kind of cooperation is necessary for the states in the GOG region 
so as to ensure that they establish an ecologically coherent network of well-
managed Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) as envisaged under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity to which all the states in the region are parties.1043 The states should 
have identical laws on MPAs in the region and eventually network them and create a 
regional management agency for supervising the management of all the MPAs in the 
region. 
A critical component in conservation through the establishment of MPAs is the 
establishment of a regular source of funding and this should be explored. The 
Convention on Biological Diversity provides that states “cooperate in providing 
financial and other support for in-situ conservation outlined in subparagraphs (a) to (1) 
above, particularly to developing countries.”1044 The GOG may not have to wait for 
external support. They can find creative ways to ensure funding. Suggestions could be 
a trust fund for MPAs. The oil and gas sector could be charged to pay into this fund. 
This is because they are stakeholders as they use the oceans for exploitation of oil and 
gas and this has an effect on fisheries Additionally, fishing licenses fees could also be 
put into the fund.  
 
iii). Integrating informal traditional community management rules on 
conservation and management of fisheries into the formal legal framework  
In most of the Gulf of Guinea, there are informal traditional community management 
rules on conservation and management of fisheries.1045 The states in the region usually 
have customary laws that regulate small scale fisheries in the lagoons, rivers and 
estuaries. Ghana, Benin, Togo and Cote d’Ivoire are examples. These customary law 
rules refer to conservation practices such as closed seasons or times around the 
 
1042 ibid 
1043Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entry into force 29 December 1993) 1760 
UNTS 79 (CBD) art 8  
1044 Ibid Article 8 (m). 
1045 Benedict Satia and Alhaji Jallow, ‘West African Coastal Capture Fisheries,’ in Ray Hilborn, Dale 
Squires, Meryl Williams, Maree Tait (eds), Handbook of Marine Fisheries Conservation and 
Management (Oxford University Press 2010) 262 
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spawning times of the fishes. During that time the fishers concentrate on other jobs like 
farming and repairing their nets. The main feature of the customary rules of 
management is that it is communal based, and a group of people manage the resources 
on behalf of the whole community.1046  
These customary rules and practices also include the prohibition of the capture of 
immature or juvenile fish, restriction of the use of particular fishing gear for example 
monofilament nets, and prohibition of fishing in some areas considered sacred or 
identified as spawning breeding or nursery grounds. There is also the observance of a 
non-fishing day each week which permits fishers to maintain their gear and equipment 
as well as to  rest and undertake social activities. Also included are a total ban on fishing 
activities for various periods prior to and during annual festivals, ban on the capture of 
certain species for a period before certain festivals prohibition of the use of chemicals 
as a means of catching fish, prohibition of the use of magical power in harvesting fish, 
taboos against eating certain fish species, closed seasons, offering certain fish species a 
relatively protected environment for breeding spawning and feeding.1047 
In most of the states in the region, the artisanal fishers do not see themselves as part of 
the fishers to be regulated and thus one way to enlist their cooperation is to improve 
management at the community level. In this regard the example of Ghana is pertinent. 
There has over the years been established unique Community-Based Fisheries 
Management Committees, that act as the linking mechanism between the traditional and 
the modern system.1048 The Committees have constitutions which obligate them to 
ensure adherence to fisheries laws and develop a management plan for sustainable 
exploitation of fisheries resources among others. The committees are to draw up a list 
of by-laws governing fishing activity on their beaches and landing sites and submitting 
them to their local government structures for ratification.1049 The by-laws usually 
contain sections on conservation of the fish stock, sanitation, restriction of children in 




1048 UK Department for International Development, ‘Analytical Appendix 2, The Challenges of 
managing small scale fisheries in West Africa’ (Final Technical Report, Analytical the DFID regarding 




sea.1050 These by-laws are a reflection of the traditional rules in use in the community 
and thus formalising them provides them with the necessary legitimacy.1051 The states 
in the region can emulate this and eventually these community based bodies can 
cooperate for a more efficient management especially of artisanal fishing. 
 
II. Proposals for effective regional cooperation in the conservation and 
management of fisheries resources 
To solve the challenges of fisheries conservation and management in the region it would 
necessitate a change in the approach from that which has been used hitherto. It is 
commendable to note that, there has been a gradual support in the region for the 
approach of large marine ecosystems (LME) as a tool to manage marine living 
resources. Currently the Committee of Ministers of the Guinea Current LME project 
have decided to create an Interim Guinea Current Commission within the framework of 
the Abidjan Convention, to serve as the legal framework for this ecosystem 
approach.1052The parties are currently in the process of making this Interim Commission 
permanent. This Commission is envisaged as the implementation vehicle for the 
strategic actions identified to solve the transboundary challenges of fisheries 
management in the region.1053  Meanwhile the Regional Fisheries Bodies and Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisation discussed in the last section operate in the GCLME 
without any reference to the Interim Commission. Nevertheless, it is possible that the 
Commission when fully formed may well hold the key to the effective management of 
the living resources of the region as discussed below.  
 
III. Proposals for the proliferation of RFMOs and RFBs leading to duplication of 
efforts and resources 
 
There are several fisheries organisations operating in the region with overlapping 
mandates to which the states in the region belong, but which have not been effective. 




1052 First meeting of the Committee of West and Central African Ministers of the Guinea Current Large 
Marine Ecosystem Project: The Abuja Declaration 22nd September 2006. 
1053 'Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis' (GCLME 
Regional Coordinating Unit 2006) 76  
213 
 
regulatory power to manage fisheries in the region using the ecosystem approach as a 
management tool. It also needs to have the power to make binding decisions. This is 
especially so as there is only one RFMO in the region – ICCAT-and this manages only 
one species of fish stock-tuna. 
 
Currently, the Interim Guinea Current Commission appears to have the potential to be 
transformed into a formidable RFMO due to several attributes it intrinsically possesses. 
One is that all the states in the Gulf of Guinea were one way or the other participants in 
the projects that finally culminated in its creation. Another is the fact that a great deal 
of work has already been done in identifying the challenges of fisheries management in 
the region and its causes as well as the strategic actions that are necessary to remedy 
these challenges. The foundation has therefore been built for a Fisheries Management 
body which has an ecosystem focus and involves all the states in the region. The only 
outstanding action is the political will of the states to take ownership of it, provide 
funding for its running and make it work to solve the fisheries management problems 
of the region.  
 
The first step in this process is to properly set it up by law. Currently the legal documents 
on the transition of the Interim Guinea Current Commission to the Guinea Current 
Commission have been drafted. These comprise of the draft Founding Treaty, Financial 
Regulations, Headquarters Agreement, Rules of procedure as well as a Draft 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Abidjan Convention. The Draft Treaty on the 
Establishment of the Guinea Current Commission1054 sets out the Commission’s 
mandate as follows: 
“(a) Providing the institutional framework for the integrated assessment, 
protection and sustainable use of the marine and coastal environmental and 
living resources of the Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem;  
(b)  Capacity building for the effective implementation of the Abidjan 
Convention and its Protocol, of the Accra Declaration of 1998 and of the Abuja 
Declaration of 2006; (c) Serving as a platform for the execution of the NEPAD 
 
1054 See Draft Treaty on the Establishment of the Guinea Current Commission Interim Guinea Current 
Commission, (Seventh Regional Steering Committee Meeting 30th June -1st July 2010) 
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plan of action concerning the protection and sustainable use of the coastal and 
marine resource systems of the Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem, 
thereby contributing to the regional realization of the objectives of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development;  
(d)  Enhancing the capacity of the Guinea Current coastal countries for the 
assessment and monitoring of environmental change, resource depletion and for 
the sustainable use of the shared trans-boundary resource systems;  
(e)  Adopting and implementing regional and sub-regional strategic 
development and resource use plans based on the integration of the pluri- 
sectoral interdependencies of land-, water- and marine resource systems at 
national and regional levels in the Guinea Current coastal region;  
(f)  Enhancing the capacity for effective trans-boundary cooperation in the 
prevention of and response to natural and man-made disasters affecting the 
Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem;  
(g)  Fostering the cooperation of the Commission and its members with regional 
and international institutions of technical cooperation, providing for their 
participation in appropriate programmes of deliberation and in the 
implementation of national and regional activities in the Guinea Current Large 
Marine Ecosystem;  
(h)  Promoting and assuring the coherence and harmonization of sectoral and 
inter-sectoral national policies of development and sustainable use of marine 
and related natural resources, including with regard to the required legal and 
other normative instruments;  
(i)  Developing and promoting a regional data processing, information and 
communication system provided to state and non-state partners including the 




(j)  Establishing and further developing close cooperation with African and 
other international organizations engaged in the sustainable use of marine and 
coastal resource systems.”1055  
 
These mandates envisage that the marine resources of the region would be viewed in 
relation to the ecosystem as a whole. It also addresses one of the challenges of the lack 
of capacity in the region for assessing stocks. Judging from the various projects and 
surveys on fisheries that have been implemented, the region has experience in this 
regard, and this would only be a continuation of what is already underway. With regard 
to its mandate of fostering cooperation of the Commission and its members with 
regional and international institutions of technical cooperation, the LME projects 
already has experience of working with these technical partners and so this mandate 
also would not pose too much of a challenge. The Commission also envisages its role 
in the harmonisation of regulations and policies in the region, on fisheries.1056   
 
An important part of its mandate which is not emphasised in the other organisations is 
the dissemination of information on fisheries management to the citizenry in the 
region.1057 This is more likely to contribute to the success of management programmes 
as citizens being more knowledgeable would be more likely to obey fisheries laws and 
regulations. Cooperation is also further emphasised as it also has the mandate of 
establishing and further developing close cooperation with African and other 
international organizations engaged in the sustainable use of marine and coastal 
resource systems. This may include other fisheries management organisations and 
bodies as well as other regional organisations with a concern for fisheries like the 
African Union (AU-IBAR) and ECOWAS. It includes the other LMEs in close 
proximity with the region namely the Benguela and Canary Current LMEs. 
Nevertheless, the proposed Commission’s mandates appear too general and lack the 
necessary focus to deal with the challenges that necessitated its creation in the first 
 
1055 Interim Guinea Current Commission Seventh Regional Steering Committee Meeting Accra, Ghana, 
30th June- 1st July 2010 Annex 6: Draft Legal Documents on the Transition of IGCC To GCC Co-
operation in the Protection and Development of the Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem Treaty on 
the Establishment of the Guinea Current Commission  
1056 ibid 
1057 Draft Treaty on the Establishment of the Guinea Current Commission art 2 
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place. As discussed above the Commission was the culmination of many GOG projects 
and was envisaged to be the vehicle to implement the strategic action plan to solve the 
challenges of the region regarding the depletion of fish stocks, habitat destruction and 
lack of enforcement of fisheries regulations. This can be seen when its mandates are 
compared with that of the Benguela Current Commission whose mandates are more 
specific and include, a provision for states to agree on setting harvest levels and sharing 
arrangements concerning transboundary fishery resources.1058 It also includes 
promoting collaboration on monitoring, control and surveillance, including joint 
activities in the Southern African Development Community region. The Treaty of the 
proposed Commission would benefit from similar provisions as these are the gaps in 
conservation and management of fisheries in the region. 
Another RFMO, the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas 
Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean is worthy of emulation. It has a section 
on procedures for the establishment and implementation of a total allowable catch or 
total allowable fishing effort for a straddling fishery resource when applied throughout 
its range.1059 To facilitate this the Convention makes provision for a Scientific 
Committee which assesses the status of the straddling resource throughout its range and 
provides advice to the Commission on setting a total allowable catch.1060 The IGCC 
could also emulate this so as to be able to set TACs in the region. To monitor that these 
quotas are being adhered to by fishers, the IGCC can have an observer programme like 
the one  in the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery 
Resources in the South Pacific Ocean.1061 Under that Convention, the observer 
programme has independent and impartial observers that are sourced from programmes 
or service providers accredited by the Commission.1062 The Convention provides for the 
programme to be coordinated, to the maximum extent possible, with other regional, sub-
 
1058 The Benguela Current Convention between the Government of the Republic of Angola and the 
Government of the Republic of Namibia and the Government of South Africa (adopted 18 March 2013 
)  art 8 (e) Benguela Current Convention | International Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database 
Project' (Iea.uoregon.edu, 2020) <https://iea.uoregon.edu/treaty-text/2013-benguelacurrententxt> 
accessed 28 May 2020. 
 
1059 Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South 
Pacific Ocean Article (adopted 14 November 2009, entered into force 24 August 2012) 'South Pacific 
Regional Management Organisation' (Sprfmo.int, 2020) <http://www.sprfmo.int/about/docs/article-36-
ratification/> accessed 28 May 2020 Annex III 
1060 ibid 




regional and national observer programmes.1063 If this provision is included in the IGCC 
draft Treaty, it would be important for ensuring compliance with quotas and preventing 
bycatch in the region. 
The draft treaty makes provision for a platform for fisheries which appears to be a 
platform to bring together other fisheries organisations and bodies namely: (a) the 
Atlantic Africa Fisheries Conference,(AAFC) (b) the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, (ICCAT)  (c) the Fishery Committee for the Eastern 
Central Atlantic,(FCECA) (d) the Fishery Committee of the West Central Gulf of 
Guinea,(FCWC) (e) the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries Organization, and (f) the Sub-
regional Fisheries Commission. This according to the draft treaty is to contribute to 
regional and sub-regional policies and programmes of action related to the exploitation 
of fishery and other marine resources by providing an international and inter-
institutional deliberative forum for the exchange of information and experience and for 
addressing policy and operational challenges with regard to fishery and marine 
resources faced by the Contracting Parties of the Commission, other regional economic 
and resource-related organizations and by the various sub-regional bodies dealing with 
fisheries. 1064  
Generally, the platform’s main role is to enhance the capacity of the member states in 
priority areas like stock assessment and fisheries management.1065 It is also to carry out 
regular regional assessment surveys for data on fisheries which would provide the 
scientific basis for management decisions on fisheries as  well as keeping under 
permanent review the state of exploitation of the fisheries resources of the region. The 
Platform also has the role of promoting, and coordinating research focused at the 
conservation of marine and coastal living resources and drawing up programmes 
required for this purpose.1066 Additionally, it is to establish the scientific basis for 
regulatory measures leading to the conservation and management of marine living 
resources. This is by formulating such measures through subsidiary bodies, as required, 
making appropriate recommendations for the adoption and implementation of these 
 
1063 Ibid 
1064 Draft Treaty on the GCC art 10  
1065 Draft Treaty on the GCC Article 2(i)  
1066 Draft Guinea Current Commission Rules of Procedure Rule 19  
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measures and providing advice for the adoption of regulatory measures by member 
Governments, or sub-regional arrangements, as appropriate.1067 
An important aspect of the draft Treaty is that it establishes a Council of Ministers with 
the power to make legally binding decisions with respect to any matter within the 
competence of the Commission and make recommendations to the Contracting Parties 
concerning such instruments which are binding.1068 This is commendable, but the states 
might well look to the example of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisation (SPRFMO) for the development of their conservation and management 
measures (CMM). These define the regulatory framework for the SPRFMO fisheries in 
the High Seas areas of the South Pacific Ocean and are regularly revised. 1069 These 
measures to be effective must be binding on the parties. The SPRFMO has in place 
twenty binding CMMs, detailing various provisions such as the application of technical 
measures or output and input controls, requirements for data collection and reporting, 
as well as regulations for monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement.1070 
Regarding the issue of avoiding duplicity and overlapping functions, it is proposed that 
since the members of the FCWC and COREP together make up the parties of the Interim 
Guinea Current Commission, and their mandates are similar to the proposed GCC, it 
would be more efficient to merge these bodies with the Commission and use their 
already established  capacities to the advantage of the Commission. For instance, the 
West Africa Task Force set up under FCWC for monitoring can be brought under the 
Commission for more effective monitoring, control and surveillance activities. Thus, 
instead of them participating in the platform on fisheries and having only an advisory 
capacity they can have a more useful role. The resources of these bodies can then be put 
at the disposal of the Commission and by so doing avoid duplicity and the need to 
resources too many organisations dealing with the same issues. This approach may 
depend heavily on the political will of states for its successful implementation. This will 
require some negotiation between these organisations which in turn would need 
additional funding. The states in pursuing this objective can assess support from the 
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Assistance fund set up under the Fish stocks Agreement and administered by FAO.1071 
This fund is for ongoing and future negotiations to establish new related organisations 
and renegotiating founding agreements among others.1072 The problem is the fund lacks 
visibility and the procedure to access it is also complex.1073 
On the important issue of financing the proposed GCC, the draft Financial 
Regulations1074 provide that the scale of contributions shall be based on four basic 
criteria: (a)  Size and proportional share of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of a 
Party in relation to the total EEZ of the entire GCLME; (b)  Size and proportional share 
of the population of each Party; (c)  Level of GNP of each Party and its proportional 
share of the gross regional product of the Parties;(d) The Principle of “sovereign 
equality” which allocates to each sovereign state an equal set of rights and 
obligations;1075 A few safeguards have been put in to ensure the payment of 
contributions by members. Thus, if a member state is twenty- four months in arrears 
with its contributions it would not be entitled to vote unless it has not paid up due to 
circumstances beyond its control.1076 The Commission is to be financed by 
contributions from its members as well as voluntary contributions from donors  It is 
envisaged that the full responsibility for the budget of the commission would be 
incrementally transferred to the member states.1077 So far funding for the projects 
leading up to the setting up of the interim commission have been provided by GEF and 
other development partners. It is envisaged that this would continue at least for a period, 
as the Financial regulations make provision for payments received by the Commission 
from international programmes and organisations under the transitional scheme of 
contributions to be deposited and managed by the Commission in a trust fund.1078 
 
 
1071 Agreement Fish stocks Assistance fund part VII  
1072 ibid 
1073 Michael Lodge and others, ‘Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations: Report of an independent panel to develop a model for improved governance by 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’ (Chatham House 2007) 98 
1074 Draft Financial Regulations of the GCC art 6  
1075 ibid 
1076 Guinea Current Commission Rules of procedure Rule 16  
1077 Draft Financial Regulations of the GCC art 8  
1078 Draft Financial Regulations of the GCC art 9  
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IV. Proposals to combat lack of compliance and enforcement 
Achieving long term sustainability of fisheries resources depends to a large extent on 
member states implementing measures agreed by regional fisheries management 
organisations. Commendably ICCAT has put in place measures for conservation and 
management albeit those measures concern tuna and tuna like species. For any 
organisation set up by the states they would have to have similar measures. However, 
the problem that has plagued ICCAT – that of non-compliance-should be avoided 
especially if IUU fishing is to be avoided. In this regard the proposed Commission could 
emulate the example of the SPRFMO, which provides for identifying vessels engaging 
in IUU fishing activities, and adopting appropriate measures to prevent, deter and 
eliminate IUU fishing, such as the development of an IUU vessels list, so that owners 
and operators of vessels engaging in such activities are deprived of the benefits accruing 
from those activities.1079 
Regarding compliance it would be prudent to regularly review the performance of the 
states in complying with measures of the proposed Commission. The examples of 
NAFO, CCAMLR and WCPFC are important. These have developed systems for 
evaluating compliance.1080  Additionally, states can agree on the kind of sanctions to be 
applied if there is any wilful non-compliance by a member state detected. In this regard 
the example of SPRFMO is important. The Convention contains a bold provision that 
provides for sanctions to be applied to discourage violations and deprive offenders of 
the benefits from illegal activities.1081 
V. Cooperative non-members 
One way is to bring on board non-members who are cooperative and give them certain 
rights that bring them benefits to encourage positive action. The example of the WCPFC 
and the SEAFO Convention are instructive. Both these conventions provide that, 
 
1079 Ibid Article 27 (f) 
1080 Lacey Act 18 USC 42-43 16 USC 3371-3378  
1080 Michael Lodge and others, ‘Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations: Report of an independent panel to develop a model for improved governance by 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’ (Chatham House 2007) 49. 
1081 Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South 
Pacific Ocean Article (adopted 14 November 2009, entered into force 24 August 2012) 'South Pacific 
Regional Management Organisation' (Sprfmo.int, 2020) <http://www.sprfmo.int/about/docs/article-36-
ratification/> accessed 28 May 2020 art 3 (ix) 
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cooperating members “shall enjoy benefits from participation in the fishery 
commensurate with their commitment to comply with ... conservation and management 
measures in respect of the relevant stocks”.1082 Thus it would be prudent for the states 
to involve distant water states that fish in the area as well as other African states whose 
nationals fish in the area. If any of these states’ nationals are involved in IUU fishing 
diplomatic means can be used to bring to the state’s attention the management measures 
in place and offer them the opportunity to have benefits as cooperating states.  
VI. Dispute resolution 
Regarding the settlement of disputes, the draft treaty of the IGCC provides that in case 
of a dispute between the states parties as to the interpretation or application of the 
Treaty, they shall seek a settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other 
peaceful means of their own choice.1083 If the disputing parties are unable to settle their 
dispute, an arbitration procedure has been provided for and annexed to the treaty.1084 
Arbitration may be by request  addressed by one Contracting Party to another 
Contracting Party, after which an ad-hoc Dispute Settlement Committee consisting of 
three members shall be constituted.1085 This dispute settlement provisions would take 
precedence over the UNCLOS regime.1086 They are also very important as disputes 
regarding fisheries in the EEZ are excluded from the compulsory jurisdiction scope of 
Part XV.1087 The language of the draft provides for the Arbitration procedure under the 
treaty as the only resort where other peaceful means like negotiation has failed. It does 
not take account of Part XV of UNCLOS and Part VII of the UNFSA on dispute 
settlement. Other RFMOs make such provisions. The SPRFMO for instance provides 
that in any case where a dispute is not resolved amicably including referring it to an 
adhoc expert panel, “the provisions relating to the settlement of disputes set out in Part 
VIII of the 1995 Agreement shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to any dispute between the 
Contracting Parties.”1088 It is made clear that the dispute resolution clause does not 
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affect the status of any Contracting Party in relation to the Fish Stock Agreement or 
UNCLOS.1089 
There are international standards for settling dispute in RFMOs that the GCC can 
consider. Under Article 30 (2) of the Fish Stocks Agreement, it is provided that the 
provisions relating to the settlement of disputes set out in Part XV of the UNCLOS 
apply mutatis mutandis to any dispute between States Parties to the Fish Stocks 
Agreement. These disputes could concern the “interpretation or application of a sub-
regional, regional or global fisheries agreement relating to straddling fish stocks or 
highly migratory fish stocks to which they are parties, including any dispute concerning 
the conservation and management of such stocks, whether or not they are also Parties 
to the Convention”.1090 
Another example can be found in the NAFO Convention which provides for disputes 
concerning adopted measures or objections to them to be considered first by a non-
binding ad hoc panel as a matter of urgency. If its recommendations are accepted, they 
are to be implemented without delay but if not, any party may refer the dispute to a 
binding settlement procedure, as provided for in paragraph 5. This paragraph applies 
the binding procedures set out in Part XV of the LOS Convention and Part VIII of 
UNFSA to disputes in NAFO.1091 This is a provision to be emulated so that the 
provisions of UNCLOS and the UNFSA on dispute settlement would still apply to states 
in the Gulf of Guinea. The treaty of the GCC could also make provision for seeking 
advisory opinions through the FAO from international courts and tribunals on legal 
questions in fisheries matters. This is provided for under ITLOS rules which states, 
“…The Tribunal may give an advisory opinion on a legal question if an international 
agreement related to the purposes of the Convention specifically provides for the 
submission to the Tribunal of a request for such an opinion. 2. A request for an advisory 
opinion shall be transmitted to the Tribunal by whatever body is authorized by or in 
accordance with the agreement to make the request to the Tribunal.” 1092 
 
1089 ibid art 34 (3)  
1090 Fish Stocks Agreement art 30 (2)  
1091 Michael Lodge and others, ‘Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations: Report of an independent panel to develop a model for improved governance by 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’ (Chatham House 2007) 80 
1092 ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal (adopted 28 October 1997, amended on 15 March and 21 September 
2001 and on 17 March 2009) art 138. 
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The jurisprudence shows that where there is conflicting jurisdiction, international courts 
and tribunals would decline jurisdiction in favour of the dispute resolution provisions 
of the relevant convention. This was the situation in the Southern Bluefïn Tuna Case 
between Australia and Japan and between New Zealand and Japan, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility,1093 where Japan argued that recourse to the arbitral 
tribunal is excluded because the 1993 Convention on the conservation of Bluefin Tuna 
provides for a dispute settlement procedure. At the preliminary stage, the International 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) prescribed provisional measures, including 
catch limits on all three parties. However, an arbitral tribunal which heard the merits, 
held that it did not have jurisdiction considering the terms of the dispute settlement 





4. 7.1. Conclusions on challenges of regional fisheries bodies active in the region 
It can be concluded from the above, that all these fisheries organisations active in the 
region have similar mandates with a few variations. They all seek to solve the problems 
of the region’s fisheries management and conservation issues, but they are each plagued 
with challenges that prevent them from realising their aims. These include lack of 
political commitment, resource constraints and states unwillingness or slowness to 
implement recommendations. The states members of these organisations or bodies do 
not have the political will nor the resources to implement the mandate of these bodies. 
Also, the area of competence of some of the organisations include some of the states 
who choose not to be members thereby undermining coordination efforts of that 
organisation. This is also coupled with the fact that apart from ICCAT, the organisations 
are consultative in nature and simply create a forum for state discussions on fisheries 
matters and do not have the power to take binding decisions.  
 
 
1093 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (Provisional Measures, Order 
of 27 August 1999) ITLOS Reports 1999, 280 
1094 Michael Lodge and others, ‘Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations: Report of an independent panel to develop a model for improved governance by 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’ (Chatham House 2007) 79 
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However, the main challenge to conservation and management in the region is 
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance. It has been established that IUU fishing is one of 
the major sources of depletion of fish stocks in the area. However, measures that curb 
this menace are not implemented effectively by the states. There are some efforts but 
key states like China, EU states and other distant fishing states which operate in the 
region are not participants in those efforts which then undermine the work of those state 
willing to deal with the issue. Importantly also, the bodies discussed above, do not 
incorporate the ecosystem and precautionary approaches adequately. The following 
section attempts to make recommendations on the way forward drawing on examples 
from other regions which have had a measure of success in the regulation of marine 
living resources. 
 
4.7.2. Conclusions on the challenges of fisheries management at the national level 
in the Gulf of Guinea 
The above discussions show that the main challenges facing the region in terms of 
fisheries management at the state level are as follows: 
a) There is generally a lack of legislation on fisheries management in some states 
and even where there is legislation, there are violations which include vessels 
fishing without a licence/authorisation or with an expired licence/authorisation; 
fishing with unauthorised or illegal gear (including small mesh size) or methods; 
fishing in prohibited areas (including in areas reserved to artisanal fisheries); the 
use of forged documentation in relation to fishing activities; provision of false, 
inaccurate or incomplete information on catch and fishing activities (knowingly 
with the intent to deceive); Illegal transhipment of catch (including of by-catch 
into canoes and sale of fish at sea); trading in illegal fish (knowingly purchasing, 
selling, importing or exporting fish caught illegally); targeting of unauthorised 
species (e.g. below minimum size/immature or valuable by-catch) and damage 
to artisanal gear by industrial fishing vessels or merchant vessels.   
b)  There is no harmonisation of measures across the region.  
c) The states also do not have an integrated approach to combat IUU fishing which 




d) There is no coherent approach to effective enforcement and implementation of 
regulations on fisheries conservation and management where they exist.  
e) Regarding compliance with international obligations the states have generally 
been unable to fulfil their obligations.  
f) Licensing regimes in the GOG are not efficient enough to regulate fisheries. 
Corruption and lack of resources to monitor and enforce the law is a factor. This 
coupled with the fact that TACS are not set to determine sustainable catch levels 
for vessels that have been licensed to fish in the region.  
g) Regulating the use of destructive fishing gear is a challenge as there is no 
integrated strategies on law enforcement to identify and punish the use of such 
gear. There is no harmonisation of legislation regarding what type of gear to be 
used. Again, there is lack of enforcement capacity to ensure poisonous 
chemicals are not used in fishing. 
h) Areas - based management measures are not used extensively in the region 
though they are so important. The legislation does not specify protected areas. 
They simply give the authorities the general power to declare marine protected 
areas with no dedicated institutional framework to manage them. The local 
community is also not involved in their setting up and management. Regarding 
closed seasons, their effectiveness is undermined by lack of scientific data. 
It can be concluded that national legislation in the region covers to a large extent the 
major aspects of fisheries conservation and management. Nevertheless, these have not 
solved the regions numerous fisheries management problems as the states do not have 
robust systems of surveillance for their coast to ensure that fisheries activities are being 
pursued according to law. None of the states in the region on their own can solve these 
problems and therefore regional solutions have been attempted in the region. Notable 
among them is the Interim Guinea Current Commission. What is attractive about this 
Commission is its ecosystem approach to management. This is an approach that takes 
account of the region as a whole and fosters cooperation which is indispensable in the 
management of the resources.  At this stage the states need to find focus and instead of 
participating in too many organisations, decide to set up one strong fisheries 
management organisation and if possible, merge the others with it and focus on making 
it work. It would be useful for the states to realise the potential of a strong RFMO and 
use it to their advantage. It is submitted that there is an urgency about fisheries 
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management in the region and it is time the states became committed because there is a 




























This thesis has demonstrated the need for the states in the Gulf of Guinea, a semi – 
enclosed sea, to cooperate at the regional level as required by the international law of 
the sea. It has explained how this general obligation to cooperate at the regional level 
has been reflected in the Gulf of Guinea for maritime delimitation, exploitation of non-
living marine resources, the protection and preservation of the marine environment from 
pollution arising out of exploitation and the sustainable management of the marine 
living resources.  
 
I. Summary of findings  
i). Lack of cooperation in the delimitation of maritime boundaries  
 
The first chapter analysed maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Guinea and 
demonstrated the importance of cooperation in maritime boundary delimitation in the 
Gulf of Guinea as mandated by Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS. It emphasised 
the importance of applying the rules and principles established by international courts 
and tribunals to facilitate the settlement of their maritime boundaries. It concluded that 
there is the need for the states to cooperate in the delimitation of their boundaries 
particularly as the Gulf of Guinea region is a semi enclosed sea according to Articles 
122 and 123 of UNCLOS and therefore the states are encouraged to cooperate in the 
performance of their duties under this Convention which include delimiting their 
maritime boundaries as well as protecting and preserving the marine environment and 
managing the fisheries. These duties are better performed in a region with clear 
jurisdictional boundaries.  
 
It also concluded that the Gulf of Guinea Commission has an important role to play in 
facilitating cooperation in the region as a forum for consultation in the agreement of 
their maritime boundaries. However, the states need to resource it to be able to play this 
role. 
 
ii). Inadequate utilisation of the dispute settlement procedures under UNCLOS 
and lack of cooperation in the joint exploitation of non-living marine resources 
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Chapter Two of the thesis demonstrates how states can cooperate to settle their maritime 
boundary disputes by using the dispute settlement provisions under UNCLOS. It also 
found that the obligation of states under Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of UNCLOS to make 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature pending the settlement of their disputes 
has not been widely implemented in the region and there are too few arrangements of a 
practical nature in the region in view of the many pending maritime boundaries. Of the 
two existing joint development agreements in the region, one has been criticised as 
being corrupt and its main implementing institution unfunded and ineffective. In this 
regard it was concluded that the Gulf of Guinea Commission could be transformed into 
a center for technical consultation and support in setting up joint development 
arrangements and assisting states with ongoing support to ensure that the joint 
development arrangements work.  
 
iii). Inadequate National and Regional Framework for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment from Pollution arising out of the Exploitation of Oil and Gas 
 
Regarding the protection of the marine environment from the inevitable risk of pollution 
due to exploration and exploitation activities, it has been found from the discussion in 
chapter three that the national framework for addressing every stage of the exploitation 
process is inadequate. States legislation are not comprehensive and harmonised and so 
makes it a challenge to deal with issues of pollution in the region in a coherent manner. 
Due to the transboundary nature of the effects of oil pollution damage to the marine 
environment, a regional solution is essential. However, the regional framework is 
inadequate. The Abidjan Convention is the main framework for dealing with pollution 
from exploitation. Nonetheless the Convention has significant challenges with funding, 
coordination and limited human resource. Currently it has managed to adopt a Protocol 
for dealing with offshore oil pollution which also addresses the issues of liability. The 
Protocol has made provision for states to develop standards and guidelines regarding 
the assignment of liability. However, this has not yet been done. This puts the region in 






iv). Fragmentation of regional fisheries bodies  
Regarding the exploitation and conservation of the marine living resources, the 
discussion in chapter four reveals that commendable effort has been made at 
cooperation and there are many fisheries bodies active in the region with many different 
mandates with varying degrees of power. An example is ICCAT which can make 
binding recommendations but others like COREP only act as information sharing 
bodies. Regarding marine living resources, specifically the management of fisheries, 
the states have commendably shown a commitment to regional cooperation. However, 
the main challenge is that this cooperation has so far been conducted in a fragmented 
fashion. There are several regional bodies with overlapping mandates and regulations 
operating in the region. This has resulted in the states participating in many regional 
cooperation efforts in an uncoordinated fashion leading to duplication of efforts and 
resources.  
 
II. Recommendations on the way forward 
International law on exploitation of marine resources has in unequivocal terms 
promoted the regional approach as important and this thesis has supported this approach 
by emphasising in each chapter the importance of the regional perspective in dealing 
with the transboundary challenges of resource management. The recommendation made 
in this thesis is for the states to allocate, exploit and manage the non-living and living 
resources of the region in a comprehensive manner through a regional approach which 
utilises the ecosystem approach as a management tool.  
 
In order for the states in the Gulf of Guinea to derive the maximum benefit from the 
rich resources of the region, there must be a comprehensive regime of cooperation 
which takes into account the following: a) the delimitation of the maritime boundaries 
in the area, in an equitable manner in order for the resources in the region to be allocated; 
b) disputes must be settled expeditiously and interim arrangements like joint 
development of the non-living resources actively pursued in a spirit of cooperation ; c) 
the marine environment should be protected from pollution arising out of exploitation 
and liability for damage and payment of compensation to victims properly streamlined 
in a regional instrument; d) the conservation and management of fisheries resources 
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using the ecosystem approach within a regional cooperative framework using an 
ecosystem approach. 
 
Regarding delimitation of maritime boundaries, the states are encouraged to use the 
UNCLOS and the rules and principles developed by international courts and tribunals 
in the delimitation of the maritime boundaries.  In view of the disruptive effect that 
maritime boundary disputes can have on exploitation of the resources, it has been 
recommended in chapter two that the states need to shift excessive focus from 
delimitation to joint exploitation. It has been suggested that more joint development 
arrangements for the exploitation of hydrocarbons in areas of overlapping claims should 
be pursued.  
 
Chapter three highlights regional cooperation as imperative for the protection of the 
marine environment from oil pollution and liability for damage arising therefrom. This 
requires the development and strengthening of regional agreements on oil pollution 
from exploitation. It also requires states in the region to have a coherent framework that 
can implement and enforce the agreements. This means the states need to build capacity 
in terms of technical, financial and human resource. There is also the need for the states 
to adopt a comprehensive regional convention on regulating liability and compensation 
for pollution damage resulting from offshore drilling activities. Already the first steps 
in this direction have been taken with the adoption of the Offshore Optional Protocol 
under the Abidjan Convention. It has also been suggested that the states need an 
institutional framework to coordinate oil pollution activities.  Despite all these efforts 
at the regional level, to adopt rules and regulations regarding liability and compensation 
for pollution arising out of oil exploitation, these have not been implemented at the 
national level and there is therefore the need for states to have a harmonised legal 
framework to address this.  
 
Regarding the challenges with the management of fisheries identified in chapter four, 
some suggestions have been made to the effect that it is important that the states have 
one regime to oversee the entire process and to act as an umbrella body to coordinate 
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the activities of all the relevant organisations in the region. Currently the body that 
appears to stand in good stead is the Interim Guinea Current Commission. Its potential 
to perform this function in the region has been highlighted and the only outstanding 
issue is that the states have the political will to fully establish it and empower it to 
sustainably manage the fisheries resources of the region. 
 
It has been suggested in chapters two to four that the states in the region need to either 
set up a new body to perform these cooperative functions or utilise already existing 
bodies. In this regard the two bodies that have the potential to coordinate these issues 
in the region are the Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Guinea Current Commission. 
Whilst the Gulf of Guinea Commission is made up solely of the states in the region, the 
GCC has a broader base being made up of states beyond the Gulf of Guinea which 
exploit the fisheries resources in the region. This body is suited to become the umbrella 
body for the regulation of the exploitation of the resources of the region. It would need 
to cooperate with the other bodies in the region managing fisheries. The mandates and 
roles of these bodies need to be renegotiated to avoid overlaps and duplications. 
Harmonisation of national laws would need to be implemented within this framework 
for more effectiveness. The protection of fragile habitats that support fisheries is also 
important and should be done in a framework of cooperation  
 
III. Need for further research 
This study has shown the need for regional cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea regarding 
the allocation, and sustainable exploitation of the resources of the Gulf of Guinea. It has 
also highlighted the need for the states to strengthen this cooperation through a 
comprehensive framework for regional cooperation. In this regard the role of two bodies 
has been explored. These are the Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Guinea Current 
Commission. The former could be subsumed under the latter and could be more a 
consultative, administrative and information sharing body especially regarding 
maritime boundary delimitation and hydrocarbon exploitation. The latter could play a 
more managerial and coordinating role especially with regard to fisheries management 
and conservation. With all the efforts being made in the region at cooperation especially 
regarding the setting up of the Guinea Current Commission, there would be the need to 
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monitor the future development of these bodies. This could form the basis of future 
research to assess its conformity with international law and how it is working to fulfil 
its objective of implementing the strategic action plan for the management of the 
resources and the protection of the marine environment and fragile ecosystems of the 
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